165 Ga. 296 | Ga. | 1927
J. W. Bridges filed a petition seeking to enjoin Grady Holman and others, commissioners of roads and revenues, and J. G. Butler, treasurer, of Early County, from paying, as per contract of employment, a sum of money to W. A. Fuqua as county demonstration agent. The petition alleged, among other things, that said agent was attached to the department of education and could be compensated only out of educational funds, none of which were in the hands of said treasurer or in control of said6commissioners; that a general tax of 5 mills was levied by said commissioners for 1926 for educational purposes in said county; that said fund was collected by the tax-collector and paid to the county school superintendent; that said commissioners had no authority to issue warrants against said fund; and that said commissioners had no funds on hand or in prospect with which to pay said agent. On presentation of the petition the judge issued
The suit is in equity. Dnder the allegations respecting the residence of the defendants, it was properly filed in Early County. At an interlocutory hearing in Terrell County, the court granted a temporary injunction and also rendered judgments on the demurrers as above stated. Had the judgment gone no further than to grant the injunction, jurisdictional difficulty would not have been encountered. Semmes v. Columbus, 19 Ga. 471, 484; Burchard v. Boyce, 21 Ga. 6. The defendants objected to the rendition of judgment on the demurrers, on the ground that the hearing was without the county of the residence of the defendants where the suit was filed, but in another county, and that the court was without jurisdiction. The objection was overruled, the court placing his decision upon the act of 1925 (Ga. Laws 1925, p. 97). That act expressly provides that decisions on demurrers may be rendered “at any interlocutory hearing before the appear
In Castellaw v. Blanchard, 106 Ga. 97, at p. 100 (31 S. E. 801), this court, dealing with the word “trial” and with’ reference to a statute, said: “Is the word trial there used in its broad and comprehensive sense — ‘the investigation and decision of a matter in issue between parties before a competent tribunal; including all the steps taken in the case from submission to the jury to the rendition of the judgment,’ or is the word there used in its restricted sense — ‘the investigation of the matter of fact in issue?’ Anderson’s Law D. (trial). In our opinion the word as used in that section is to be given only its restricted meaning, that is, the sense in which it is used by Sir William Blackstone when he says: ‘Trial then is the examination of the matter of fact in issue; of which there are many different species, according to the difference of the subject, or thing to be tried.’ 3 Black. Com. 33.” The Supreme Court of the United States, in Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533 (31 Sup. Ct. 683, 55 L. ed. 842), held.
The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings. Hicks v. Beacham, 131 Ga. 89, at p. 93 (62 S. E. 45). The Code giving the judge jurisdiction to hear demurrers in vacation, “it necessarily follows that he would have authority to allow amendments to the bill in order to perfect it and to meet the grounds of demurrer.” DeLacy v. Hurst, 83 Ga. 223, 227 (9 S. E. 1052). “The rules of pleading have been adopted partly with a view of saving both the parties and the public the trouble and expense of an unnecessary trial.” Warren v. Powell, 122 Ga. 4 (49 S. E. 730). There is no good reason why the litigant should be allowed to proceed with a trial, and to introduce evidence to prove what amounts in law to nothing. Kelly v. Strouse,
“Where a citizen and taxpayer brings an action in behalf of himself and other taxpayers against a municipality, every citizen is regarded as a party to the proceedings, and bound by the judgment entered therein. In such cases the people are regarded as the real parties.” 15 R C. L., 1035, § 510. The same rule is stated in 2 Black on Judgments, § 584, and in 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 437. “A judgment on a petition by a taxpayer, on behalf of
Judgment reversed.