Hollander v. Institute for Research on Women & Gender at Columbia UniversityHollander v. Institute for Research on Women & Gender at Columbia University
Robert D. Kaplan, Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York, NY, for Columbia University Defendants-Appellees.
Jean-David Barnea, Assistant United States Attorney (Ross E. Morrison, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Federal Defendants-Appellees.
Patrick J. Walsh, Assistant Solicitor General, (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Peter Karanjia, Special Counsel to the Solicitor General, of counsel), for Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY, for State Defendants-Appellees.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Roy Den Hollander1 appeals from the judgment of the district court dated April 30, 2009 (Kaplan, J.), adopting the Report and Recommendation dated April 15, 2009 by United States Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox, and granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and specification of issues on appeal.
“The party seeking judicial review bears the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate its standing.” Green Island Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 577 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the existence of Columbia University‘s Women‘s Studies Program and the corresponding lack of an equivalent “Men‘s Studies Program” inflicts harm on certain men as a class by, inter alia, promoting “misandry-feminism,” promoting feminism as a religion, and robbing men of an equivalent educational experience. As to the plaintiff‘s discrimination-based claims, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of standing as to all defendants because the plaintiff‘s claims of harm amount to the kind of speculative harm for which courts cannot confer standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (stating that “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact‘—an invasion of a
David A. Lewis, Assistant Federal Defender, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY, for Appellant.
SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant Brian Pearl appeals from a November 20, 2008 order of the District Court convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of violating the conditions of his supervised release, revoking his supervised release, and sentencing him to fourteen months’ imprisonment.
In response to an order entered by this Court on February 17, 2010, both parties have filed letter briefs asserting that Pearl was released from prison on October 21, 2009. As Pearl is no longer in prison and is not serving a term of supervised release, his appeal is moot. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998).
Accordingly, we dismiss Pearl‘s appeal as moot.