■ The plaintiff’s cause of action is for a divorce on tbe ground of tbe adultery of tbe defendant. In her co'm-
There is no doubt that 1878 G. S. ch. 62, § 24, secures to tbe wife, in tbe cases specified, an unqualified right to dower in tbe lands of ber husband as if be were dead. By tbe statute in force when tbis section was enacted, tbe widow’s right of dower, substantially as at common law, was preserved to ber. 1851 R. S. ch. 49, § 1. By Laws 1875, ch. 40, estates in dower eo nomine, as then existing, were abolished, and, in lieu thereof, provision was made for a life estate in tbe homestead of tbe husband and an undivided one-tbird of all other lands of which be might die seised. By Laws 1876, cb. 37, and again in tbe Probate Code, enacted in 1889, tbe subject is revised, and, with some changes, tbe provisions of the act of 1875 are retained, and incorporated under tbe bead of “Title to Real Property by Descent.” Now, under section 24, in question, is tbe rule to be applied as tbe term “dower” was used and understood when that section was enacted, or is it to be given an enlarged and extended application, so as to embrace tbe present liberal provisions for tbe wife made out of bis estate on tbe death of ber husband? Estates in dower have been changed and enlarged in many of tbe states by legislative enactment, (Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 46; Smith’s Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 9; Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252;) so that it has come to be understood generally as tbe provision in tbe nature of dower which tbe law makes for tbe wife from tbe estate of ber deceased husband, and it is contingent only upon tbe seisin of tbe husband and bis death, and beyond bis power to divest. Tbe present provisions for tbe wife, above specified, were clearly intended to be in lieu of dower, and retain its essential features. Tbe interest thereby created is inchoate upon tbe marriage and seisin, and becomes absolute at bis death, and is thus distinguishable from other provisions made for ber as heir in certain contingencies. Her estate extends