18 N.Y.S. 704 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1892
This action is ejectment to recover possession of a strip of land, formerly a part of Bloomingdale road, between Ninety-Second and Ninety-Third streets, in the city of New York. The question to be determined depends upon the construction to be given to two deeds,—one from Cliarles Apthorp and others tó William Jauncey and others, dated August 6, 1799, and one from Charles Apthorp and others to Oliver Vanderbilt, dated February 28, 1800. In the ease of Holloway v. Delano, 18 N. Y. Supp. —, (action No. 1, decided herewith,) we construed the deed of Apthorp to Jauncey as conveying the fee of the east half of the Bloomingdale road, and the plaintiff has therefore failed to show a title to the east half of the property to recover which the action is brought. The deed of Charles Apthorp to Vanderbilt, however, does not convey to the grantees the west half of such road, and the plaintiff, as heir at law of Charles Apthorp, is the owner of the fee of the west half of said Bloomingdale road between Ninety-Second and Ninety-Third streets. The description in the Vanderbilt deed is: “Beginning at a corner on the west side of the Bloomingdale road, at the northerly side of a private road leading to Hudson river, and running thence along the west side of the Bloomingdale road, aforesaid, north, 35° east, 3 chains and 60 links, and thence by several courses to the place of beginning.” This description plainly excludes the fee in front of the premises. It is materially different from the description contained in the other deeds that we have had occasion to consider in these actions. I think, however, that the grantee named in the Vanderbilt deed acquired an easement in the west half of the street abutting on the premises conveyed by this conveyance. In considering this question, the distinction between an easement granted by the deed in the
That an owner of laud does acquire an interest in a street abutting on his. property where the conveyance of such property to such owner bounds the - property by the street, and where the grantor owned the fee of the street,. even though the conveyance excludes the fee of the street, separate and dis-
The judgment in the case adjudges that the plaintiff recover of the defendants the possession of the property described in the complaint, and, as it appears that plaintiff is not entitled to the possession of such property, the judgement must be reversed.
There are other questions presented, but for the reasons stated, the judgment must be reversed, and it is not necessary now that they should be determined. Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.