79 P. 534 | Cal. | 1905
This action is upon a promissory note, for one thousand dollars, dated October 5, 1899, signed by J.F. Jenkins and his wife, Annie J. Jenkins. J.F. Jenkins died intestate, and respondent Annie J. Jenkins is his surviving widow. After the action had been commenced a writ of attachment *778 was issued and levied upon $1,020.57 on deposit in the Citizens National Bank of Los Angeles to the credit of respondent Annie J. Jenkins.
The court made an order after notice — and, on motion of respondents, setting aside the levy of said writ and dissolving it as to the money so on deposit with said bank. This appeal is from the order so made. The principal question is as to whether or not the said money was subject to the debts of respondent Annie J. Jenkins, or exempt from execution against her. At the time of his death J.F. Jenkins was the owner and holder of three fully paid up life-insurance policies upon his own life, two of which (one for $99 and one for $1,385) were payable to respondent Annie J. Jenkins, and one of which (for $982.50) was payable to the estate of deceased, his administrators or executors. The estate of said deceased was duly probated, and the $982.50 insurance collected, which constituted the entire estate, and of which there remained $539.45 after paying costs and expenses of administration. This was set apart to the surviving widow, Annie J. Jenkins, as exempt from execution under section 1465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proceeds of all said policies were deposited by respondent Annie J. Jenkins in one account to her credit in said Citizens National Bank of Los Angeles. She drew against this account from time to time until the date of the levy of the attachment, when there remained the sum of $1,202.57 to her credit in said bank.
"All moneys, benefits, privileges, or immunities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid do not exceed five hundred dollars," are exempt from execution. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 690, subd. 18.)
The main contention of appellant is, that the exemption extends only against the debts of the person whose life was insured and who paid the premiums requisite to procure the insurance and keep it in force, and that such exemption does not continue after his death in favor of the beneficiary. In construing this statute, as in the construction of all statutes, it is the duty of the court to arrive at the intent of the legislature, if it can be done, from the language used in the statute. Statutes exempting property from execution are enacted on the ground of public policy for the benevolent purpose of *779
saving debtors and their families from want by reason of misfortune or improvidence. The general rule now is to construe such statutes liberally, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature, and the humane purpose, designed by the lawmakers. (12 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., pp. 75-76, and cases cited;In re McManus,
In New York the language of the statute is, that such funds shall be exempt "from execution, and shall not be liable to be seized, taken or appropriated by any legal or equitable process to pay any debt or liability of such deceased member." (Bolt v.Keyhoe, 30 Hun, 619.) The Kentucky and Minnesota cases are criticised by Freeman in his work on Executions (3d ed., vol. 2, sec. 234b), but the author says in speaking of the language of the statutes in those states: "If these statutes stopped with the words `exempt from execution' there would be no doubt of the exemption in favor of the beneficiary, but the additional words in the statute indicate that the legislature had in mind merely the debts or other liabilities of members of the association in question, and hence that, after the benefit was received by a person other than a member it would be subject to the usual laws relating to executions." In our code the statute stops with the words "exempt from execution." Under our statute necessary household and kitchen furniture is exempt from execution, and if the wife succeeds to such furniture it is equally exempt as to her debts. The farming utensils or implements of husbandry of the judgment-debtor are exempt, and if the son should take them under the will of his father, following his father's occupation, they would still be exempt as to the son's debts. Equally true as to the insurance money in controversy herein. If it had come to J.F. Jenkins in his lifetime, it is conceded that it would have been exempt as to his debts. It came to his wife as his beneficiary and is equally exempt as to her debts.
As to the policy payable to, and collected by the estate, the estate was the beneficiary, and the money was for the reasons before stated exempt from execution. It was therefore assets of the deceased exempt from execution, and was properly *781
set apart to the widow, as being so exempt. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1465; Estate of Miller,
In Barnum v. Boughton,
Appellant contends that by the deposit of the money in the bank, the money lost its identity, and that thereafter the bank owed Annie J. Jenkins the money. That the debtor thus voluntarily parted with the money, which was exempt, and acquired in lieu thereof a credit due by the bank. Such construction would seem to be unreasonable, and no authority is cited which supports it. It is true that in one sense by the deposit the relation of debtor and creditor was created as between the bank and Mrs. Jenkins, but she put the exempt money in the bank. She regarded it as money in the bank. She expected to and did draw it as she needed it. The bank did not give her the identical pieces of money that she deposited, but it gave her as she drew upon it money equal in value and kind. She was not required to keep the money buried or in her stocking in order to have it remain exempt. If the appellant's theory is correct she could not have paid a five-dollar grocery bill with a twenty-dollar piece, receiving fifteen dollars in change, without the risk of having the fifteen dollars attached. The law does not require such absurdity. The cases cited by appellant arose under the United States pension laws, and are not in point. The section of the revised statute construed provides: "No sum of money due or to become due to any pensioner, shall be liable to attachment," etc. The courts have correctly held that the section only protected the money while due or in course of transmission to the pensioner. Money due or to become due is designed to protect the amount *783 of the pension until it reaches the hands of the pensioner. It is then no longer money due or to become due. Our statute exempts the money, and although deposited in the bank it is still money and protected. It has not lost its identity because of the fact that the identical coins or bills deposited are not to be returned. Respondent probably never saw any coins or bills, but took the checks which the insurance company gave her, as evidence that it had the money for her, and deposited them with the bank, having the amounts credited in her bank-book as evidence that she had the money in the bank.
In Hibernia Savings and Loan Society v. City and County of SanFrancisco,
It follows that the order should be affirmed.
Gray, C., and Smith, C., concurred. *784
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the order is affirmed. McFarland, J., Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J.
Hearing in Bank denied.