171 So. 542 | Miss. | 1937
Mrs. Mackie Slaughter, who, in her lifetime, owned certain property in Meridian, Miss., lived on a certain piece of property upon which a deed of trust, which had been executed, was foreclosed, and the mortgagee bought same at the foreclosure sale. Thereupon, she moved into the house involved in this controversy and filed a homestead declaration thereto. She lived in this house with her two sons, both above the age of twenty-one years, one of whom was at college. She also had an adult daughter who was mentally afflicted and in the insane hospital, but supported there by her mother, who also reserved a room in her house for said daughter.
On December 17, 1932, a judgment was rendered against her in favor of the appellant, and during the month of April, 1934, Mrs. Mackie Slaughter moved into the house in controversy, filing the homestead declaration on May 25, 1934, and died a few days later. After her death, execution was levied upon the homestead property. Prior to her death, and while she was living *559 in the house in controversy, she executed a deed thereto to her son W.J. Slaughter, and she also willed same to him.
W.J. Slaughter sued out an injunction to restrain the appellant from selling the property under the execution, claiming that it was a homestead and thereby exempt from execution, and had descended to him free from his mother's debts.
The chancellor heard the case and held that, Mrs. Mackie Slaughter being the head of a family, the property was exempt.
The proof shows that Mrs. Mackie Slaughter supported all of her children; that W.J. Slaughter, then being in college, lived with her; and that she supported another adult son, who had been married and, after being divorced, came to live with her, whom she characterized in her will as a poor business man.
The only question for decision is whether or not Mrs. Mackie Slaughter, under the circumstances, was a householder, the head of a family.
The exemption laws of this state are liberally construed in favor of exemptionists. Bank of Gulfport v. O'Neal,
In Pearson v. Miller,
In Cox v. Martin,
Under the laws of this state, the obligation of parents to maintain dependent members of their families, who are unable to care for themselves, is established by statute (Code 1930, sec. 5706). In the Homestead Law, a *561 majority of the authorities hold that the legal obligation is not necessarily a condition of the exemption, but a moral obligation is sufficient to constitute an exemption.
In the case at bar, the fact that the daughter was temporarily in the insane hospital did not affect the mother's right nor relieve her of the duty of caring for her afflicted daughter.
We are also of the opinion that it is a natural or moral duty of parents to give all of their children such education as may be necessary or proper for the discharge of their obligations toward such children. We do not think the fact that a son or daughter being educated is over the age of twenty-one years destroys this natural or moral obligation, provided such help is necessary to such education.
In Powers v. Sample,
It will be seen from these decisions, and many others from other states, that dependency is not the sole test of the right to exemption; and we believe that, construing the statute providing therefor liberally, as we are bound to do, the decree of the court below must be affirmed.
Affirmed. *562