102 N.Y.S. 616 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1907
Upon the former appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff in this action the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered (184 N. Y. 486). The decision of the Ootirt of Appeals determined the rights of the parties to this action under the first assignment made by thexplaintiff and her mother, dated April 13, 1891.. It was there held that the by-laws of the New- York Produce Exchange “ constitute a clear and unmistakable prohibition against the assignment or pledge by the beneficiaries of any interest in the gratuity fund of the New York Produce Exchange in payment or-to secure the payment of a debt having no relation to such a fund and in nowise incurred for the purpose of keeping alive the interest of the beneficiaries in such fund. So far, therefore, as the first assignment assumed or purported to charge the interest of the plaintiff in the gratuity fund with any liability on account of the debt to the Oriental Bank of $3,614.00 owing by Holmes to the Oriental Bank and paid by the defendant, together with the interest thereon, that assignment was ineffectual, and to that extent the referee was right in adjudging it to be void.” It was further held, however, that the transfer of the interest of those executing the assignment by which they agreed that the trustees of the gratuity fund of the New York Produce Exchange should pay over to the defendant “ such further sums of money as he, the said Egbert B. Seaman, shall or may pay to the said Produce Exchange or the trustees of the gratuity fund thereof, hereafter, for or on account of dues or assessments upon the said certificate, together with interest on each of such payments from the date thereof,” was sufficient “ to constitute a legal charge or lien upon the plaintiff’s interest in the gratuity fund to the extent of the sum paid out by the defendant to the Produce Exchange upon the faith of the instrument and for the purpose of keeping the plaintiff’s interest in that fund alive.” In speaking of the second assignment or transfer made on April 5,1901, the court said: “ As we regard this first instrument as amply sufficient of itself to charge the plaintiff’s interest in the gratuity fund with the sum thereafter paid out by the defendant to keep it alive, the circumstances under which the second assignment was obtained become wholly immaterial. Upon the evidence in the two cases the defendant was entitled to receive out of the plaintiff’s interest in the gratuity fund the aggregate of all the amounts
The effect of this decision is, that the sole interest of the defendant in the fund was the repayment to him of the amounts that he had paid subsequent to the execution, of the first assignment to preserve to the beneficiaries the amount of the fund payable by the Mew York Produce Exchange upon the death of Holmes, a member of the exchange. While.it may be conceded that after the death of her father the plaintiff, being entitled to the gratuity, would have the right to transfer that gratuity, as she would have the right to transfer any other chose in action, an instrument executed merely to carry out the former agreement, with no intention to make a new and independent assignment of the fund, and based upon a statement or representation by the person to whom the assignment was made that the assignment was to carry out the former instrument, conferred no new rights upon the assignee, and, without a new and independent consideration, would not affect the ownership of the fund. The situation as it existed when this second instrument was executed was that the defendant held an instrument executed by the plaintiff which assigned to him the plaintiff’s right to the fund when it became payable to secure the repayment of the amount that he had paid to protect the fund.
The plaintiff’s father died on March 31, 1901, leaving him surviving the plaintiff, his only child and next of kin, his wife having died before him. The referee found that on the evening of April 4, 1901, the day after the burial of the plaintiff’s father, the defendant called upon her to obtain her signature to a paper which he said the Produce Exchange had requested him to get her to sign to confirm the former one, that of April 13,1891, which paper then sought to be obtained was in terms an assignment to him of moneys due or
I think it clear that this second assignment was ineffectual to transfer to the defendant any right that the plaintiff had at the time it was executed to this gratuity fund which under the by-laws of the Produce Exchange was payable only to the widow or children of the deceased member, and which was not then chargeable with any indebtedness of the plaintiff’s father to the defendant. The plaintiff had no intention to do any more than to carry into effect the- former agreement executed by her and her mother, and which was valid to the extent of securing the defendant the repayment of such sums as he had paid subsequent to its execution to keep the membership of the plaintiff’s father in the exchange alive, so that the fund would be preserved. There was no consideration for the assignment. The defendant paid to the plaintiff no money. He simply consented to allow her to receive a portion of the money which belonged to her and which was payable to- her by the exchange. Legally, the defendant was entitled to be paid out of the fund the amount which he was paid subsequent to the execution of the first agreement, but whether he received that out of the first or second payment was entirely immaterial. He was sure of his money and sure of interest on it until it Was paid, as the fund largely'exceeded the amount to which he was legally entitled. His consent, therefore, that the plaintiff should be paid $500 out of the first payment of $3,000 that was made by the exchange was to allow her to receive what belonged to her and for whieh the defendant gave up no substantial right.
In separate findings of fact submitted by the defendant and which were marked as found by the'referee there is the following: “After receiving the payment of $2,500 from the trustees of the Gratuity Fund the amount remaining due and payable to the defendant on account of his ad vanees,with interest to April 22,1901, was $5,848.81.. This included a balance over and above said $2,500 of $273.54 for dues and assessments paid by the defendant after the execution of the first assignment.” The defendant claims that in any event the judgment should be modified by awarding him this sum of' $273.54, instead of the sum'of $44!99- awarded by the. judgment. These findings seem to be inconsistent. In a letter from the defendant to the plaintiff’s attorney, dated January 8, 1902, there is inclosed a statement of the amounts actually paid by the defendant after the execution of the first agreement, from which it appears that the defendant actually paid $2,044, and the interest on that to . the date of the statement appears to 'be- $6l3.13. From thesé: statements it would appear that there was due to the defendant in January, 1902, the, sum; of $2,657.13. It also appeared that the defendant sold the membership seat in the exchange, for which he received • $120, and this amount should also be charged against the defendant. Therefore, the. finding of the referee, that •the amount due defendant at the time of the receipt of the $2,500 was. $44.99 seems to be in ^excess of what the defendant was entitled to receive according to his own statement.. The finding at the request of the defendant,
It may also be said . that this ,tenth proposed finding of fact, although marked found by the referee, was not incorporated in his' report and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a finding of fact which this court on appeal from the judgment can consider. (Elterman v. Hyman, 117 App Div. 519 decided herewith.)
It follows that'the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Patterson, P. J., Laughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ., concurred. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Order filed.