Holleyman v. Holleyman

HOLLEYMAN, Cynthia now Jo

Ward, Appellant, Plaintiff/ HOLLEYMAN,

Randall Dexter

Defendant/Appellee. 95,584.

No.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 26, 2008.

Rehearing Denied June on Denial

Supplemental Opinion Rehearing Oct. OK, Pearson, City, for Oklahoma

Jim Appellant. Plaintiff/ Gorton, Liebel, Okla- James T. E. William OK, Defendant/Appellee. City, homa SUMMERS, J.

[ enforceability question involves Our which of a divorcee decree agree leave the child purport "to age of child reaches the open after the minor high ..." complete school eighteen and/or child, any. approval judge pre-exist- based the needs of the of the of the parties agree that “special ing agreement parties. the child is a degree needs” child with some retardation ¶ Whitehead, Whitehead problems. and seizure (note omitted and em- added). phasis ¶2 Mother and Father divorced in 1993 years when their child was fifteen old. Fa- Father’s leading brief describes the events stopped providing up ther medical insurance in the decree: “After the had been sought litigating 2000. Mother then an order from days, the trial for a matter of set- (1) compel District pro- Court Father to tlement par- discussions ensued between the (2) insurance, pay vide medical additional respective ties and their counsel that led to (3) support, pay- Entry reimburse Mother for the Journal Order and Di- Decree of ” ments made to maintain the supports insurance and vorce .... The record descrip- (4) expenses, pay support for medical child tion in that the parties decree states that the payments 1999, unpaid agreed that were since provisions to the of the divorce de- (5) adjudicate support future amounts needed regard cree “with to all issues.” Decree of by alleged Divorce, the child. She that at the time of judgment O.R. at 9. The decree is a the parties agreed by divorce the that Father consent or a “consent decree.” provide support after the child was 21 ¶ course, characterizing Of the decree as years old. a consent decree does not determine that the parties agreed particular to a ¶ matter. The responded 3 Father to applica- Mother’s controversy in the trial court centered on one tion with a motion to dismiss. He stated that provision of the 1993 divorce decree. It stopped he making support the child pay- states that: May ments in of graduat- 1999 after the child ORDERED, IT high age years. ed from school at IS THEREFORE AD- the of 21 argued by He that the District JUDGED AND DECREED the Court was with- Court jurisdiction pay out that the Defendant shall payments support support to order to child in the child after the child has amount of Four Hundred age reached the of Dollars ($400.00) month, years. per deviated from the support guidelines, child attached hereto ¶4 The trial court argument heard “A”, as agreed upon by Exhibit the granted counsel and the motion to dismiss. parties. special Due to the needs of the appealed Mother judgment and the was af- child, parties minor agreed have by firmed the Court of Appeals. Civil We support leave the child open after the mi- opinion vacate the Ap- Court of Civil (18) age nor child reaches eighteen peals and reverse the judgment of the Dis- completes high school, and the and/or trict Court. jurisdiction Court will retain for either ¶ 5 The Father maintains that the decree party application to file an sup- for further consent, judgment by not a or “consent port upon specific based needs and decree.” We have discussed the characteris- requirements child, any. of the minor tics aof consent decree: Id. O.R. at 11. agreement A consent is the Mother claims that the trial court has upon entered the record with jurisdiction support to order more child be McRary sanction of the court. agreement. cause of Father’s Father claims 714, McRary, 719, 27, 228 N.C. 47 S.E.2d subject a District Court has no matter (1948). A consent decree in a divorce is compel support payments negotiations the result of between the support for the they of children after have subsequent settlement of the age years, reached the and that involved, issues which is then settlement matter cannot be created presented proposed to the court as a judg- agreement parties. Although ment. judicial it is not a deter- ¶ rights mination of the parties, it parent haveWe said that a has a acquires judgment through the status of a legal duty support his or her child until agree modification parties could to such State, majority. age of child reaches rel. Jones judgment by Human Services ex Dept. incorporate such rel. ex ¶ 22, explained consent. that such a consent We Baggett, 1999 OK judicially was enforceable. decree Abrego, 1991OK 812 Abrego v. in this case agree. The divorce decree With this contention we Under and the authority on June court has pronounced was ©.8.1941 1277the at that time stated modify support prospec- in effect relevant statute an order for child tively. authority that: does have modifying operate order retro- to make the support Any child shall be entitled actively. Sango Sango, 121 Ok. eigh- child reaches parents until 925; Reynolds Reynolds, (18) 249 P. Okl. age. dependent If a years of teen Therefore, if the order continuously attend- regularly and child is 1946 had entered school, of December been child shall entitled ing high said after a trial of the court the merits age parents through the it have been insofar the issues would void (18) years. eighteen relieving the defen- as it hаd the effect of (eff, 112(D), June O.S$.Supp.1998 liability unpaid dant of installments 1993). entry of up accrued to the time of the Thus, decree this stat- at the time of the order. support did not obligationfor child ute-based However, agreed it is that the order of birth- beyond the child's nineteenth extend 21, 1946 was a consent order December day. Id. agreement entered the court the in is a But the decree this case in parties. and consent of the While decree, aspect to a consent de parties it void a court consent retroactive being order, may agree obligations order, yet between them cree a consent it is in contract, required those law. and in the selves that exceed the nature binding mistake, fraud is a absence of or parties re- agreement the If the between parties obligation thereto. between maintenance is in- garding support and leaving binding, noth- tended as final and Greeson, (empha- v. 257 P.2d at 278. Greeson by the court on the ing added) for determination sis allowance, amount of the question of the may consent to a parties Just as subject such decree is not modification adjustment personal retroactive their parties. consent of both without rights, they may also contract as to their Stuart, at 615. OK T 555 P.2d example, rights in the future. For personal parties agreement between the Such an Kittredge, 1995 Kittredge v. OK though valid even it is enforceable explained that a consent decree P.2d we do, pro- does what a trial court cannot of the hus awarding percentage the wife a agreement does not contravene vided the property in Hieuof divi band's future income public policy. enforceable, though the statute even sion was Whitehead, v. Whitehead prohibited have an order would otherwise added). 1098, 1101, (emphasis that effect: Thus, requested a trial court is when argues the trial court did The husband obligation upon par- child-support enforce a jurisdictional power to divide have the issue must be addressed: important ent an earnings because the consent his future obligation? of that Does What is the source to the rights though even he consented his mandatory obligation spring from law P Eitinger Ettinger, v. 687 .2d division. agreement? consensual spring does it from a (Okla1981), held that this Court G@reeson (Gree- this distinction We noted title 12 of the Okla- under section 1278 of son, 1958OK (now Okla.Stat.tit. homa Statutes juris- that a trial 121), T9 In Greeson we observed not have district court did future earn- to divide a husband's diction possess statutory power court did not retroactively, modify but the child in the decree ing absent recitation parties intended to cireamvent the statute. these determinations. that we We have said Court, however, recognized that where construe a consent "as other con par had entered into a consent tracts" and ascertain the intent of the agreement sought which to avoid the stric- ties. statute, tures of the district agreed judgment An is in the of a nature would have to enter such an contract and is to be construed as other Further, express order. waiver of stat- Grayson Co., contracts. v. Pure Oil utory rights in the consent decree was not Okl. Insurance Service required, only agreement "which seeks Finegan, Co. v. 196 Okl. 165 P.2d 620. avoid the strictures Section 1278." The intention of the tois be ascer- alone, writing possible. tained from the

Kittredge Kittredge, 911 P2d at 904. 15 0.98.1941 155. Thus, parties may, general proposi- as a tion, (Greeson agree between themselves as to future Greeson, 257 P .2d at 278-279. support payments. points spec 112 Father to the lack of argues Father further that a ifiсity in an amount to be determined anything "consent decree not leave specificity future. A lack of in either the determination the trial court." He relies scope obligation amount or of an does not upon language stating in Whitehead that: "If necessarily judicially mean an of a absence parties regarding between the obligation. explained enforceable We have support and maintenance is intended as final provision that even if a of a contract is too leaving nothing binding, for determi vague and indefinite to determine the intent question nation the court on the of the parties, may supply their conduct necessary information to determine intent of allowance, amount such decree is not Co., parties. Sterling Bartlett v. Const. to modification without the consent of Whitehead, 1999 1972OK 499 P.2d parties." both Whitehead 995 emphasis P.2d at parties 118 intent of the language added. finality This addresses the they the time agreement entered into an obligation, of an and not whether the amount meaning controls the of their written con obligation may contractually of an be set for tract, and the ascertaining rules for a future determination. We have allowed intent are §§ set out at 15 0.8.2001 consent possess obligations decrees to where through 157. Founders Bank and Trust Co. the amount thereof is at a determined future Upsher, 1992OK 830 P.2d 1361.1 Kittredge Kittredge, supra. date. The trial court made its decision in the con recognize parties Once we that text of a motion challenging to dismiss may agree obligations jurisdiction to alter their the next of the trial court to award statu steps determining are if torily support such did mandated after a child has majority. reached her The trial court did agreement. occur and the substаnce of the principles We use findings of contract law to make make of fact or law on the issue 0.$.2001 contracts, 0.$.2001 § § 1. 15 151: "All whether 155: "When a contract is re- public private, interpreted by or are to be writing, parties duced to the intention of the is to rules, except provided by same as otherwise alone, writing possible, be ascertained from the if law." however, subject, provisions to the other this of 0.$.2001 § "A contract must be so article." interpreted give as to effect to the mutual inten- fraud, through § 156: "When parties, tion of the as it existed at the time of mistake, or accident a written contract fails to contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable the real intention of the such express parties, and lawful." regarded, intention is to be and the erroneous purpose § 15 0.8.2001 153: "For the of as- part writing disregarded." of the certaining the intention of the to a con- 0.$.2001 § 157: ''The whole of a contract given tract, if doubtful, otherwise the rules in this together, give is to be taken so as to effect to chapter applied." are to be every part, reasonably practicable, if each clause 0.$.2001 § language 154: "The of a con- helping interpret the others." govern tract is to if the lan- interpretation, guage explicit, is clear and does not and involve absurdity." an 112.14, § intent, provides may it that a court the essential elements and parties' of the portion any age or the contested agreement, support order for the of a child of Further, although Moth the event of certain disabilities.2 Because we the divorce decree. judicially agree alleges that a reverse the of the trial court and enforceable er exists, Father or Mother identi neither ment remand the matter to that court need not we principles of contract law fy the relevant request briefs from the or address controversy support may apply to the 112.14, applicability any, of new This will respective positions. Court their controversy. this appellate to make not exercise its disputed determinations trial first instance 115 The court dismissed the fact or Public questions of law. Oklahoma first, claims with two conclusions: that it did Dept. Employees Association Oklahoma jurisdiction, possess of not matter and Services, 71, 121, 55 P.3d Central secondly, that onee a child reaches his or her Center, 1072, 1081; Patel v. OMH Medical majority proper party the child is the Inc., 1999 OK 1 1201. bring legal against parent a action for the therefore, must, be remanded to This cause pay during parent's support failure to proceedings. the trial court for further minority. possess A child's child does right independent to maintain an action and note that while this matter was We request support Legislature added 48 0.9.2001 and maintenance. State pending the child, 1, 2001). (eff. July regardless age a. and 2. 43 0.98.2001 112.14 independent b. as an cause of action or support-Parental § 112.14. Definitions-Child joined any remedy provided rights with other claim or and duties-Actions | A. In this section: this title. (18) eighteen 1. "Adult child" means a child continuing, juris- 2. If no court has exclusive years age or older. child, diction of the an action under this section age. daughter or "Child" means son may original be filed as an suit. or B. The court order either both continuing, If there is court of exclusive provide support parents to for the of a child for jurisdiction, an action under this section be period may determine an indefinite pursuant Sec- filed as suit for modification rights parents and duties of the if the court finds tion 115 title. that: determining E. the amount of not, child, a. whether institutionalized eighteenth birthday, paid after a child's personal supervi- requires substantial care and specific support, terms and conditions of that disability physical sion because of a mental or rights parents and the and duties of both with capable self-support, and will not be child, respect support the court shall to the of the exists, b. or the cause of the the disability give special to: determine and consideration exist, is known to on or before disability Any existing or needs of the adult 1. future birthday eighteenth of the child. directly related to the adult child's mental child support this sec- 2. A court that orders under physical disability designate and the substantial care parent child or tion shall a of the or custody person having physical personal supervision directly required by another or or and guardianship order to of the child under court disability; to that related support may receive the for the child. The parent pays pay for or will for Whether the (18) designate eighteen years a child is who supervision adult or care or of the child support directly. age or older to receive the per- provides provide or will substantial care or may provided by C. A suit this section child; sonal of the adult supervision only by: filed available to both 3. The financial resources person parent or a. a of the child another care, parents support, supervision of for the and having physical custody guardianship or of the child; and the adult order, a court or child under Any other financial resources or other re- b. if the the child child: support, programs for the sources or available older, (1) (18) age eighteen years or care, supervision and of the adult child. (2) disability, does not have mental may provided F. An order this section (3) capable is determined the court to be governing rights provisions contain managing child's financial affairs. parents respect support to the duties of both with eigh- child, if the child is The parent, may of the child and be modified or enforced older, (18) person years age teen or or other provided by the same manner as other order assign not transfer or the cause of action to this title. any person, including governmental private or assignment entity agency, except made for an agency. to the Title IV-D section be filed: D. 1. A suit under this Dept. Human Services ex rel. opinion K.A.G. T18 The of the Court Civil T.D.G., 993. Appeals is vacated." The of the disputed portion Whether decree is District Court is reversed, and the matter is in fact an allowing Mother to act remanded to the District for Court further behalf, on the child's and the effect of such proceedings opinion. consistent with this agreement upon right Father's to chal- lenge status, representative Mother's any, if WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., 1 19 was not addressed the trial court. The HODGES, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, trial court's order must be reversed on this SUMMERS, JJ., concur. point as well. { LAVENDER, BOUDREAU, Generally, we use a de novo WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent.

standard to review a trial court's dismissal of party's petition for relief because such dis OPALA, V.C.J., concurring. usually solely missal is based an issue T 1 The court post-decree holds that Miller, of law fact. Miller v. proceeding cognizance the district court has 894. Father's quantum to determine the of Father's obli argued motion to dismiss that no consent have) gation (if any support Re to his dis existed, decree and that could abled adult marriage. child of a dissolved not, law, as a agree subject matter of challenges jurisdic The dissent for want of jurisdiction. matter The trial court order support tional enforceability of Father's jurisdic determines that no matter decree-imposed duty. Father's successful li tion existed. ability-defeating defense below calls on us 117 That order is correct insofar here to retest the trial court's view that it as it jurisdiction determines a lack of cognizance lacked to enforce the decree-created award support child under Title 43. igation.1 obl I separately write to an But district courts have adju jurisdiction-anchored swer Father's argu dicate the existence and effect of contracts. ment for the prius correctness of the nisi Here the Mother's claim is for enforcement dismissal respond and to to the dissent's alleges a contract she to be in effect. She analysis of theory. Father's defense alleges bargain consideration for by way agreeing give Even it were true that the decree of her up part of her statu torily calculated support. child Father portion sought to be patently enforced is this, does not dispute infirm, but the trial court has imposes least insofar as it on Fa adjudicated never the existence or duty support non-exis ther a his disabled adult alleged tence of that child, contract. The trial the district court would not be without court did not determine whether Father quest to entertain Mother's agreed pay after the child promise and for determi enforcement of majority. reached her We will not determine support's quantum. nation The dis in the first instance whether the decree con trict court is an omnicompetent tribunal of 2 tains agreement. such an Oklahoma jurisdiction." Public "unlimited The constitutional Employees Association v. Dept. Oklahoma jurisdiction breadth of its invests that court Services, supra; Central Patel v. OMH Med in subject-matter this case with cognizance Center, Inc., ical supra. The Mother is enti over the parties' claimed for day what, adult child. tled to her decree-imposed duty prove While the court to if anything, to, agreed and whether may, reasons, contest for other be at the Father is in fact breach of agree unenforceable, jurisdic tacked as Father's ment. tion-anchored defense does not defeat argument 1. As I understand (3) Father's proceeding on certiora- to be enforced in this or to en- ri, (1) challenge he decree-imposed makes a broad obligation to the district for want of force cognizance specificity interspousal agreement. proceed- over the in the modification ing jurisdiction" because it was "without either (2) impose very obligation 7(a), sought 5). (infra that was 2. Art. 7 Ok. Const. proceeding er's stood affirmed the Court cognizance over trial court's Appeals, granted that will once motion of Civil we certiorari on matter of Mother's petition. again it on remand. The dis Mother's stand before analysis, adopted, would undermine sent's cognizance-related T4 The issues tendered their stability judgments and unsettle by arguments on certiorari3 call for a two- invulnerability delayed present-day part analysis. step In its we must first attacks for mere procedurally impermissible the district ascertain whether court-in challenge, Father's based mistakes of law. adjudicative authority exercise its over the specificity decree-approved in the on want of parties' power approve divoree-had catapulted cannot to the support promise, be issue-expanding interspousal agreement. Nimply jurisdiction-vitiating defect. level of so, step If our second should determine jurisdic put, case is not at all about this approved agreement may whether be enforceability post-remand but about tion post-decree in enforced modification duty. decree-imposed of Father's proceeding Mother in her divorce case. filed I, explained, For the reasons like the

I court, resolve both issues an affirmative answer. THE IN LITIGATION CRITICAL ‍​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‍FACTS (Mother Cynthia obligee) or Jo (Father Holleyman II or obli-

Randall Dexter by a consent decree. gor) were divorced THE DISTRICT COURTS SUBJECT- (a)

By they agreed to leave unde- its terms MATTER JURISDICTION quantum post-ma- of Father's termined the support obligation until the minor jority A. age eighteen complete reach the should (b) high school and to let the district court The District A Court Has Constitutional- party's request) set the amount (upon either ly-Derived Original Cogni- Unlimited post-majority support obligation, of Father's To Fa- zance Over Mother's Claim upon the then-established needs and based Support ther's For Her Disabled Adult child-beneficiary. requirements The Child stopped paying support divorced father when subject-matter ju high T5 The district court's graduated his child from school at By is from the consti age post-decree proceeding of 21. her risdiction derived State's provisions, court Mother moved to enforce tution. Under now review on-the-record, single-level, omnicompetent, as an decree-approved Father's serves "unlimited first-instance tribunal4* with promise provide support parties' for the justiciable offspring. original the trial court's of all matt disabled After ) constitutionally-con (for dismissal want of Moth- ers...."5 While arguments patently certiorari intermix the (Opala, J., 123, 116, concepts continuing subject-matter juris- dissenting); with Interstate Brands Corp. Stephens, argues diction. Mother the terms of the (Opala, J., OK Smith, acquired concurring); Logan consent decree the trial court "continu- J., dissenting); (Opala, ing jurisdiction" Carter the claim enforcement of Father, promise. an on-the-record on the other Gulleft, J., dissenting). (Opala, without hand, claims the trial utterly subject-matter jurisdiction compel support pay- 7(a), § age pertinent Art. 7 OK. the 21 5. The terms of ments the has reached after of (or jurisdiction and its want cannot be cured are: Const., of "* * * filled) decree-merged agreement. by parties' the The District Court shall have unlimited matters, justiciable original of all Article, except provided in this as otherwise Eskridge 587 Ladd, 3, 4. See 1991 OK 811 P.2d powers of review of administrative and such (Opala, concurring); C.J., B.C., Matter 1988 of * * *" by provided statute. action (Opala, J., 749 P.2d 548 concur- 4, 13, 542, OK Hester, added). ring dissenting part); (emphasis part Lee v. in in 30, 16, 243, 246; general tribunals of Pre-1969 district courts were 1982 OK. 642 P.2d Childers v. 7, (repealed County, jurisdiction. § Independent Bryan 7 Okl. Const. Dist. No. 1 Art. School of 930 cases) non-jury dividing or discrete classes conceptually is indivisi or

ferred (domestic, civil, litigation criminal or the ble, though carved even its exercise stands like). interdocket are Because boundaries dockets,6 separate the into several full (rather merely jurisdiction remedial than abridged sweep cognizance of its cannot be al), cognizance court's exercise of district legislation or caselaw. If is the either judicature any issue tendered for its over breadth of district constitutional upon wrong docket will not defeat its jurisdiction, parties' con constitutionally-invested subject- unlimited sent, operates to invest the trial jurisdiction. docket matter Neither cognizance court with over Mother's (or boundary's judgment extension render support. for an The claim adult child's parts) facially of its as coram non void cleаrly bottoming erred in district court judice.8 crossing Errors remedial inter- jurisdiction." its dismissal on "lack of lines, though perhaps on docket correctible appeal,9 impress direct will not themselves as B. judgment a fatal flaw the face of the Impact The of Docket Boundaries remedial roll."10No lines were crossed in on Divorce-Related Issues this case.11" T6 Interdocket boundaries cannot be in jurisprudential T7 develop- Oklzhoma's voked to restrict the tribunal's constitutional very early post-statehood ment has led to a ommicompetence.7 They merely proce are expanded cognizga- accommodation issues separating dural demarcation lines different placed upon ble within the cases what is now (small claims, regimes probate, jury fomily-and-domestic remedial docket the dis- 1967, 13, 1969); Crouch, 2, 14, 467, J., (Opala, 47 Jan. Flick 1967 2002 OK P.3d 473-74 eff. 131, 116, 256, 434 P.2d 261. Since 1969 dissenting); Kane, Wilson v. 6 at \l 6- note supra 8, 721-22; Mulvihill, 5, original juris- district courts exercise unlimited Williams v. 1993 OK justiciable matters, diction of all as other- 14, 1097, 14; T8 n. 846 P.2d 1102 n. Board except 7, provided by §7 Library County wise the Constitution. Art. Law Trustees Oklahoma v. State 1969); (eff. 13, Okl. Const. Jan. ex State rel. ex 122, 11, rel. 1991 OK 15 n. 825 P.2d Petuskey, Brown, 19,

Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. 1974 OK 1285, 1288 n. 11. 491, 519 P.2d 495. judice 8. A case is said to be coram non when the division of the district court's business into brought jurisdic- in which it is is without separate provisions dockets is authorized Goldman, tion to settle the Goldman dispute. 91.2, 0.$.2001 § 20of which stand vitalized 111, 12, 1, citing 1994 OK 883 P.2d 166 n. (SCAD this court's administrative directives No. Trustees, Library supra Board Law note (16 1999), (24 99-87 December 92-06 December (15 Dictionary 31; n. at 1291 n. Buack's Law 1992), (12 1989), (31 September 89-7 89-1 Janu- (5th ed.1979). at 305 1989), (23 1968)). See, ary eg., 68-1 December v. Kane, 6-8, Wilson 1993 OK 1% Wilson, 6-8, at 14 at 721-22. 717, 721-22, analysis for an of interdocket reme- probate judicature. impact dial boundaries' (or order) judgment facially 10. A district court if, roll, judgment inspection void on an of the it is rigidly Interdockеt boundaries are not frozen apparent requisite juris- that one or more of the along jurisdictional some lines. The notion of juris- dictional elements-that diction, matter multiple procedural tracks for some classes of personam cognizance, power or the proceedings district court which cannot be ac- particular render a decision-is shown to have Pleading commodated Code is not new to Producing been absent. Halliburton Oil Co. v. See, body adjective eg., of our law. Grothaus, 110, 110, 1998 OK Act, 0.$.2001 Adoption § Uniform 7501-1.1 1249; Fuller, Code, seq.; Scoufos et the Oklahoma Children's 10 O.S. 723. The materials included in the seq.; governing § 7001-1.1 et statutes filia- provi- roll are those enumerated in the 0.$.2001 proceedings, seg.; § tion 70 et con- 0.$.2001 § sions of 12 32.1. proceedings highways, demnation for 69 O.S. § proceedings condemnation divorce, condemnation, railroads, 0.$.2001 pro- 11. A seq.; probate pro- suit for like 51 et bate, cases, cedure, 0.$.2001 adoption juvenile seq.; provisions et is not stricto governed by general regime sensu §§ 318.2-318.8, 0.8.2001 known commonly Act;" Damages Pleading Langley Sequo- as the "Surface Ward Petroleum Code. v. District Court of 3, 112-3, yah County, v. Stewart, Corp. 1116; Elec., City Tahlequah Region City Tahlequah, v. Lake see this connection of

931 has the That docket become sum, trict court."12 longer T8 In there no doubt divorce- processing channel for both propriety allowing about the the main litigation as well as for all and-family-status expand a litigation's scope divorce suit to the divoree-generated post-decree dis kinds of by injecting process into the decisional extra- court's divorce-related putes. The district generated by issues an interspousal authority approval includes of consent decrees agreement that settles еither some or all parties greater that confer 13 rights marital in contest. stage this post-marital rights than those defined jurisprudential our development, it is much There is hence mo need to direct statute.14 family-and-domestic too late to restrict re-pro that remand the cause be here after solely disputes rights docket that are stat- along a docketroute."15 cessed different 7, 4, J., (the (Opala, supra note at I dissent- the American Law Institute's 473-74 authors and Restatements) ing). publishers of Princirtes or tur Law Faminy Amatysis amp Recommenpa- Dissorution: 2000), reorganization, [Principles] (adopted May Tions when the 16 where 1969 court Before "[mjost jurisdictions district court's constitutional was it is observed that allow the merely "general," incorporate agreement this court had to in a court terms that confirm case-by-case itself, approach power whether maiters not stricto court does not have the to order (i.e., family-status sensu divorce-related or divorce- and to enforce them as terms of the decree." litigation) generated post-decree Id., could docketed be (Incorporation Sepa- 7.10 the Terms a county in the district or in the court. If a case Decree) Agreement ration in a Comment at 1022 court's then-main- did not fit into the district added); 7.11, (emphasis (Reporter's Notes at Priweiptes 1023). docket, tained civil or divorce it would (Introduc- pg. According to the See, county eg., a Green v. deemed Green, court matter. 39-40), pgs. [separation agreements tion at re- 70, (an 1957 OK 309 P.2d 276 action filed favored, solving the terms of dissolution are both Reciprocal Enforcement of under the Uniform existing Principles." under law and these It Support support Act to secure for a child of a separation counsels that "the law enforce should bigamous marriage, in which the court held contract, agreements unless the rules of viewed court); properly brought it was before the district dissolution, in the context have been family Yahola, 306, parte Ex 1937 OK violated, or the terms of the (the 180 Ok. 637 court allowed the district important policy frustrate some of the law of original court's to accommodate an habe- docket family Id. dissolution." corpus against proceeding as a child's father grandmother); Ross, 35, Ross v. 1949 OK 203 jurisprudence long 14. Oklahoma has sanctioned 702, (an original P.2d 705 suit for minor child's expansion family-and-domestic docket brought support was allowed to be in the district by injecting generated through cases issues con- (a) court); Whitney Whitney trilogy: go beyond legislative sent decrees that far 357, 268, 1125-26, P.2d Ok. parameters. limit of divorce-related Consent de- (the recognized equitable property legitimate expanding rights crees are a means of right, quasi-partner- described as an interest in a Whitehead, divorcing parties. Whitehead v. estate, ship arising bigamous marriage from a 91, §10, 1098, 1101; 1999 OK Dicka- right, though marital, and held that Dickason, son v. 1980 OK could be settled in a district court lawsuit be- 674, 677-78; Greeson, Greeson v. (b) bigamous spouses); tween (the consented (the P.2d 194 Ok. 361 court allowed former post-decree retroactive modification of child bigamous spouses bring a district court action orders, support). expand Divorce-related which rights arising property for settlement of from issues, facially were never treated as void (c) marriage); their void only "gen- eten when the district court exercised 245, 246-47, (the 198 Ok. 681 court held jurisdiction." eral After court came to be re- rights that a contract for settlement of claimed organized acquired juris- in 1969 and unlimited by bigаmous spouses was enforceable the dis- greater diction, it is with even reason that we court). By post trict 1969 district court's consent-expanded should now consider all issues general to an unlimited from transformation effectively legitimately within the district pro- a case tribunal the fitness of authority to settle. cessing longer presents a on the divorce track no jurisdictional matter. All cases are now docketa- (under another) Family-and-domestic ble rubric or in the same docket are to one boundaries single-level dynamic shape trial court. be treated as elastic with They is far from static or mummified. change expands. Today's pronounce- jurisdic- law 13. Oklahoma is in the mainstream of logical interspousal agreements ment adds no more than another se- tions that allow to ex- litigation quence: approved promise pand divorce-related issues inclusion of those the child, court could not their absence. See one's disabled adult which is entertain in 932 court's consti

utorily family-and-domestic docket The district brought upon the defined.16 number). (under earlier-assigned cause jurisdic original unlimited tutionally-derived justiciable matters cannot be of all tion interspousal agreement is 110 Once an range cogni by imprisoning its shrunk decree, incorporated into the approved and issues within the divorce-related zance over converted parties' private contract stands by pre-1857 cireumseribed parameters obligation judicially to a solemn enforceable English-law antecedents.17 purely a longer which is no one of of record (or contractual) Be character.18 private-law

EII mid-divorce, promise on-the-record cause a support for one's disabled adult provide THE DISTRICT THE EXTENT OF pоst-decree pro may be enforced in JU- COURTS SUBJECT-MATTER family- ceedings, the claim falls within the IN POST-DECREE RISDICTION boundary.19 In that docket and-domestic STAGES purpose this district court sense and for that promise- may to include all authority ap- docket be said 19 The district post-decree generated, to the end clearly in- issues agreement prove an on-the-record remedies stand pacts that the same enforcement parties' power cludes enforce obligations- all decree-bottomed proceedings accorded through post-decree modification decree, judg- ("from merged a is enforceable as the bond of matrimo- vinculo matrimonii divorce," ny" granting or one "an absolute obligations. like other consent-based ment, much dissolution) might marriage a which means dissent, may According to the a court [while only by special a act of the British obtained general jurisdiction of the matter of have jurisdiction was transferred Parliament. Divorce actions, necessarily it does not follow a class of 1857 from ecclesiastical courts to civil particu- a hear and determine that the court system by the Matrimonial Causes Act of court A court submitted for its consideration. lar case Reaves, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. See Reaves v. 1857, judicial particu- power a have the to decide must 490, 494, 240; P. 15 OKI. 1905 OK 82 particular judgment a lar matter and to render 10, 548, 37 P. Irwin, 29, Irwin v. judgment.... pronounce a valid order J., Holdsworth, (Scott, dissenting); A His- 15 W. juris- upon parties court the not confer Tory (1965); Homer H. Or EncuisH Law 205-06 pronounce particular a decision it en- diction Rerations In THE Clark, Jr., THs Law or Domestic recognized at common ters. 'Divorce was not Unitep 16.1, (2d ed.1988); at Max States were law, where divorces either ecclesiastically History § 269, American Lecar at Radin, Aneto right legislatively granted. The to divorce is or (1936). 512-513 recognized purely statute.' as a creature of Parr, €32, 46, Chapman 799, interspousal agreement approved Accordingly, rights 18. When an is all with decree, (con- statutory incorporated respect are fixed law into the the former to divorce omitted). (citations of the state." tract) extinguished merged in the latter is (decree) by Chapman Chapman, litigation force of law. appears The dissent to view divorce 1369, 1374; straitjacket firmly compressed OK Dicka- in a dissent, According despite its unlim- law. to the Acker, note at at Acker v. son, 14, 19, supra jurisdiction, original is ited the district OK 1219. While impotent issue to consider divorce-related court is not bound the district by legislation. specifically Over- sanctioned rights, parties settling property their ali- analysis Blount, looked the dissent's is that (Blount mony and child legislative textually demonstrable no indicia 477), P.2d once the inter- capacity to curb the district court's intent spousal agreement incorporated de- into the directly judicature upon all issues related broad judicial rights upon approval, cree (as ancillary to divorce contests. This State's enjoy merge will in the under its terms Nation's) strongly jurisprudence mili- well as the T11, supra, Chapman, at at 1374. decree. against adopting dissent-suggested con- tates rights and become These cease be contractual judicature, even if these straints divorce Dickason, judicial obligation. as a enforceable pass could constitutional muster. constraints 677; Acker, at supra, my See III and IV concurrence. Part at 1219. law 17. Neither the three courts of common nor (or chancery marriage that of could dissolve a Hunter, 98, 13-4, 19. Warren (an decree). interparental support claim for grant separate a A divorce maintenance board", (from parent child is who is an adult actionable et thoro "bed and which mensa providing legal separation) the child with the necessities of life on could be meant decree of basis; courts; day-to-day equitable right of contri- procured a divorce a from ecclesiastical

933 solely decree-rendering prius as well vain because the that are statute-based nisi those inter-spousal approved cognizance derive from court stood sams to transform as those that pacts obligation judg decreed into an enforceable .20 ment for the requisite latter's want of a here 1 11 need not be concerned about We jurisdictional power element-that to en post-decree standing the custodial Mother's support judgment ter favor of an adult to enforce Fa plaintiff as a Hohfeldian*21 child.?23 invalidity The decree's facial also is promise. is the ob- ther's on-the-record She urged to from stem the dissent's view that court-approved agreement as ligee of a well interspousal agreement the terms of the are support adult as a co-contributor of for her indefinite and hence as a con unenforceable capacity child. In that dual she would be tract. beneficiary standing entitled to both as the (if promise proves qualify an it enforceable A. category) as well as the actual under liability provider legal for which Complete Judgment In the Absence of a parents.22 extend to both will now Roll, a Forensic Assessment of the De- Invalidity Impermissi- cree's Facial Is IV ble DE- THE OF THE DISSENTS VIEW judgment may A113 not be attacked for SUPPORT DUTY CREE-IMPOSED invalidity facial (complete) when the entire AAS JURISDICTION-VITIATING judgment incorporated roll24 has not been THE FACIAL DEFECT RESTS ON into the record for review.25 The record (1) NOTION THAT THE MISTAKEN necessary before us falls far short of what is CONTRACT INTERSPOUSAL WAS jurisdictional to establish a facial defect (2) INDEFINITE, IT UNEN- WAS duty-creating the 1998 decree.26 QUA AND FORCEABLE CONTRACT (3) ITS DECREE-IMPOSED DUTY B. IN A STANDS SUSPENDED JURIS- Catapulted DICTIONAL VACUUM A Law Be Mistake of Cannot to the Level of a Jurisdictional appears argue 12 The dissent had Flaw the trial court not dismissed Mother's motion (for cognizance), complete judgment want of the efforts to en- 1 14 Even if a roll were court, promise foree Father's would have been now before the an attack on the de- elements, parent may pressed requisite jurisdictional the custodial 23. For the three bution against nonpaying parent). supra see note 10. Dickason, 14, 119-13, note at 677- supra proper judgment 24. The record or roll consists of return, petition, pleadings process, ''the thereto, verdicts, orders, subsequent reports, plaintiff judi- 21. A Hohfeldian is one who seeks judgments, proceedings all acts and material party litigant cial determination as that it has 32.1; 0.$.2001 § of the court." 12 Elliott v. right, privilege, immunity power'" "a or a Guthrie, 8, 861, 1986 OK n. 725 P.2d opposite party. Macy vis-a-vis the Board 863, n. 1985 OK 8; Mayhue Mayhue, Com'rs, 53, 28, County 11 1999 OK 12 n. 890, n. n. 17. 17, 895, 1137-38 n. Toxic Waste Impact Group, Leavitt, Inc. v. n. jurisdictional 25. The absence of a element from a J., (Opala, concurring); 1n. Fowler v. judgment support. roll must be rested on record Bailey, OK 160 n. P.2d n. Chamberlin, Chamberlin C.J., Jaffe, concurring); (Opala, Louis L. 721, 725; Oklahoma City City, Salazar Litigant As In Public Actions: The non- Citizen 20, 111-12, 1061-62. Ideological Plaintiff, or 116 U.Pa. Hohfeldian (1968). L.Rev. 1033 appeal only includes three 26. The record October items from the roll of the 16 (par- at M Warren, 3-4, ents, petition, 1993 decree-Mother's divorce Father's co-obligors support, for child are re- contribute, journal entry granting quired equally equitably, answer and the October either discharge obligation). toward the a divorce. common Upon the record before invalidity.30 facial duty support for the provide cree-imposed us, clearly child, alleged here unw on an that kind of attack is adult based disabled arranted.31 flaw, The de- impermissible. would be facial does not constitute feet Father invokes

infirmity to divest the court that would serve C. jurisdiction post-decree modifica of over infirmity in the quest. The relied-on tion Misplaced Chapman v. The Reliance On was) (H any clause there critical decree In A Pre- District Courts Parr Places error, legal rather at most constitute would Straitjacket Jurisdictional Statehood A jurisdiction-vitiating defect. than a facial Chapman 116 The dissent's reliance not taint ty apparent mistake law will of that courts exer Parr32 for the notion imprint invali judgment roll offacial ju "without cising cognizance divorce are "jurisdic dity."27 use of the term Excessive entertaining when issues risdiction" or for synonym mere for error tion"-as by statutory law is an authorized divoree deficiency-introduces confusion other some Chapman extension both unwarranted undermines the district into the law and of Irwin,33 case on which and Irwin v. cognizance. sweep of court's constitutional Chapman dealt duty protect stability Chapman of is bottomed. This court's is to proce judgments expose inapplicability general rather than them to of venue with the durally unwarrant impermissible and hence litigation. to divorcee It statutes refused delayed ed attacks. the common law's extend to divorcee suits doctrine. intrastate non conveniens forum I A district court has over Chapman effective To that extent is still judgments to the same extent unenforceable appears Chapman Insofar ‍​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‍as to treat law. claims.28 it does over nonactionablе cases) (sitting in as eu judges trial divorce authority to deal with When straitjacket, nuchs fitted into pow and extent of the present, the manner antiqua holding relegated should be its exercise, excessive, though patently must er's exposition of rian lore as an aberrational undisturbed, a direct attack stand absent Chapman on Irw post-statehood law. relies timely years29 three The launched within in,"34 pronouncement by Supreme interspousal agreement, even if deficient for Territory of of Inso Court Oklahoma. specificity, longer lack of would no be vulner deny Chapman for its far as the district to an attack unless it be mounted able 8, ously. Mayhue, supra note 24 at 15 n. at 893 Mouse, 157, 110, 27. Estate 1993 OK Matter 1284, 1286, citing Vanguard 864 P.2d Underwrit- 8; Woodrow, 28, 6, n. at 1 at 171. For 86, 11, Amick, ju- Co. v. OK. 512 P.2d the difference between absence and excess of ers Ins. City see Tax Com'n v. Vend- risdiction Oklahoma ex Land 807, 808; State rel. Commissioners 742, Keller, 371, 19, 110, 117-8, 97, ing, "1 264 P.2d 1953 OK 1992 OK 835 P.2d 104-05 Office 746; C.J., City City, concurring judgment). (Opala, Oklahoma Fitesimmons 422, 16, 340, 342, OK 192 OKI. 248. IV(F), 31. See discussion in Part infra. Ewing, 28. Woodrow v. 1953 OK Regardless post-remand pro- 171. 32. 521 P.2d 799. outcome, absolutely ceeding's there is no doubt power jurisdictional about the trial court's Supra 33. note 17. The dissent also relies on quest. Mother's entertain modification Williams, Williams Roesler, In Roesler v. Johnston, 29. See Pettis v. 550, 550-51, the court observes T4, Scoufos, supra note P. 688 and wholly a divorce is creature of "[whhile 725, holding that a valid on its face Williams, [citing supral, di- statute actions for passage three not be attacked after purely equi- property are of vorce and division of years. Father did not attack the 26 October 1993 cognizance." quoted explana- Roesler table The facially decree as infirm for want correctly identifies the notion that Oklahoma tion until 2000. At that time he was limited judges who hear divorcе cases are not in the 0.$.2001 invalidity. facial See 12 attack for English legal system's straitjacket imposed § 1038. parliamentary antecedents. ecclesiastical or merely wanting Jurisdiction is not but exceed- Supra judicial authority ed when is exercised errone- note 17. power approval specified to entertain for time.37 parties' promise The here issues, agreement-generated pure ipse it is under specifies review that the post-majority utterly unsupported by dixit-a statement will be determined the trial judge by any based the established needs and post-statehood text of Irwin or jurisprudence of this court. The territorial requirements of the disabled adult child pronouncement only stands not age when he reaches graduates 18 or precedential effect, sams it is impris also high school. The decree-approved in- from oned territorial divorcee law that is con terspousal agreement controversy clearly trary (post-statehood) to this court's extant contemplates proceedings to ascer further 35 (as jurisprudence present- well as to the tain quantum post-majority Father's day statutory regime). divoree-law support obligation. parties' agreement decree-imposed support duty are hence legal free from both infirmity

D. and fa invalidity. cial Jurispru- Settled Common-Law Contract Against Attributing

dence Militates E. Enforceability Lack Of To The Decree- Imposed Support Obligation For Want The Common Law Of Contracts Is Not Im- Of In Definiteness Father's Promise plicated Here Because Mother Is En- pure 17 Even under contract law the lack forcing Obligation, A Solemn Judicial of obligation's specificity the assumed Not A Contract preclude not enforceability its if the trial {18 determine, Mother court is able to enforcing is with a reasonable here a solemn degree certainty, of parties what obligation the had created the merger of Judicial intended.36 A contract will not fail for lack of in, promise Father's incorporation and its specificity into, in its terms if it is clear that the the decree which now stands converted parties contemplated open the judgment38 terms to be by caselaw that authorizes specified resolved in a manner in and approved enforcement of interspousal agree open e.g., more terms 35. See, are left a contract for sale does Whitehead, 14, 110, note at at supra not parties fail for indefiniteness if the Dickason, 14, note at ¥ 9-13, at 677- have in- supra tended to make a contract and there is a reason- 78; Greeson, 14, 110, note at at 278. supra ably giving appropriate certain basis for an rem- edy." According to the Uniform Commercial Bivings, 36. Brown v. 1954 OK 673; 671, Elmore, § Code Comment 232, 2-204, follows P.2d "Oklahoma Watts v. T8, 220, 223; previously required Moran, courts have not absolute cer- Webbv. tainty respects grant agree- in all 369, relief. The 121, 308, 312; Publishing Harlow 0, sufficiently ment has been held Patrick, 579, certain if the Co. v. 11 181 Okla. court could par- determine the intention of the syl. P.2d 511 181 Ok. 83. Once * * * pre- ties. Since the Oklahoma courts have parties it is determined that the intended to form viously considering liberal been in all the binding agreement, circum- certainty of the terms is stances, searching important the intention of the only determining as a "basis for enforcing agreement, it does not giving existence of a appropri- breach and for appear materially changes (Second) this section remedy." ate Okla- Restatement of Contracts sum, 33(2). homa law." the common law that ante- UCC, adoption dates the of Artiсle 2 of much itself, supports enforceability like the Article principle It is a settled that the law does not of contracts with terms that are indefinite but agreements ground favor invalidation of on the capable being agreed of ascertained methods uncertainty. A contract is not void for uncer- parties. and known to both The lack of tainty because it fails to set out details as to the specific necessarily terms does not invalidate subject matter if it can be ascertained with a long open missing contracts as as the terms degree certainty reasonable what certainty by could be reduced to the use of extra- Brown, intended. 673; note at Watts, supra Contracts, § neous evidence. 4.1, p. note at 223; Webb, note at supra supra (1993). 533 n. 19 long 312. This has been the common law in Oklahoma. It is now in 124 0.8.2001 codified T11, § 2-204 Chapman, supra Commercial Code note 18 at at Uniform 0.$.2001 2-204(3) [UCC]. The terms of 12A Dickason, 677; Acker, note at supra provide pertinent part: though "Even one or at 1219. parents' legislature, court nor Father's Because judgment.39 qua ments for his disabled support sup provide that creates a promise agreement interspousal (1) a con contrary public unenforceable as clearly is not duty adult child is port (2) a vital lacking specificity tract of American nor to the mainstream policy incorporated into agreement part of the jurisprudence. decree, invulnerable in the now merged that does interspousal An T20 defects,41 the district for nonfacial attack principles quali any public policy not offend authority adjudicate with court is vested The outer bounds judicial approval. fies for exercise quest in the modification jurisdictional perimeter the district (Mother-invoked) en power to ascertain and agree approved incorporation obli for decretal Father's assumed quantum force with their sanctioned are co-extensive gation. ments in contest here critical terms terms. The F. (1) assumption promise-based are: Father's (2) responsibility, post-majority According Of Ameri- The Mainstream To perform quantum is to be set after whose Subject, A Jurisprudence On can (3) due, proceeding post-decree in a ance is Support Disabled To One's Promise (4) through and en processed which will be Contrary To Is Neither Adult Child very same trial court Policy forced Nor Unenforceable Public imposed nonconsen- if it were an manner as {19 early common law did Although the duty. None of these terms exceeds sual duty support parental one's not extend of boundary. jurisdictional district court's majori minority,42 great beyond a child's inject not a fatal incorporation does Their jurisdictions, in which the ty of American Moreover, no judgment roll.45 flaw into the silent, recognized an has statutory law is for facial inval may be condemned where, here, the child is unable exception judicial inspection of idity a majority.43 without attaining to care for itself attempt to ex The dissent's entire roll."46 developme on common-law This view is rested require time of the 1998 de decrees from the law's empt consent at the nts.44 While examination by (ealling for a four-corners' ment neither been addressed cree the issue had g § that the Principles." Comment to 3.24 notes supra note 14. 39. See cases cited in post- states are silent as to statutes most of children, IV(D), majority support "in disabled supra. Part See for judicially many extended courts have which case obligation chil- support to adult disabled III, 41. See Part suрra. Id., Kamp Kamp, citing support 640 in dren." Streb., (Wyo.1982); Streb v. (D.C. 774 50-51 P.2d A.2d 113 Nelson, 548 Nelson Annotation, 1989); 1988) (Alaska Koltay, Obligation Koltay (citing Parent's to Child, (1948)). Support Adult 1A.L.R.2d910 (Colo.1983); Nelson, 1374, 1377 supra Ohio St.3d Castle, at Castle v. note Principres, supra (1984); Institute's 43. See American Law Kinder v. 806-807 473 N.E.2d 39-40, 3.13(1) §§ pgs. at note Introduction (1991), S$.E.2d Schlaegel, W.Va. Sup- (Effect Agreement Smith, on a Child a Parental noting contrary view in Smith v. but of 3.24(4) (Duration ), Sup- the Child port (1989). Award 447 N.W.2d Mich. (The Enforceability Obligation), port 7.09 ), (Incorporation Agreement Separation 7.10 the court observes Nelson, Decree). Agreement Separation in a Terms of (a) the "trend the absence of statute 3.13(1) § "The child- pertinent terms of are: recog- considering to among this issue is courts agreement support parental should be terms of a duty support adult parental for the nize the adopted by approved the court unless of the com- child as a natural extension disabled substantially agreement provides less child obligation support for minor chil- mon law be awarded under than would otherwise 116) (b) (id. majority vast that the dren" 3.24(4) Chapter." state: The terms of developing that the courts "have found of those agreement parties may by extend the dura- ''The (id. 115). duty" imposes such a common law obligation." According child-support tion of the parties may al- 3.24: "The to Comment h IV(B) supra. 45. See Part obligations each ways agree to a child or to by imposed law. This is those other that exceed IV(A) law and in these consistent theme in current 46. See Part supra. proper) logic of the record rests neither on post-decree domestic docket as a dispute. authority."47 nor on extant Mother's decree is The district authority extends clearly impervious issues, to the dissent's attack on those arising decree, after the divorcee (and which generated by were approved today an its facial fitness. Were we follow memorialized) analysis the dissent's and were we to con mid-divoree impos- demn-upon incomplete judgment ing roll- duty Father a to support his disabled part the assailed of the decree as unenforcea adult child. facially jurisdictional excess, apparent ble for 122 The in a divorcee suit adjudged rights Mother's would become im- expand litigation's scope by injecting into permissibly extinguished by interposition of process the decisional extra-statutory issues after-pronounced jurisprudence. Because generated by their approved agreement validity, meaning, judg and effect of a which settles some or rights all marital always assayed by

ment must be the law controversy. The district court's constitu entered, judicial in force at the time it was omnicompetent tion-derived cognizance that testing adjudged of these factors unquestionably includes divorce suits obligation kept impair be must free from be pre cireumseribed resort legislation ment after-enacted (onee English-law restrictions attached to ec after-promulgated caselaw.48 judicature clesiastical divorcee and to the now- authority defunct of the British Parliament

y acts).49 to dissolve marriages by special Nonprecedential pre-statehood jurisprudence MY SUMMARY OF VIEWS that would make the district impotent IN CONCURRENCE to consider divorce-related issues outside omnicompetence 121 Constitutional specifically those legislation sanctioned legisla- the district court is not cannot regarded as a exposition correct abridgement. tive The district "un- court's present-day Oklahoma law. jurisdiction" limited authority includes the 'I 23 Settled common-law extra-statutory resolve jurispru- promise- contract status- or generated related issues a decree-ap- firmly dence against militates declaring Fa- proved, interparental agree- on-the-record ther's obligation assumed unenforceable be- post-majority ment for support of a disabled cause his promise was not in a definite marriage. child of the The issues settled presents amount. challenge The case no real interspousal agreement, an though expand- judge's jurisdiction to the trial over Moth- ing range the divorce cognizable suit's post-decree er's child-support quest. The matters, subject- neither decree-imposed obligation court's is now invulnera- defeat jurisdiction matter nor any make the suit un- ble to attack jurisdiction want for qualified for processing upon family-and- other pressed grounds than one of facial exempted 47. Consent decrees are not an rubric 27, 112, OK 865, 870; 827 P.2d Timmons v. qua from the sine non four-corners' examination. Co., Globe Ins. 1985 OK 1 13, 713 P.2d Royal (or stipulate The failed to as to even 594 n. v. 1985 OK 68, Mayhue Mayhue, on) suggest they agreed that the contents of the T6, 706 P.2d 890, 894; Nantz, v. 1988 OK Nantz complete judgment proceedings roll in the that 9, 16, J., (Opala, 749 P.2d dissent- jurisdictional led to the decree here under ing); Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum scrutiny. The burden to show a flaw on the face 16, 124, 438, 449; Corp., 1986 OK 732 P.2d Salazar, judgment roll is cast on Father. Askew, 37, 18, Wootten v. 1983 OK 668 P.2d supra duty at 1061. It was his 1123, 1124-125, citing Crain v. Farmer's United to have in the record the four corners of the Pool, 134, 113, 1970 OK 472 P.2d Cooperative judgment appeal roll. The record for Mother's 882, 884 and Curtis 1961 OK Barby, stipulation is devoid of her that the decree is 1T 31-32, 616, 622; v. Socony Bomford facially fatally Nothing void. short of Moth- Mobil Co., 43, 124, Oil 440 P.2d 713, (or concession) er's admission will stipulated 720-21; Company American-First Title & Trust suppоrt analysis. the dissent's Ewing, Hedges Hedges, English upon For the various restrictions di- 364, 374; Evans, Evans v. 10-11, judicature vorce see Messenger Messenger, note 17. 145, 149; Enforcing agreement impermissi- re- the latter

invalidity. The record for this certiorari jurisdiction parties to confer appearance bly facial allows the presents no view particular jurisdictional apparent upon pronounce Even an the court fatal flaw. judgment Legislature not taint the that the has not current- law would decision mistake of If invalidity. of facial imprint roll ly to the court. extended ju- ordinary error were to become a facial case, correctly T2 In this the trial court infirmity no would risdictional did not enter determined delayed and unwarranted at- be safe from agreement as to the legally into a enforceable policy Public calls on this court tack. obligations after the child terms of their protect judgments them from stabilize majority. They merely agreed that reaches unauthorized assaults. The district jurisdiction" the court "retain to de- jurisdiction to entertain is not divested of sup- for child post-minority application cide a quest Mother's for Father's enforcement of reads, port. pertinent Their duty. District courts have decree-imposed part: jurisdiction of actions that are barred ORDERED, AD- IT IS THEREFORE as of those in which en- limitations as well sought by the Court forceability of a decree is to be de- JUDGED AND DECREED jurisdictional grounds. pay support the Defendant shall feated on Dollars in the amount of Four Hundred [ 24 This case is not at all about want of ($400.00), support from the child deviated enforceability rather but about "A", as Exhibit guidelines, attached hereto decree-imposed duty support of Father's agreed upon by parties. Due to the if, adult child. Even as Father his disabled child, special par- minor needs decree-imposed duty jurisdic- urges, his were agreed support to leave the child ties have flawed, tionally the district court would have age open after the minor child reaches the accept reject that defense. (18) high eighteen completes and/or juris- trial dismissal "for want of school, jurisdic- and the Court will retain clearly erroneous and must be diction" was party application tion either file court, by prius if the nisi reversed even specific based for further ruling's confusing phraseology, meant to ac- requirements needs and the minor jurisdictional cept challenge. Father's For child, any. disposition a total the latter there is here invalidity. record-supported facial absence added). (emphasis reversing 125 I hence concur the nisi juris general a court have T3 While remanding prius order and the cause for subject matter diction of the class post-remand proceedings to be consistent actions, necessarily it does not follow that the today's pronouncement with particular hear determine a court and for its consideration. A court case submitted BOUDREAU, J., with whom LAVENDER judicial power must have ‍​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‍the to decide a WINCHESTER, JJ., join, dissenting: and particular particular matter and to render a major judg judgment pronounce T1 I there is a in order to a valid dissent because Stork, enforcing agreement ment. Stork v. 898 P.2d difference between Roberts, 17; Peity obligates and wife that 738 n. v. between husband Isenhower, 602; pay support one or the other to child after a Isenhower APP 666 P.2d 238. The 1983 OK CIV majority, enforcing an child reaches and attempts parties may upon to court not confer the court the agreement which vest the jurisdiction support with to determine a child jurisdiction pronounce particular to deci sion it enters.1 obligation majority. the reaches after child jurisdiction necessary empower particular judgment. to a court If one of these three 1. The (1) types: lacking, purported judgment to a valid is of three requisites render is a the (2) jurisdiction parties, jurisdiction of the of the nullity Kittredge Kittredge, and is void. (3) 30,OK 911 P.2d 903. general subject judicial power to matter and particular decide a and to render the matter recognized T4 parent "Divorce was at com- can bind himself or by agree herself law, support ment to beyond a child mon where divorces were either ecclesi- minority. astically legislatively granted. right The However, agreement may be enforced recognized purely to divorceeis a creature by only the parties if the intend the Parr, Chapman of statute." agreement to be final and binding only and Williams, Williams agreement the nothing leaves for determina Accordingly, tion question court on the of the terms rights parties respect all with to divorce obligation. Whitehead, of the See are fixed law of the state. at 1101.2 pro- T5 The relevant statute in this case T8 today, Before we had held that a trial vides: court retains in a divoree action Any child shall support by be entitled to parties' agreement enforce the that the parents eigh- until the child reaches wife would receive a certain percentage of (18) years age. teen If dependent the husband's future income in lieu prop- regularly child is continuously and attend- erty Kittredge, division. supra. We had ing school, high said child shall be entitled also held that a trial court retains support parents through age parties' agreement enforce the that the (18) eighteen years. wife would receive per "$650.00 month ... 112(D) (eff. Supp.1998 48 O.S. June period such as [the husband] continues to 1993). employment draw or retirement income from statute, T6 In enacting this Legisla- Burlington Northern Army and retirement." authority ture limited the of the trial court to Whitehead, supra. In both Kittredge and issue a support authority child order. The of Whitehead, parties entered into a final the trial court comes to an end when a child nothing left for determina- (or eighteen years later, age reaches if the tion the court question on the of the terms regularly child is continuously attending agreement. school) high power the court has no Today, majority T9 opinion seems to provision make or continue a sup- for child say there is no difference between what the port Certainly Legislature thereafter. parties agreed in Kittredge and Whitehead can authority extend the trial court's if it so parties agreed what the to in this case. desires, Lookout, Lookout v. 1974 OK CIV my major In view there is a difference. APP power but that re- cases, the former entered into only sides Legislature, with not with the fully agreements executed which left the trial parties. nothing court with to do but enforce the T7 concurring opinion goes great agreed case, terms. In this left lengths to stress that judi- Oklahoma allows the terms of their post-minority cial approval of consent decrees that confer obligations open for the court to decide after parties greater post-marital rights majority. the child reached than those proposi- defined statute. This tion of seriously law cannot be contested. € 10 a trial may approve While court Unquestionably parties the in a any divorce ac- type of issue-expanding agree- enforce may, by tion agreement, expand the parties case, issues ment offered the in a divorce beyond what trial court could. Whitehead the trial court not determine issues be- Whitehead, youd scope the of its authority, Kittredge v. Kittredge, 1995 OK parties even when the attempt to confer such Likewise, 903. there is no that a power on the court. doubt arguing pure Rather, 2. In that even under contract law governed by this case. this case is the obligation's the lack of the specificity assumed requires law common of contracts which a con- enforcement, preclude would not the concur- sufficiently significant tract to be definite in its 2-204(3) ring opinion § cites of the Oklahoma terms to be enforceable. Edwards v. Board of Code, 0.$.2001 §§ Uniform Commercial 12A 1- Education Oklahoma 1946 OK 183, 169 City, 2-204(3) seq. applies only 101 et Section to P.2d 1015. goods applicability transactions in and has no to their obli- to terms of the the argues that concurring opinion 11 The majority, but decree, child reaches gations after the it would infirmity in the is an there could retain merely agreed that the court than a legal error rather most constitute ap- post-minority decide their respectfully I defect. jurisdictional-vitiating decree, clause in the support. The trial The critical disagree. for child plication jurisdic- no legal correctly that it had than determined more my opinion, constitutes judicial the issue. tion to decide erroneous exercise or the error court with attempts to vest the authority. It the trial court. 'I 14 I affirm In by statute. provided is not power that situation, wanting. jurisdiction is this AFTER OPINION SUPPLEMENTAL for is void trial court's decision 112 The DENIAL REHEARING'S the the face of jurisdiction because lack of OPALA, V.CJ. one of the that at least judgment roll reveals lacking, the is three elements of {1 dispute comes now matrimonial This particular the рronounce judicial power appellant's motion to for our consideration Stork, entered. Stork decision that was Rule 1.14a1 Supreme Court tax costs. See Accordingly, 738.3 1995OK § of 12 0.98.2001 9782 provisions any time may be attacked decision and the three granted motion is Appellant's action. independent an case or the same (totaling sought recovered to be cost items Grothaus, Producing v.Co. Halliburton Oil $333.75) allowed. stand 110,981P.2d 1998OK I sum, parent can himself bind a child be- by agreement herself §OF 978 COMMAND THE PROVISIONS cannot confer minority, parents yond but APPEL A THAT PREVAILING decide, after the jurisdiction on a court OF COSTS ON REVERSAL LANTS post- majority, the terms child has reached BE TAXED DE CUR-S A JUDGMENT in con- minority support. In the case U3 accurately appre- troversy, trial court terms of whose 12 The not enter into that the did hended return, parties stipulate process in their argues concurring opinion we lack a that 3. The and, they signed appeal into and a consent complete judgment accord- that entered roll on briefs judgment ingly, decree cannot be attacked roll of the consent the 1993 divorce decree. The judgment invalidity. (aided by roll consists of The facial admissions divorce decree return, pleadings process, petition, briefs) complete enough ''the to warrant in their facially orders, verdicts, pronouncement the decree is void. thereto, that reports, subsequent proceedings judgments, acts and and all material 0.$.2001-32.1. general- While court." 0.$.2001, 1.14a, of Rule 1. The terms App. ly instrument Court will not notice part, provide: pertinent record, part appellate uncontrovert- is not any expense shall not tax as costs admit- ''The Clerk that record which stand ed facts outside same, claiming prior person parties' briefs be considered unless the ted in the cause, deficiently-assembled supplement or incom- file a mandate in the shall issuance of Savings & plete judgment Federal roll. First of taxable Clerk a verified statement with the Nath, showing person paid Loan Assn. v. has cost items 1342 note same." objection party to the trial voiced an Neither consent divorce de- determination of the 0.$.2001 provisions 978 state: of 12 incomplete invalidity based cree's facial reversed, judgment or final order is ''When a roll, any missing doc- nor asserted that costs, plaintiff error shall recover his in uments, inspection, presented there for transcript including of the the costs of the relating anything legally significant to the reveal case-made, peti- with the proceedings, or filed judgment Nor was the decree's roll. condition and when reversed in error; tion in part objection Court on any ever raised before this equally part, shall be divided in costs affirmed ground. appeal includes all The record on supplied) parties." (emphasis between the judgment from the roll essential items petition, mother's divorce decree: rendered, translates as answer, Simply de cursu-which entry granting 3. journal and the father's taxing costs the context of in Although "of course""-means it does not contain decree. 978, § THE procedure regulated OF TERMS WHICH APPLY enforcement is APPEALS, TO ALL 1.142, ARE NOT AL- Rule mandate that at the conclusion of TERED BY THE MATRIMONIAL appellate litigation prevailing party CHARACTER THE OF CASE entitled to recover taxable costs de cursu.4 may The court clerk tax provisions § The 978 and of costs, fees, filing such as those described as Rule 1.14a are as applicable appeals in losing party judicial to the sans intervention.5 disputes matrimonial they as appeals are to If prevailing party has submitted "veri in other classes of litigation.7 Though Gil fied statement of taxable cost items" before Gilcrease,8 case, crease v. a 1986 declares issuance of the mandate accordance with Supreme Court is vested with "abso 1.142, litigant may Rule the victorious also be lute discretion" to tax appeal costs on of a reporter's expenses.6 awarded the court divorcee proceeding, its text is not a correct exposition present-day governing law costs prevailing party 13 As on reversal appeal on of a dispute.9 matrimonial The (for appellant filing is entitled to two fees her @ilerease language in adopts which this view petition certiorari), in error and that for to pure ipse is dixit opinion cites no taling These deposits cost items are $300.00. authority upon which the rule was rested.10 They taxable de cursu. granted should be to Moreover, expressed the view there is an (as appellant prevailing party on reversal of aberration landscape. Oklahoma-law order) the trial court's dismissal in accor pronouncement-that Its taxing appellate § dance with Appellant the terms of 978. costs in divorcee purely cases is discretion also reporter's is entitled to have the court ary-has not been any followed in other ($83.75) expense taxed as costs. Before the Oklahoma published opinion. short, mandate, submitted, issuance of she has longer Gilerease norm no carries the force of 1.142, required by proof payment Rule for law. Because the case has never been cited reporter's the court services. any Oklahoma opinion nor followed in day-to-day

actual Supreme practice, Court it fell into efficacy by disuse and lost its II hereby doctrine of It desuetude.11 over

ruled. decision, Chamberlin, appellate 3, 11, that after supra or ordi- 7. (apply- note at 726 ing nary generally party's request § summarily by appellate cost items 978 to a are taxed costs Jackson, clerk, dispute); in matrimonial Jackson v. the ministerial act of a without ante- 25, 122, 418, (declining OK 45 P.3d judicial party's request. cedent action or a grant party proceeding in a divorce its costs on Chamberlin, 30, Chamberlin 111 n. appeal prevailing party because it was not the regulate 25, 721, 726 n. 25. We taxa- judgment, ruling reversal of a consistent with by procedure tion of these de cursu cost items 978). the terms of prescribed by Rule 1.14a. 8. sylb. 176 Okla. 2; provisions supra 4. See the note 3. Perkins, Company Williams Natural Gas 72, 1126, 491. Chamberlin, 3, N11, 726; supra note at Jack- son, note I7, 22, at 429. supra Perkins, 491; Chamberlin, supra note at Gilcrease, supra sylb. 10. See note at note 111 n. 726 n. 25. supra Ullman, 497, 511-12, 11. See Poe 367 U.S. 6. Chamberlin, 3, T11, see (1961). "[A) S.Ct. 6 LEd.2d 989 Clark, generally, Owens v. legal validity by being norm lose its never (holding party 177 Okla. 519 that a who applied obeyed-by or so-called desuetude. De- appeal won reversal on was entitled to costs on custom, negative suetude be described as appeal sought provided by manner Su- validity and its essential function is abolish the preme [present-day Kelsen, Court Rule No. Rule existing of an custom." Hans Pure TeEo- ry Law, 1.14]). (Max Trans.1967). Knight 942 HI hand, require judicial may determination and subject equitable apportionment.21 be $ 978 ARE NOT

THE PROVISIONS OF distinguished cursu, de from ex Costs PARI MATERIA12 THOSE IN WITH penses, regulated by equitable are never § 43 110D13 OF 0.8.2001 principles. They purely statutory.22 are "expenses" The terms "costs" and are nei § 15 The terms of 978 and those interchangeable synonymous. ther nor In regulate § not the same of 110D do disputes, § appeals from matrimonial 110D together. and should not construed matter (which only exрenses) addresses will not con solely § costs provisions of 978 address (which § governs ap trol over costs on primarily § appeal those of 110D while peal). in expenses authorize allowance of trial-court Though Larman v. Larman23 and litigation. appel to tax party A who seeks Stepp Stepp24 party left each in a divorcee § authority must late costs under the proceeding paying with the burden of its own court,14 pursuit appellate in initiate its attorney's litigation-related expenses, fee and § litigant quest of a 110D matri while germane today's analy these cases are not initially press for monial must allowance Stepp sis. Neither Larman nor addresses short, § 110D relief the trial court.15 (which appellate taxable costs are at issue generally granted allowances are not but here). Bingham Bingham25 inap- also is only appellate tribunal. reviewed posite Though Bing- to the issue before us. Moreover, govern § the terms taxable appellate equally ham costs divides be exelusively,16 appellate "eosts" whereas dispute, tween the in a matrimonial it regulate §of "ex those 110D allowance of any grounds any does not state or cite au penses" enforcing modifying or incurred (not 110D) thority § even for this conclusi exp are divoree-court order.17 Costs Bingham on.26 does not refer to taxation The former are creatures of statutes appellate upon judg costs reversal of a enses.18 19 are court taxed de cursu only ment. It deals with allocation of these 20" upon specific clerk tariffs enacted judgment.27 based costs affirmance of a Fi legislature. nally, Expenses, Bingham precedential on the other lacks status. pari terminology granting 12. Statutes in materia are those that relate 525. The used for costs person thing having expenses widely. Statutory to the same or a common or differs costs are Dictionary (5th ed.) purpose. equitable expenses Brack's Law "taxed" the court while by judge's ruling. are "allowed" 0.$.2001 (now provisions § 13. The of 43 110D 110E) § state: 19. Co., 730, 127, Howe v. Fed. Surety ''The court in its discretion make addi- 404, 407, 144; 161 Okla. see also Owens, expenses tional orders relative to the 6, 120, note at 203. supra actions, subsequent including such but not lim- corpus, brought by ited writs of habeas Chamberlin, 3, 25, supra 20. note 1 11 n. at 726 n. attorneys, for the their enforcement 25. any interlocutory or modification of or final orders in the divorce action made for the bene- Fleet, 18, 120, also, supra 21. note see party respective fit of either or their attor- Rand, supra note 18. neys." 978, supra § 14. See the note 22. terms 2. Howe, 407, Owens, See note supra at 203. supra 110D, provisions supra § 15. See the note 13. 23. 1999 OK 991 P.2d 536. supra 16. See the terms of note 2. 24. 1998 OK 955 P.2d 722. 17. See 110D, note 13. provisions 25. OK CIV APP Ltd., Sanguine, 18. See Fleet v. (differentiating ordinary 854 P.2d 892 between equi- de costs that be taxed cursu and Id. litigation expenses); explanation ‍​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‍table for an equitable litigation expenses generally, see Rand Nash, 174 Okla. Id.

IV ment, a faithful exposition of existing law on appellate taxation of costs in matrimonial WHEN TAXING COURT COSTS COURTS disputes, does not alter pres the course of ADHERE MUST STRICTLY TO ent-day merely law but excises body from its LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS growth aberrational of antiquarian juris prudence long in desuetude. Combining appeal-related T7 at torney's appellate fee with costs for treat single category

ment as a of burdens to be VI imposed appellate in the aftermath litiga SUMMARY strips Legislature tion of its control over Early jurisprudence court costs. carefully T10 In obedience to provisions legislative avoids this conflict between § clearly which mandate appellate that judicial authority by ceding legislature to the costs be tazed de cursu in favor pre- responsibility the sole for controlling the tax vailing party judgment, on reversal of a regime taxing ation of court costs. When 1.142, to Rule governs which proce- in-court strictly court costs courts adhere must statute, dure for the enforcement of that legislative enactments.28 appellant's motion to tax appellate costs granted. her Any favor is ruling other 18 It is this duty obey open be an judicial invitation to dispensation legislative cost-allocation scheme.29 Section favors, practice which place has no in the very plainly prescribes appellate legislative regime of regulation. court-costs costs be taxed in favor of prevailing The costs today taxed shall be enforced party. exceptions It allows no the trial receiving court-after this court's litigation class of and leaves no room for mandate-and their execution shall be dealt judicial tinkering. with in the same manner as if each item had been taxed below. y HODGES, LAVENDER, TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT IS HARGRAVE,SUMMERS and RETROACTIVE AND APPLIES BOUDREAU, JJ., concur. TO THE PRESENT CASE not, T9 The court need as the dis WATT, C.J., and KAUGER and counsels, sent apply today's ruling prospec WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent. tively. past practice taxing Its appellate KAUGER, J., WATT, with whom C.J. and disputes costs matrimonial in strict con WINCHESTER, join, dissenting J. to the formity § to the terms of 978 has been fol supplemental opinion rehearing: uninterruptedly beyond lowed the enactment §of 110D."30Gilerease has never been I majority 1 The appellate determines that adopted practice. as a rule of Because the costs in matrimonial matters are automatical formally norm we today abolish long ly against has prevailing taxable party. To disuse,31 been in speculate we will not result, 1) reach majority: ignores anyone would have expectation harbored an principles construction insofar as of reaping Today's pronounce § benefits. 12 0.8.2001 9781 and 48 0.98.2001 1102 including transcript costs of the Howe, note at %0 at 404. supra syl. case-made, proceedings, peti- filed with the Howe, error; note at 1 0 at 404. supra syl. part tion in and when reversed in part, equally affirmed in costs shall be divided Chamberlin, supra note Jack- parties." between the son, at 429. 0.$.2001 provides pertinent 2. Title 43 opinion. 31. See Part II of this part: 0.$.2001 § provides: 1. Title 12 Upon granting "... C. a decree of divorce or maintenance, separate reversed, may require the court "'When a or final order is costs, plaintiff in error party pay expenses shall recover his either such reasonable 2) has concerned; specif ©.S.2001 978, allowing appeal, precedent $ costs overrules are the authori law since part this Court has of Oklahoma ically holding that been 8) specificallywith matrimo- 110 deals Section equitably; costs ty appellate to divide gen- costs 978 addresses nial matters while fact that matrimo disregards the historical apparent conflict chancery and are there is an erally. While from matters arise nial costs, relates to provisions as it between Finally, equitable in nature. equitable abiding by simply can be avoided this conflict nothing more require of costs division statutory con- of rules the established trial courts already being when done than is the most recent struction-giving effect to attorney division of equitable determine will, allowing legislative of the expression expenses. fees and more over the specific statute to control general. I. $ LATER IN 110 IS 43 0.8.2001

T2 TITLE IL § 978 AND 12 0.8.2001 TIME THAN APPLICABLE SPECIFICALLY IS PRECEDENT SUPPORTS BINDING T5 PROCEEDINGS. TO MATRIMONIAL EQUITABLE OF DIVISION THE [ relate more enactments two or 3 Where COSTS. matter, subject pri this Court's the same thirty years before the In almost I 6 the latest mary objective is to determine equitable division of allowed the Legislature legislative will3 Under of the expression this held proceeding, in a Court costs divorce construction, the most of this rule Gilcrease, v. three of Hilcrease syllabus in ordinarily prevail when will recent enactment 50, 0,T 54 P.2d 1056: 1936OK conflict between an irreconcilable there is "Notwithstanding the affirmance clearly special statute When two statutes. court, may, this court judgment of the trial spe controversy, in the matter includes discretion, appeal in a tax the costs of in its general of over a statute cial statute controls prevailing Finally, goal against our when consid applicability.4 proceeding divorce party." conflicting legislative ering apparently two dealing with the same enactments efficacy of the GHilcrease decrying together them as is to consider

matter law majority ignores well-settled opinion, the give and to effect to each harmonious whole syllabus, authored on another issue-a provision.5 Court, the law.6 The Court's embodies ipse bare asser language is not dixit-the provi- Legislature first enacted 1 4 The Rather, it is the state tion of an individual.7 expenses of equitable division sion for proceedings, 48 0.98.2001 being and is more akin divorce-related ment of this Court rely upon However, regularly We 12 carved stone. language of in 1965. just proper under the 44, 113, OK 959 the other as Tulsa 1998 Comm'rs County, of 979; City, City 1993 v. Oklahoma P.2d Carter circumstances. of 134, 111, 77; addi- its discretion make State ex rel. Trimble D. The court OK any expenses to the of tional orders relative P.2d 889. Moore, OK. 1 818 v. 1991 City of actions, including subsequent but not lim- such brought by corpus, to writs of habeas ited 2, 19, Tulsa, City OK 5. McNeill v. attorneys, the enforcement parties or their Board Trustees Oscar 329; Abbott v. P.2d interlocutory or final or modification 586 P.2d 1098. Rose, Etc., 1978 OK the bene- divorce action made for orders in the respective attor- party or their fit of either Oklahoma, Election Bd. 6. Box v. State neys." Rector, 936; Turner OK 507; Hilligoss, P.2d OK Perforators v. Northeastern Serv. Co. Oklahoma 3. Public €38, 113; Eckels Inc., Coop., Oklahoma Elec. See 139, 12, 362 P.2d 683. Traverse, 1961 OK State, Dam Auth. v. Grand River Jones, also, Short 60, 124, 645 P.2d 1011. County Deputy Order Fraternal 4. Tulsa Sheriff's (1968). Dictionary, 4th Police, County Law Ed. 7. Black's Lodge v. Board No. 188 syllabi they IV. as what are-Oklahoma law expressed by this Court.8 11 NO ADDITIONAL BURDEN IS PRE- majority only T7 The can reach the result SENTED IF ON COSTS APPEAL by overruling precedent. EQUITABLY here If Gilcrease is ARE DIVIDED. overruled, change to be in the law should Everyone agrees the award of given prospective application. be aWhen attorney expenses fees and depends never appears statute or rule of law obscure in its upon prevailing party status matrimonial bar, impact pronounce on the case at our matters.12 Where no compelling or over given prospective ments are protect effect to riding equitable exist, considerations hus those who would otherwise suffer.9 band and required wives are each to bear their own obligations counsel fee litiga 18 Research does not reveal cause expenses.13 tion related Where there is subsequent to Gilerease in which this Court equitable division, reason for a different Nevertheless, equitably has divided costs. consider the financial means of the Appeals evidently the Court of Civil did not parties and whether frivolous claims were practice "foreign" consider the so to Okla pursued.14 practice. Bingham homa Bingham, v. Attorney go fees and costs together 1981 OK APP CIV 629 P.2d like bread and butter or potatoes mashed Appeals Court of Civil taxed the costs of the gravy. you Once have to consider the appeal equally parties."10 between the equities for the award of attorney fees and expenses as is mandated 48 0.8.2001 TH. 110,15 the trial court has precise made the required determination the award of T9 MATRIMONIAL ARE SUITS Presumably, costs. equities sup EQUITABLE IN NATURE. port the same award for costs as for counsel Therefore, fees. equitable division of majority 110 The dispute does not requires costs no mental exercise that is not equitable matrimonial suits are in nature.11 already being attorney done when fees and Nevertheless, by questionable statutory con costs are awarded. only by struction overruling controlling precedent, that, requires it in the matter of costs,

taxing appellate equity taken out of equation. position unsupported

either statute or controlling precedent. Ass'n, 8. Lawton v. International Union Police Rules of the Court, 12 0.$.2001 Ch. 15, Supreme 1, 19, 371; 2002 OK 41 P.3d Chickasaw Tele- App. 1. Drabek, 76, 17, phone Co. v. 1996 OK 921 P.2d 333; Goldman, 111, 12, Goldman v. 1994 OK 11. v. 146, 10, 1962 OK Moyers Moyers, 883 P.2d 164. 844; Bouma Bouma, v. 1968 OK 10, 439 P.2d 198. 9. When meaning called to settle the of not- so-readily intelligible not-so-clearly settled le- gal trap 91, 113, norms that are a veritable Kerby Kerby, for the un- 12. v. ‍​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​​​‍2002 OK 60 P.3d wary, give pronouncement 1038; the court will Thielenhaus, Thielenhaus v. 1995 OK purely prospective effect in order to save the 925; Harmon, 890 P.2d Harmon v. impact from the unforeseen of an ob- 89, 119, 770 P.2d 1. See, scurely regime worded of rules. McDaneld Inc., 30, 1, Lynn Hickey Dodge, v. 1999 OK. Daniel, 117, § 24, 13. Daniel v. 2001 OK 42 P.3d Hughes, P.2d 252; Bushert v. 21, 12, 1996 OK 863; Larman, Larman v. 83, 118, 1999 OK 334; Manning Dept. 912 P.2d v. State ex rel. 62, 11, P.2d 536. 667; Safety, Public 1994 OK Cty. Hale v. Board Comm'rs Seminole Coun- Kerby 158, 14, Kerby, supra; Casey 761; see note ty, Poafpybitty 1979 OK Co., Skelly Oil Abbott Casey, Abbott, 25 P.3d 291. Opinions Ap- released the Court of Civil 0.$.2001 supra. 15. Title 43 see note peals 1.200(c)(2), persuasive only. are Rule

Case Details

Case Name: Holleyman v. Holleyman

Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Date Published: Oct 14, 2003

Citation: 78 P.3d 921

Docket Number: 95,584

Court Abbreviation: Okla.