Holycross v. HolycrossHolycross v. Holycross
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Upon divorce,
II. Facts
{¶ 2} Michael Holycross was married to Carol Zerkle. Michael received a life insurance policy through his employer, and in 1972 he named Carol as beneficiary. In 1993, Michael and Carol were divorced. The divorce decree did not indicate any change to the policy, and Carol remained the named beneficiary.
{¶ 3} On May 3, 1997, Michael married appellant, Barbra Holycross. On February 4, 2003, Michael died, and the insurer paid the proceeds from the life insurance policy ($32,532) to Carol. Barbra claimed that pursuant to
{¶ 4} Barbra objected to the appointment of Michael’s son Matthew as the executor of Michael’s estate, alleging that he was unsuitable because he refused to pursue litigation to recover the proceeds from the life insurance policy for the estate. On March 16, 2004, the probate court overruled Barbra’s objections.
{¶ 6} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the acceptance of Barbra’s discretionary appeal.
III. Analysis
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} “(A) As used in this section:
{¶ 9} “(1) ‘Beneficiary’ means a beneficiary of a life insurance policy, an annuity, a payable on death account, an individual retirement plan, an employer death benefit plan, or another right to death benefits arising under a contract.
{¶ 10} “* * *
{¶ 11} “(B)(1) Unless the designation of beneficiary or the judgment or decree granting the divorce, dissolution of marriage, or annulment specifically provides otherwise, and subject to division (B)(2) of this section, if a spouse designates the other spouse as a beneficiary or if another person having the right to designate a beneficiary on behalf of the spouse designates the other spouse as a beneficiary, and if, after either type of designation, the spouse who made the designation or on whose behalf the designation was made, is divorced from the other spouse, obtains a dissolution of marriage, or has the marriage to the other spouse annulled, then the other spouse shall be deemed to have predeceased the spouse who made the designation or on whose behalf the designation was made, and the designation of the other spouse as a beneficiary is revoked as a result of the divorce, dissolution of marriage, or annulment.”
{¶ 12}
A. Schilling Still Controls
{¶ 13} Barbra claims that Carol waived her right to argue that she was entitled to any proceeds from the policy. Barbra argues that because
{¶ 14} More than 13 years ago, we examined
{¶ 15} In Schilling, Herma Schilling was a beneficiary on a life insurance policy owned by her husband, Lawrence Schilling. The beneficiary to this policy was never changed. On March 17, 1977, Herma and Lawrence were divorced. In December 1988, Lawrence entered into a common-law marriage with Molly Lehman.
{¶ 16} On June 19, 1990, Lawrence died.
{¶ 17} The issue before this court was whether applying
{¶ 18} Nevertheless, Barbra argues that Schilling is distinguishable from the instant case because, unlike in Schilling, the divorce in the instant case occurred after
{¶ 19} This footnote is nothing more than dicta that highlighted how little time there was to change the beneficiary of the insurance policy because Lawrence died shortly after the statute was enacted. But that was not the legal basis of the court’s decision. The critical issue in Schilling was the date that the insurance contract was entered into, not the date of the divorce. The instant case is indistinguishable from Schilling.
{¶ 20} Accepting Barbra’s waiver argument would require this court to disregard Schilling, which we decline to do. Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to Schilling,
B. Schilling Remains Viable
{¶ 21} Barbra alternatively invites us to overturn Schilling, arguing that applying
{¶ 22} Under the legal doctrine of stare decisis, courts follow controlling precedent, thereby “creating stability and predictability in our legal system.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis,
{¶ 23} We find that none of Barbra’s arguments raise an issue sufficient to require significant analysis to determine whether Schilling was wrongly decided. At the time of Michael’s death, the insurer was contractually obligated to pay the proceeds from the policy to the beneficiary named in the policy — Carol. See Schilling,
{¶ 24} Further, and perhaps more important, we find that overturning Schilling would create an undue hardship on those who have relied on it for the past 13 years. We acknowledge that the policy behind the enactment of
{¶ 25} Since this court’s decision in Schilling 13 years ago, at least four of Ohio’s 12 appellate districts have applied Schilling to hold that
{¶ 26} Schilling has clearly defined the rule that a person who owns an insurance policy in existence before May 31, 1990, and who wishes to remove his or her ex-spouse as beneficiary of that policy must undertake an affirmative act in order to remove his or her ex-spouse as beneficiary despite the language of
{¶ 27} All persons are “conclusively presumed to know the law.” State v. Pinkney (1988),
{¶ 28} Thus, in cases where the spouse who owns an insurance policy purchased prior to May 31,1990, failed to take an affirmative act to revoke his or her
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we find insufficient justification under the Galatis test to overturn Schilling.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 30} For the aforementioned reasons, we reaffirm Schilling and hold that
{¶ 31} In this case, Michael purchased the insurance policy in 1972 and made Carol the beneficiary — a designation that never changed. Applying
Judgment affirmed.