Holmes Appeal
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Rhodes
Opinion by
Rhodes, P. J.,This appeal questions the legality of an order of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, Juvenile Division, committing Joseph Holmes, aged 16, to the Pennsylvania Industrial School at White Hill, as a delinquent child under The Juvenile Court Law of June 2, 1933, P. L. 1433, as amended,
Joseph Holmes was born on May 7, 1936. He was adjudged delinquent on August 19, 1949, by the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, Juvenile Division, upon a petition alleging that he was involved in a highway *141robbery. At that time he was placed on probation. Subsequently, on January 19, 1951, he was exonerated of participation in a burglary, and allowed to continue on probation, although his record showed absence from school for sixty-seven days of the current school year. Between January of 1951 and August of 1952, the school authorities advised the Juvenile Court of Holmes’ persistent absence from school and the continuation of his truancies. Holmes was again taken into custody on August 18, 1952, for a delinquency involving highway robbery and assault and battery. After a hearing he was committed to Pennypack House for training, where he remained for two months, or until November 12, 1952, at which time he was discharged and placed on probation.
On December 23, 1952, Holmes was-taken into custody on a delinquency petition alleging larceny of an automobile, operating an automobile without the owner’s consent, and operating an automobile without a driver’s license. He was given a hearing before the Juvenile Court on January 7, 1953. At this hearing Holmes denied knowledge that the car was stolen and stated that he was told it belonged to an uncle of one of his companions. Holmes, however, admitted driving the car without a license. The Juvenile Court adjudged Holmes delinquent on the charge of operating a motor vehicle without a license, although in so doing the court inadvertently used the words “We will mark him guilty on this charge.” Holmes was committed to the county prison pending a hearing on other charges.
On January 12, 1953, a petition was filed setting forth Holmes’ delinquency by reason of his participation in an armed robbery of Our Lady of Victory Church at 54th and Vine Streets, Philadelphia. Wideman, a companion of Holmes in the stolen automobile, signed a confession and, upon a criminal trial, was convicted *142on the charge of armed robbery at the church. Wide-man’s signed confession, used against Wideman at the trial, implicated I-Iolmes, Richard Hodges, and Charles Clark as participants in the robbery. However, at a hearing held on January 23, 1953, before Judge Prop-per on the delinquency petition, Hodges and Holmes denied knowledge that the car was stolen and denied participation in the robbery. At the conclusion of this hearing Judge Propper revoked Holmes’ probation and ordered him committed to the Pennsylvania Industrial School at White Hill. In making the commitment Judge Propper referred to Holmes’ prior record in the Juvenile Court. Meanwhile, counsel entered an appearance for Holmes. Appellant’s attorney then sought permission to inspect the juvenile court file, including the reports of court investigators. The court permitted inspection of the notes of testimony and records of the Juvenile Court relating to Holmes, but denied the right of appellant’s attorney to inspect the reports of court investigators. At the request of appellant and his attorney, the court granted Holmes a rehearing, which was held on March 6, 1953. Over objection of appellant’s attorney, the Commonwealth offered additional evidence in an attempt to establish Holmes’ delinquency as to the theft of the automobile and participation in the church robbery. However the Commonwealth’s witnesses, Wideman and Clark, repudiating prior confessions, testified that Holmes, who was with them at the time, did not know the car was stolen and did not participate in the robbery. At the conclusion of this testimony the court, after reciting Holmes’ record in the Juvenile Court, reiterated its adjudication of delinquency, basing such finding on participation in the robbery and driving a stolen car without a license Avhile on probation. Accordingly the court committed Holmes to the Pennsylvania Indus*143trial School at White Hill.’ He has appealed from that order.
Appellant asserts that the adjudication of delinquency and the commitment violate his constitutional right and privilege against self-incrimination. As stated, Holmes had been adjudicated a delinquent as of August 19, 1949, at which time he was placed on probation. The jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court attached and the status of the minor as a delinquent was established from that time. As a delinquent he was on probation and subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of the court. The objective of the court under the doctrine of parens patriae is to promote the best interests of both the state and the child. On the basis of the original adjudication of delinquency, the court had the power to revoke its order placing the minor on probation, and to commit him to an institution for training. Actually, the commitment appealed from was justified under the prior adjudication of delinquency, and no question regarding the alleged right against self-incrimination is involved. If, however, we consider the delinquency petition filed December 23, 1952, relating to larceny of an automobile and the operation of a motor vehicle without a license, and the hearing, adjudication and commitment thereunder, as a separate proceeding, there is in any event no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination established. Article I, §9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, . . As clearly appears in Com. v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, dealing with the predecessor of the present Juvenile Court Law, a proceeding under such Law is not a criminal case, but rather a procedure intended to save a child who violates the law from the ordeal of a criminal trial, and to provide for his treatment *144under court supervision. It has been compared to an action in equity. The purpose underlying the Law is to avoid branding the child with the stigma of criminality and to insure the growth of the child as a useful member of society. Therefore many of the constitutional guarantees granted to one formally charged with a criminal offense are not applicable to a proceeding under The Juvenile Court Law. As stated in Com. v. Fisher, supra, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200, “. . . there was no trial for any crime here, and the act is operative only when there is to be no trial. The very purpose of the act is to prevent a trial, though, if the welfare of the public require that the minor should be tried, power to try it is not taken away from the court of quarter sessions, ...” A delinquency proceeding in a children’s court is not a criminal trial, hence the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to the questioning of the juvenile. 8 Wigmore, Evidence, §2252, n. 10, (3d Ed.) ; People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, 86 A.L.R. 1001 (certiorari denied in 289 U. S. 709, 53 S. Ct. 786, 77 L. Ed. 1464) ; 31 Am. Jur., Juvenile Courts and Offenders, §42, p. 807. Furthermore, ordinarily, when the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction, makes an adjudication of delinquency and commits a child, it could not certify the case to the court of quarter sessions for criminal prosecution based on the same violations of law. Trignani’s Case, 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 491, 494, 28 A. 2d 702.
Section 19 of The Juvenile Court Law of 1933,
Appellant also claims the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment are invalid because based on hearsay evidence. Again, strictly speaking, the question of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the juvenile court proceeding does not here arise since the present commitment could rest on the prior adjudication of delinquency and the revocation of probation. In any event there is sufficient admissible evidence in the record to support the court’s finding of delinquency based on the violations of the law set forth in the delinquency petition of December 23, 1952. Appellant. admitted operating the automobile without a license, though he denied’ knowing that it had been stolen; he also denied- that.he had been involved in the robbery at. the church: Further, appellant’s companions admitted in the juvenile court proceeding that they were tried .and convicted on charges of robbery and. larceny, of the car, although they re pudiated previous written . confessions.:. as to . such *146charges. The court had before it the previous record of appellant, including adjudications of delinquencies and appellant’s probation record. While it is doubtful that prior records could, under settled rules of evidence, be used as the basis for an adjudication of delinquency, it is clear that the court could consider appellant’s prior record in determining what treatment authorized under the Law would be in the best interests of the child and the state.
Even in ordinary civil litigation and trial, hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, if relevant and material, may be given the value of direct evidence. Poluski v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa. 473, 133 A. 819; Sledzianowski Unemployment Compensation Case, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 37, 40, 76 A. 2d 666. Whatever may be the rule in ordinary litigation, all the rules of evidence cannot be applicable to the fullest extent in juvenile court proceedings. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence, §1400 (3d Ed.). Such proceedings do not involve a trial, or criminal charges, and, in view of their primary purpose, must be conducted on a comparatively informal basis. Com. ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 556, 560, 561. At the same time, the proceeding is an action in a court of record, the court must have jurisdiction, its basic findings must be supported by evidence and the rudiments of procedural due process and fair play must be observed. The record must be legally and factually adequate to sustain the findings of fact and order of commitment. Weintraub Appeal, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 342, 351, 71 A. 2d 823. Within this framework the juvenile court is, under the Law,‘granted broad discretionary power. The action of the juvenile court is always subject to appellate review and correction for errors of law or abuse of discretion. Rose Child Dependency Case, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 204, 54 A. 2d 297.
*147It is contended that the court had no authority to commit the juvenile without notice to its parents, guardian, or person having control of the child. Under section 4 of the Law,
*148We have made reference to the fact that prior to the final hearing of March 6, 1953, appellant’s attorney made a formal request by letter, asking the right to inspect all the reports and recommendations made to the Juvenile Court concerning this minor, including the reports of probation and interviewing officers. The court allowed the attorney to inspect the notes of testimony and any statements made by the juvenile to court representatives, but denied the right to inspect any reports which the court considered confidential, including the reports of probation officers. Counsel now contends that on the minor’s behalf he had a fundamental right to inspect all the court records, and that the action of the court in limiting the right of inspection was error. Section 3 of The Juvenile Court Law of 1933, as amended,
At the rehearing on March 6, 1953, granted appellant as a matter of right (section 15 of the Law,
The order of the court below is affirmed.
Notes
Cf. Com. ex rel. Mark v. Mark, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 181, 182, 175 A. 289; Com. ex rel. McClenen v. McClenen, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 471, 193 A. 83; Com. ex rel. Knode v. Knode, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 1, 20 A. 2d 896.