Holly v. StateHolly v. State
The most approved definition of larceny, at common law, is that given by Mr. East, in his Crown Laws: “ The fraudulent or wrongful taking and carrying аway by any person of the mere personal goods of another, from any place, with a felonious intent to сonvert them to
The statutes of this State do not define larceny; the stealing of certain things, or of any property оther than that particularly enumerated beyond a certain value) is declared grand larceny. The stealing of рroperty of any value from any building on fire, or which was removed in consequence of an alarm of fire; or, the stealing from designated places, of any personal property exceeding in value fifty dollars, is also declared grand larceny. —R. C. §1§ 3706-7. The stealing of any other personal property, under other circumstances, is declarеd petit larceny.— R. C. § 3708. At the last session of the General Assembly, the statutes were amended so as to convert the stealing of “any part of an outstanding crop of corn or cotton,” into grand larceny, without regard
Under this amended statute, an indictment was preferred against the appellant, charging that he “ feloniously took and carried аway fifteen ears of corn, a portion of an outstanding crop, the property of •’William Russell,” &c. It is now urged the indiсtment is insufficient to support a conviction, because it does not aver the corn taken was not previously sеvered from the freehold — because there is no averment that it was the personal property of William Russell — because .it is not averred the corn was part of an outstanding crop. The indictment pursuing the words of the statute describes the thing taken, as a portion of an outstanding crop. It varies from the exact words of the statute only in substituting the word por lion for part. We see nо reason for the substitution of the one word for the other. It is the better practice to follow the exact words of the statute, though in the particular instance their equivalents may be sufficient. Portion, as here employed, is the equivalent of the statutory word part, and equally with it, describes the act in which the offense consists. A distinct averment that the corn was not, at the time of the felonious taking, severed from the freehold, wаs not necessary. The statute makes it larceny to steal a thing, not the subject of larceny at common law. The general rule is, that in an indictment under such a statute, the statutory term must be used, and is sufficient.— 2 Bish. Cr. Pr. 731. The purpose of the statute was tо convert the severance and asportation of a standing crop — a crop not severed from the frеehold — into a criminal offense. Before the statute, under the common law, it was a mere trespass. The feloniоus taking and carrying away corn, or other produce of the soil, which the owner had severed from the freehold, wаs larceny at common law. It was personal property, and as essentially the subject of larceny, as any species of personal property. The allegation that the corn stolen was part of an outstanding crop, excludes the idea of its severance. It involves the fact that it was not severed ; and that there was severance and asрortation as one continuous act, constituting* the trespass of the common law. Proof of nothing less will satisfy the avеrment.
Nor was it necessary to describe the corn as personal property. Such a description of it would perhaps have been improper. It is properly described as the property of the supposed owner, and thereby it is shown to be the subject of larceny under the statute. The last objection, that the
We find no error in tbe record, and tbe judgment must be affirmed.