Hollaris v. JankowskiHollaris v. Jankowski
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Scanlan
delivered the opinion of the court.
A suit for damages for personal injuries sustained by the minor. A jury returned a verdict finding defendants
The complaint charges that defendants were driving a truck in an alley and (1) carelessly and negligently drove it so as to injure the plaintiff, a boy four years of age; (2) negligently failed to keep their motor truck under control; (3) drove the truck at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and the use of the way; (4) wilfully and wantonly drove the truck. Defendants filed a general denial to the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiff thereafter withdrew the charge of wilful and wanton conduct.
The complaint alleges that Clyde Hollaris, the minor, was four years of age at the time of the accident. The mother of the minor testified that Clyde “was between four and five years old at the time of the accident.” The accident happened on August 14, 1937, about ten o’clock a.m. -It was a clear, dry day. The theory of plaintiff was that the minor at and just prior to the accident was riding or propelling his “scooter” in an easterly direction upon the south edge or margin of a paved alley which ran east and west between Greenview avenue on the east and Bosworth avenue on the west; that the street just south of the alley was North avenue; that the alley was in the rear of the residence occupied by the parents of plaintiff; that the scooter consisted of a box mounted at one end of a two-by-four about three feet long, to the
Defendants strenuously contend that the manifest weight of the evidence is in favor of defendants. After carefully reading the entire evidence that bears upon
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in permitting Clyde Hollaris, the minor, to testify; that a child of eight years of age should not be permitted to testify to an accident that happened to him when he was between four and five years of age. Defendants argue that the child would not have been competent to testify as to the accident if he had been called as a witness directly after it occurred, and that the mere fact that he has now reached the age of eight years does not now make him competent to tell what happened when he was between four and five years of age, and counsel argues that- “many children do not walk until they are two years of age and do not talk until they are three. At four a child is very apt to be in the prattling age in which impressions are nebulous and conversations vague.” Counsel for plaintiff argues that “it is the intelligence and understanding of the witness, and not his age, that determines his competency.” Upon the first trial of the case the court refused to allow the minor to testify. Neither the Legislature of this State nor our Supreme Court has laid down a hard and fast rule with respect to the minimum age at which a minor is permitted to testify.
In People v. Peck, 314 Ill. 237, the defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties with a bay of the age of six. The boy was permitted to testify over the objection of the defendant. The Supreme Court held that he was a competent witness, it appearing that the testimony of the boy “shows him to be a very intelligent boy,” able to tell in detail all of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offense. In that case two girls, each four years of age, saw the commission of the offense, in fact, the evidence shows that the defendant took indecent liberties with
In Featherstone v. People, 194 Ill. 325, a boy who was six years of age at the time of the offense was permitted to testify, and the Supreme Court held that the action of the trial court in permitting him to testify was not error. The Supreme Court stated, however, that if they had entertained any doubt of the guilt of the defendant they would have reversed the ease, and the court reviewed at length the evidence that corroborated the testimony of the prosecuting witness and that proved the guilt of the defendant.
We find no case in this State wherein the competency of a child under six years of age to testify has been passed upon.
In State v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 565, the complaining witness was five years of age at the time of the alleged criminal offense. The opinion in that case states (p. 569): “Under the age of six, presumption of incompetency would arise, and at the age of five the utmost limit would be ordinarily reached, unless extraordinary development of the mental and religious faculties should be shown, to take the case out of the ordinary course of nature.” The court held that the child should not have been permitted to testify.
In Macale v. Lynch (Wash.), 188 Pac. 517, the plaintiff was five years of age at the time of the accident. Fourteen months later he was allowed to testify in his case over the objection of the defendant. The child had often discussed the facts of the accident with the members of his family and the lawyers. It was held that the child should not have been allowed to testify.
The judgment of the circuit court of Cook county js reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Judgment reversed; and cause remanded for a new trial.
Sullivan and Friend, JJ., concur.