8 N.W.2d 613 | Minn. | 1943
The title of the later act defines it as "An act prescribing the procedure in eminent domain proceedings brought by the state or by any of its agencies," etc. It then proceeds (§
"In eminent domain proceedings instituted by the state or by any of its agencies or political subdivisions as petitioners under the provisions of this chapter the procedure shall be asfollows:
* * * * *
"(2) At any time within 30 days from the date of the filingof the report, any party to the proceeding may appeal from any award of damages embraced in the report, * * *" (Italics supplied.)
It is thus obvious that the legislature by its later act, in language free from doubt, has said that this act shall apply to and control eminent domain proceedings instituted by the state under its provisions. The language chosen and used affords no ground for seeking legislative intent. There are in its provisions no uncertainties, ambiguities, or doubts. In such case there is neither room nor reason for interpretation.
The rule here to be applied is well stated in 6 Dunnell, Dig. § 8927:
"Where a new statute, not in the form of amendments to prior statutes, is complete in itself, and shows that the legislature intended to substitute its provisions for those previously in force and intended the new statute to prescribe the only rules governing the subject-matter of the legislation, it supersedes all prior legislation in respect to such subject-matter and repeals all prior laws in so far as they apply thereto." (See note 20.)
We thought we had decided the issue presented here in State, by Peterson, v. Severson,
Affirmed.