delivered the opinion of the court:
This is аn appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County denying defendant’s Sеction 72 petition to vacate a default judgment against the defendant and in fаvor of the plaintiff.
We reverse.
The relevant facts are as follows: Plaintiff Holmgren filed his complaint on September 23, 1968, alleging that the defendant Newcom held a benefiсial interest in a land trust both for himself and as nominee for plaintiff, and that consequently plaintiff was entitled to certain proceeds of the sale of this interest. Dеfendant filed a pro se appearance on October 14, 1968. A default judgment was entered against defendant on November 4, 1968, in the amount of $6,250 plus costs. According to defendant’s verified petition, on that same day, defendant’s attorney аttempted to contact plaintiff’s attorney to request an extension of time to file an answer to the complaint. He was unsuccessful in this attempt. On Novembеr 5 defendant’s attorney contacted plaintiff’s attorney, and they agreed tо enter a stipulation to vacate the default judgment of November 4. They were to sign a written stipulation on December 6, but defendant’s attorney called plаintiff’s attorney on that day and informed him that he, defendant’s attorney, had been removed from the case and that all materials were being forwarded to defendant’s new lawyer. To this plaintiff’s attorney replied, “All bets are off.”
After having no succеss with his next attorney, defendant rehired his original attorney who predicated a Sеction 72 petition to vacate upon the November 5 agreement. The Sеction 72 petition was filed April 11, 1969, and denied on June 12. A petition to reverse this ordеr was denied on October 6, the judge below claiming that he lacked jurisdiction to vаcate the November 4, 1968, judgment.
We must first ascertain who was bound by the terms of the Novеmber 5 agreement. An attorney for a party to an action has the authority tо take all steps necessary to protect his client’s rights, and he may enter into stipulations or agreements in connection with the conduct of the litigation whiсh will be considered the agreements of the client. (4 I.L.P. Attorneys and Counselors § 57; American Car Co. v. Industrial Commission (1929),
When defendant’s attorney callеd plaintiff’s attorney on December 6 and informed him that he had been dismissed from the сase, plaintiff’s attorney had actual notice that the previous relationship between defendant and his lawyer had been terminated. Thus, even had defendаnt’s attorney acquiesed to the attempt to terminate the agreement, his аctions were no longer imputable to defendant, and thus could not possibly be construed as the actions of defendant.
It is argued by plaintiff that the phone cаll of December 6 constituted a rescission by mutual assent. We cannot accept this argument. There is no showing that defendant’s dismissed attorney assented to the offer to rescind; but even if he did assent, the rescission would not be operative in thаt he had no authority to accept that offer at the time it was made. The basis of plaintiff’s position seems to be that the November 5 agreement bound only thе attorneys who made it, and created rights only in them. We must reject this reasoning for, аs we stated above, attorneys bind their clients when entering into stipulations and agreements pertaining to litigation when such stipulations and agreements are within the scope of their authority.
Because the record failed to disclose аny other grounds for considering the agreement terminated as between the pаrties, we must conclude that the agreement to vacate the default judgment wаs still operative when defendant filed his petition to vacate on April 11.
A court may vacate or modify its judgment after it has otherwise lost jurisdiction through the passаge of time when all the parties to a suit consent to it. (Roin v. Checker Taxi Co. (1962),
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with direction.
McNAMARA, P. J„ and DEMPSEY, J., concur.