87 P. 1009 | Utah | 1906
This is an action in equity, commenced by respondent, to quiet the title to a small strip of land alleged by him to be 2.1 feet wide on the south end, and 1.83 feet on the north .end, and 47.93 feet in length north and south. Eespondent alleges that he is the owner of the north 47.93 feet of lot 5, block 56, plat A. Salt Lake City survey, and the strip above mentioned is at the rear, or east, end of the part owned by him.. Appellant alleges that she is the owner of the west
Appellant duly filed a motion for a new trial, and, the same being overruled, preserved all the evidence in a bill of exceptions, which evidence-, in that form, is now before us. There is no- substantial or material conflict in the evidence, and therefore the question here is one purely of law applicable to the uncontroverted facts and circumstances, as they appear from the bill of exceptions. The undisputed facts may .be briefly, yet comprehensively, stated as follows: Block 56 is one of the original blocks of Salt Lake City, with an area of 20x20' rods, and lot 5 aforesaid is bounded on the west by State street and on the north by Second South street, while lot 6 is bounded on the north by Second South street and on the east by Second East street. While it appears from the evidence that some improvements were made on both lots 5 and 6 prior to that time, patent was not issued thereto until Time 1, 1872, when it was issued to Daniel H. Wells, as mayor of Salt Lake City, and he in September of that year
Appellant produced a Mrs. Carman as a witness, who is a daughter of the original owner of that part of lot 6 claimed by appellant. Mrs. Carman testified that she was bom on the property owned by her father that is part of lot 6; that she had lived there all her life, with the exception of about seven years, from 1877 to about 1884, and that she was living there at the time of the trial; that she remembers the building that was erected on the northwest corner of lot 6; that it remained in the same position it was in at the time of the trial for more than 20 years last past; that a fence was erected, starting from the southwest comer of said building, extending south to the rear end of her father’s property; that her father always claimed all that part of lot 6 lying east of said fence and up to the fence; that he.collected ground rent for the land upon which the building stood during all of his life, and his estate did the same after his death; that the aforesaid fence was erected more than thirty years prior to- the time of the trial, and was in the same place all the time. Mr. Romney, who purchased the property claimed by appellant from
We remark here that there is nothing in the evidence show
Counsel for respondent contends that this is a case where a boundary line was established, if established at all, by mistake or by a misconception of the true line, and therefore the parties on either side of the line are, pnder the law, permitted to claim up to the true line whenever it is discovered. They further contend that there is nothing in this record upon which the doctrine of estoppel can be based, that the true boundary lir^e was not established until shortly before the action was brought, that the same is at the point fixed by the survey of 1904, and that there never was an agreement between the adjoining owners fixing or agreeing upon a boundary line, and therefore respondent should prevail in this court, as he prevailed in the court below. Counsel further
The authorities upon the subject of disputed boundaries are, as might well be expected, not in harmony. Reasonably well defined principles, however, are established respecting the subject, and it is in the application of these principles to the particular case, rather than in any disagreement respecting the law, that the authorities differ. At the oral argument the writer, at least, was much impressed with the views contended for by counsel for respondent, and by the law as contended for by him; but upon a thorough reading of all the evidence, and a careful examination of all the authorities cited, as well as others, and upon mature reflection, he has been compelled to yield his first impressions, and we are all convinced that the law in this case is with the appellant upon the uncontroverted facts. We cannot, within the limits of this opinion, refer to more than a few of the many cases upon the subject. The lower court found that there never was any agreement between the owners of lots 5 and 6 respecting the boundary line in question, and in view of this fact permitted the respondent to recover. '
Is such an agreement necessary in cases of this hind ? Upon
“The supposition of such an agreement [referring to an agreement establishing a boundary line] in cases of long acquiescence in an established line is, as I apprehend, entirely superfluous. The acquiescence in such eases affords ground, not merely for an inference of fact to go to the jury as evidence of an original parol agreement, but for a direct legal inference as to the true boundary line. It is held to be proof of so conclusive a nature that the party is precluded from offering any evidence to the contrary. Unless the acquiescence has continued for a sufficient length of time to become thus conclusive, it is of no importance. The rule seems to have been adopted as a rule of repose, with a view to the quieting of titles, and rests upon the same reason as our statute prohibiting the disturbance of an adverse possession which has continued for twenty years. In all eases in which practical locations have been confirmed upon evidence of this kind, the acquiescence has continued for a long period, rarely less than twenty years.” (Italics ours.)
Tbe foregoing cáseas even weaker in its facts than is the case at bar. In that case the contending parties claimed title from a common source, and by mistake located a division fence at a point not the true line, yet it was held that long acquiescence, in that case more than forty years, concluded the parties, from questioning the boundary line. Cases are there cited where the period of acquiescence was for a much shorter time than is/ the time in the case at bar. Moreover it is expressly held in that case that the decision is not based upon adverse possession, but upon acquiescence alone. The case of Reed v. Farr, 35 N. Y. 113, is much like the foregoing in its facts, and cites and approves that case. The case of Beardsley v. Crane (Minn.), 54 N. W. 740, was a case of ejectment, and involved the question, in some respects, now under consideration. 'Collins, I., speaking for the Supreme Court of Minnesota, at page 742 of 54 N. W., right-hand column, says:
“There should be an express agreement made between the owners of the lands, deliberately settling the exact, precise line between them, and acquiescence for a considerable time, or, in the absence of proof of such agreement, it should be as clearly and distinctly shown that the party claiming has had possession of the premises claimed up to a certain,*277 visible, and well-known line, with the knowledge of the owner of the adjoining land, and his acquiescence, continued for a considerable period of time. What this jgeriod is has not been limited or defined, is quite vague and uncertain, and must necessarily depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.”
The foregoing cases were cited by counsel for respondent upon the .proposition that a mere passive assent and acquiescence is insufficient; that there must be more than that; that it must be or amount to an act or acts showing an actual acquiescence in the line as claimed. There is, however, nothing in those cases from which the law as claimed by counsel can be deduced, except now and then a loose expression may be found to that effect, and in view of all the authorities, when examined for the purpose of ascertaining what isi ace tually decided, and the principles upon which the decisions rest, the contention of counsel is not supported to thie full extent claimed by him. It is squarely held, however, that long acquiescence in a boundary that is visibly marked, or placed where it can be and is observed by the adjoining owner, is sufficient to establish a boundary from which neither party may depart at will.
The case of McNamara, v. Seaton, 82 Ill. 498, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case two brothers, owning adjoining farms, agreed upon a wrong boundary by mistake, but discovered their error within four years thereafter, and thenceforth disregarded such line, and each claimed to the true boundary. The grantee of one of the brothers afterwards sought to enforce the rule of agreed boundary, but his claim was disallowed by the court. ' The case of Manistee Mfg. Co. v. Cogswell (Mich.), 61 N. W. 884, did not present the question of a boundary by acquiescence. In that case the error was discovered after five years, and no consent or acquiescence is shown. Palmer v. Osborne (Iowa), 87 N. W. 712, is a boundary line case; but, owing to the fact that the claimed boundary was on land overgrown with brush and not visible, and the owner against whom the boundary was claimed being a nonresident of the state, and having no knowledge except that which the law presumes in respect to owner
“But another view should have been equally conclusive in this case. The long practical acquiescence of the parties concerned in supposed boundary lines should he regarded as such an agreement upon them as to be conclusive, even if originally located erroneously.”
In Husted v. Willoughby, 15 N. W. 219, the same court held that, where a boundary line was located by mistake by one party and acquiesced in for more than fifteen years, such boundary will not be disturbed. In a recent ease in New York (Katz v. Kaiser, 48 N. E. 532) the case of Baldwin v. Brown, supra, is approved and followed. The following cases are all to the same effect: Palmer v. Dosch (Ind. Sup.), 47 N. E. 176; Holloran v. Holloran (Mass.), 21 N. E. 374. In the case of Miller v. Mills County, 82 N. W. 1038, the Supreme Court of Iowa makes a thorough review of the authorities and holds that long acquiescence in a visibly marked boundary line between owners becomes conclusive. The same court, in a later ease, entitled Kulas v. McHugh, 86 N. W. 288, in the syllabus, states the rule as follows:
“Where a division fence between adjoining owners has stood for over ten years, each party claiming to own up to it, an agreement to make it the true boundary • will be implied.”
In the case at bar the improvements were made more than thirty years before the trial. These improvements, although of no great value, were erected in such a way that they were
Counsel for respondent, however, contend that tbe improvements and fence were erected by tenants and that the owners are not to be bound, by tbe acts of such tenants. Grant this, and there remains tbe fact that tbe owners and tbeir successors and grantees by implication of Taw adopted tbe acts of these tenants by acquiescing therein for more than thirty years. Tbe record does not show who constructed the fence, nor who requested it be built, except by mere inference. But it does appear that tbe owners and tbeir successors in interest must have seen and known of its existence during all of tbe time it was there. Neither can it be inferred, as counsel suggests, that tbe fence was erected merly for convenience, and not with a view of establishing a boundary, for tbe reason that tbe fence so nearly approximates tbe line as now claimed by respondent that such an inference is left without any force whatever. But tbe evidence is not satisfactory that tbe true division line is where it is claimed to be by respondent. True, tbe surveyor says that it was determined from tbe
While, as all the authorities agree, no hard and fast rule can be laid down to control in every case, but that each case must be_ determined by its own peculiar facts> an3~Jnrcum-'stances, still where, as in this case, the facts respecting the acquiescence for so many years, and the open and visible boundary is so clearly established, and the knowledge thereof by interested parties is so clearly shown, the general principles recognized by all authorities apply with full force, and we cannot do otherwise than to give them effect. We do not wish to be understood as holding that parties may not claim to the true boundary, where an assumed or agreed boundary is located through mistake or inadvertence, or where it is clear that the line as located was not intended as.a boundary, and where a boundary so located has not been acquiesced in for a long term of years by the parties in interest. But in all cases where the boundary is open, and visibly marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, and is knowingly acquiesced in for a long term of years, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, and will not permit the parties or their grantees to depart from such line. These rules, of course, have no application where a party buys with a view to lines established by new or later surveys. As to such gran
The appellant asks for affirmative relief in her counterclaim, and prays that the title to the strip of land, as described therein, be quieted in her. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to the district court, with directions to vacate the findings of fact and • conclusions of law, and to substitute therefor findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformity to the views contained in the foregoing opinion, and that upon such findings and conclusions said court enter a judgment and decree quieting the title to the strip of land, as the same is- described in appellant’s counterclaim, in her. Costs to be taxed against respondent.