I. INTRODUCTION
Dаwn Opala Holt sued her former employer, Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc. (“GLMHC”), claiming GLMHC unlawfully terminated her because she has a disability. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to GLMHC, concluding Holt failed to demonstrate she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Holt appeals. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the decision of the district court.
II. BACKGROUND
Holt is diagnosed with a mild form of cerebral palsy that adversely affects her speech and her ability to perform certain аctivities which require fine motor coordination. Holt requires assistance when chopping, peeling, and slicing food. She sometimes has difficulty eating and must chew her food thoroughly or it will become lodged in her throat. She cannot cut her own fingernails or toenails. Holt сan dress herself, but sometimes must ask for help when buttoning her clothes.
Despite these challenges, Holt successfully held three different positions at GLMHC. In September of 1993, she applied for a position as a counselor or ease manager, and the following month, GLMHC hired her to work as a children’s *764 case manager. In 1995, she was promoted to Intake Coordinator for Rogers County Clinic. In 1998, Holt was appointed the acting County Administrator of the Rogers County Clinic. Later that year, she was permanently appointed to the Rogers County Administratоr position. With each new position, Holt was given more responsibility and a higher salary. Throughout this time and extending into 2000, Holt’s supervisors consistently gave her positive performance evaluations, with summary scores that ranged between “exceptional” and “clearly outstanding.”
In the beginning of 2001, however, perceptions of Holt’s performance began to turn negative. At that time, Holt’s supervisor, Charles Danley, observed a “marked change” in Holt’s behavior. He stated Holt’s behavior was erratic, she was late to meetings, and her staff indiсated she was “hiding in her office” and not providing leadership. At the' time, Holt told Danley she was experiencing an ongoing domestic violence situation. In April of 2001, Dan-ley placed Holt on two weeks’ paid administrative leave.
After returning to work, Holt received her annual performance evaluation, dated June 20, 2001. In spite of her recent problems, Holt received high marks for her performance over the preceding year. As in past years, her summary scores fell between “exceptional” and “clearly outstanding.” Unlikе past years, however, the evaluation noted Holt needed to recognize and address her personal issues.
In July of 2001, at the request of the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, Danley and Holt attended a meeting at the Rogers County Health Department. Members of the public, judges, the Assistant District Attorney for Rogers County, and others attended the meeting. During the meeting, some individuals criticized Holt. Danley observed Holt during the meeting, and characterized her reaction to the criticism as “deplorable.” He described her rеsponse as being “very defensive” and “in denial.” Moreover, he stated he saw Holt covering her ears, rocking back and forth, and apparently sucking her thumb in response to the criticism. Immediately after the meeting, Danley told Holt he was “enraged” and “very upset” by her сonduct. He advised her there would be consequences as a result. Dan-ley also told others at GLMHC he was concerned about Holt’s conduct.
That summer, GLMHC was asked to begin providing mental health services in Tulsa after a local hospital closed. On August 1, 2001, Danley reassigned Holt to the position of acting Intake Coordinator in Tulsa. He selected Holt partly because he was not satisfied with her performance as Administrator at Rogers County Clinic, and partly because Holt lived closest to the Tulsa location. Holt had difficulty adjusting to the new position in Tulsa. She told GLMHC’s Clinical Director, Dr. Janet Hackworth, that she felt overwhelmed by the paperwork and specifically noted she was having difficulty with the volume of writing that was required of her. Hackwork observed that Holt was occasionally tearful, agitatеd, and unfocused.
On August 8, Hackworth sent Holt home because she felt Holt had acted inappropriately in front of the Tulsa staff. On the same day, Holt requested she be allowed to return to her old position as Rogers County Administrator. In a text message to Danley and GLMHC’s human resources manager, Holt stated she had problems keeping up with the writing demands of the Tulsa job due to her cerebral palsy.
After the August 8 incident, Danley’s concerns about Holt’s ability to be an administrative leader increased, and he decided to remove Holt from her рosition as County Administrator at the Rogers Coun *765 ty Clinic. At Holt’s termination hearing, GLMHC’s executive team told Holt they had observed a rapid deterioration in her ability to function on the job. The team told Holt they believed the domestic abuse she was experiencing negatively аffected her ability to perform at work. Danley and the executive team noted GLMHC’s “at will” employment policy, and stated they did not want to fire Holt for cause because they wanted to make it as easy as possible for her to transition to another job. The executive team offered Holt another position within GLMHC, where she would have less responsibility and receive less pay. The team also left open the possibility that Holt might be able to return to her County Administrator position after a period of time. Holt declined thе offer and her employment with GLMHC was terminated effective August 17, 2001.
Holt sued GLMHC. She claimed it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, by terminating her because of her cerebral palsy. GLMHC moved for summary judgment on grounds that Holt was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. The district court granted GLMHC’s motion. Holt appeals, alleging the district court erred when it determined she failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claim that cerebral palsy substantially limited her ability to perform one or more major life activities. She argues a reasоnable jury could have found she was substantially limited in the major life activities of “performing manual tasks” or “caring for herself.”
III. ANALYSIS
This court reviews
de novo
a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Sa-lehpoor v. Shahinpoor,
To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has a disability.
Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
*766
The Suprеme Court has noted the term “substantial” must “be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams,
A. Performing Manual Tasks
To meet the ADA’s definition of “disabled,” a рlaintiff must satisfy a “demanding standard.”
Id.
at 197,
Courts have granted summary judgment to defendants when the evidence shоws a plaintiff is restricted from doing a few specific tasks, but can otherwise perform a variety of manual activities. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held a plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial limitation when, although she could not type or write for long periods of time, she could perform “a wide range of manual tasks, including grocery shopping, driving, making beds, doing laundry, and dressing herself.”
Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.,
Summary judgment in favor of the defendant may not be appropriate, however, when evidence indicates a plaintiffs impairment restriсts him from performing a wide range of manual tasks. In
Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit court noted the plaintiff, Alvin Emory, was unable to perform a wide array of manual tasks.
The instant case is more similar to Chanda and Thornton than to Emory. The record shows Holt’s limitations are narrow and specific; it does not indicate she is severely restricted in her ability to perform a broad range of manual tasks. For example, Holt is unable to perform the specific task of cutting her own nails, but she has presented no evidence that would allow a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in her ability to perform other manual tasks relating to personal hygiene. While Holt needs help when chopping, cutting, and slicing food, the evidence is insufficiеnt to allow a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in her ability to cook. It is undisputed that Holt occasionally must ask others for assistance when buttoning her clothing; Holt has introduced no evidence, however, that would permit a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in dressing herself. In short, based on the evidence presented, 2 a rational jury could not find Holt is substantially limited in her ability to perform manual tasks.
B. Caring for One’s Self
Holt also claims the limitations caused by her cerebral palsy substantially impair her ability to perform thе major life activity of caring for herself. Caring for one’s self “encompasses normal activities of daily living; including feeding oneself, driving, grooming, and cleaning home.”
Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is affirmed.
Notes
. Whether the plaintiff has an impairmеnt within the meaning of the ADA and whether the conduct affected is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA are questions of law for court to decide.
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co.,
. Holt also claims she substantially limited in her ability to perform manual tasks because she has difficulty chewing and swallowing. Chewing and swallowing, however, are not manual tasks. Instead, they are components of the major life activity of "caring for one's self."
See Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown,