134 Mo. App. 247 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1908
These parties were married November 4, 1902, and separated finally some time in April, 1907. There had been a previous separation' which continued for six months, when a divorce suit was filed by defendant against his wife. Through the influence of plaintiff’s cousin, the parties became reconciled and resumed conjugal relations. This is the second suit for divorce and was begun by the wife. The parties resided after their marriage with plaintiff’s widowed mother and her family on Shenandoah avenue, until January, 1904. On October 4, 1903, a few months before they left that home, their only child Viola, was born. The husband and wife and their families appear to have gotten along well until after the child was born, when dissensions crept in. Plaintiff and her family are Protestants and defendant and his family Catholics; wherefore plaintiff signed a writing before the marriage in which she recited her intention to marry defendant, knowing he was a member of the Roman Catholic Church; said she would do so understanding the marriage bond was indissoluble, except by death; would permit defendant the free exercise of religion according to the Roman Catholic faith, and permit any children born of the marriage to be baptized and educated in the faith and according to the teachings of said church. There are signs in the record that the diverse religious opinions of the parties wére a principal source of their bick-erings and of the estrangement of their families, who became- bitter toward each other. But disagreements about religion did not cause the departure of the parties
“Q. I don’t know whether you were asked or not, but I want to ask you, what was the immediate cause of your leaving home at that time? A. Well, because he refused to give me that child that day, and ordered me out and never spoke to me any more and it was almost impossible for me to put up with it.
“Q. Was that the Easter day that he wanted the child? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And two weeks after that day you went down there and tried to get the child? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. That was one thing; what was the other? A. Why, then because he refused to give me the child*253 when I went down there I told him I didn’t feel that I wonld like to have the child go down there any more; that his folks conld visit her, and I did not feel that it was right to let the child go there Sundays any more, and he insisted on it, and said that she should go down there whenever he wanted, and I felt that I couldn’t stand it any longer.
“Q. You left and took the child with you? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. The incident you have related was on Easter day, and the subsequent conversation you had with him in which you said you would not allow him to have the child any more is the time following it, and his statement to you that he would have it so was what brought you to the conclusion that you would go home and take the child with you? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Perhaps it is already in the testimony, but I will ask you again, when was the arrangement first made by which he was to take the baby on one Sunday, and you were to have it the next? A. Well, right after we were reconciled, for two years and a half he had been doing that. . . .
“Q. You took the child to your mother’s every other Sunday? A. Yes, sir; I never went out in the week.
“Q. Were you willing that he should take the child down to see his mother? A. I was not willing; but he wanted to have it that way, she was so awfully small at first; just a little over a year old, and I had to fix the bottle for her, and her napkins and everything.
“Q. Did he ever ask you to go 'down with him with the child? A. No, sir, never. I often tried to be reconciled to his folks, and wanted them at Christmas, but he said, no.”
Plaintiff did not leave home until two weeks later, when she returned to her mother, taking her clothing and household property, and without notifying defend
The causes for a decree which plaintiff states in her petition are these: Defendant compelled her to return to her mother in May, 1904, and, without grounds, filed a suit wherein he accused her of subjecting him to intolerable indignities; that he sought a reconciliation, and relying on his assurance of giving her proper attention and affection, she returned to him, but since then he had treated her with coldness and contempt; has taken his midday meals and on three days of each week, his evening meals, at his mother’s, has returned home late in the other evenings and required plaintiff to’prepare meals for him; stayed from home on Sundays, saying he was at work, though frequently he was out driving with different persons; persisted in taking the child from home on alternate Sundays, keeping it late and leaving plaintiff alone; rarely took plaintiff to places of amusement; though receiving an income of from three to five hundred dollars a month, refused to
We liar e indicated how the evidence touching those complaints impresses us. Plaintiff condoned whatever grievances she had prior to the first separation, though, to be sure, they would be revived if repeated; for, according to her, the condonation was based on his promise of better treatment. But neither before nor after the reconciliation do we find such acts as constitute statutory indignities which rendered plaintiff’s life intolerable, and, in reason, would be expected to do so. Plaintiff had cause to complain of defendant’s staying away from home too much in the evening and on Sunday, if she realiy desired his company. He excused this conduct on the score of keen business competition and the class of patrons he had; working people who could not visit his office at other times. We are satisfied these circumstances, and not dislike of his home, were the true reasons why defendant put in so much time at his office. A court cannot say how a man who must depend on his business to support his family and accumulate a competency, shall divide his time between Lis home and his affairs. A wife’s complaint in respect of this matter cannot be treated as a statutory indignity, unless the neglect of the husband amounted to desertion or he displayed contempt or aversion for her, or, perchance, his neglect .of her was so extreme as to constitute cruelty and prey on her health and spirits. Though defendant probably devoted more time to his
Turning to defendant’s cross-bill we find these matters averred: intolerable indignities committed by plaintiff prior to the first separation, leading defendant to file a suit for divorce; reconciliation for the sake of the child, on defendant’s promise to treat plaintiff with kindness and affection if he would live with her again; abandonment of him without cause in April, 1907, and institution of the present suit; annoyances heaped on him by plaintiff and' consisting of continual quarreling and fault-finding, calling him a dirty dog, contemptible coward and other vile names; trying to teach his child to hate him; unreasonable jealousy of his mother and sisters and breach of friendship with them because defendant paid his mother’s rent; objections to the child visiting defendant’s relatives; efforts to provoke him to strike plaintiff in order that she might have ground for divorce; refusal to go driving or to amusements with him and finger if he went with his brothers or sisters; objecting to the baptism of the child into the Catholic Church according to the ante-nuptial agreement, and refusal to have natural intercourse with defendant lest she might conceive. It will be observed defendant counts neither on desertion for more than a year, nor on the vile language previously mentioned, in which, as defendant swore, plaintiff declared her intention not to bear children. Some of the grounds alleged in the cross-bill are statutory indignities; other are not. ' Jealousy of defendant’s fam
The judgment is reversed and the petition of plaintiff and defendant’s cross-bill are dismissed.