Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MICHAEL H. HOLLAND et al. , :
: Plаintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 06-178 (RMU) :
v. : Document No.: 22
:
VALLEY SERVICES, INC. et al. , :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING THE P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION TO A LTER OR A MEND AN I NTERLOCUTORY J UDGMENT ; O RDERING S UPPLEMENTAL B RIEFING ON D AMAGES I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the court’s decision to grant in part and deny in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Thе plaintiffs are trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan who seek to recover from the defendants pursuant to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (“the Coаl Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 9701 et seq. , and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled that the defendants were liable for certain claims undеr the Coal Act, but that certain claims were time-barred. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the court’s calculation of the applicable statute оf limitations. Because the plaintiffs’ motion would properly adjust the application of the statute of limitations, the court grants the plaintiffs’ motion.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1962, Valley Services, Inc. was incоrporated for the purpose of operating a coal mine. Compl. ¶ 8. Ovila Bibeau and Dorothy Kilbourne, husband and wife at the time, became owners of Valley Services in 1975. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4. Valley Services ceased operations in November 1979, id. , and formally dissolved shortly thereafter. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4. Defendant Bibeau Construction, which is owned entirely by Ovila Bibeau, was established in approximately 1962 and has been in operation since that time. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.
On September 25, 1979, Arthur Marcum, Jr., a Valley Services employee, injured his back when he jumрed off of a bulldozer that he was operating. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4. On April 4, 1995, Marcum’s application for retiree health benefits coverage from the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan (“the 1992 Plan”) was approved, but he was informed that Valley Services was no longer in business. Id . at 4-5. As a result, the 1992 Plan agreed to pay his medical bill until it could identify a company thаt was related to Valley Services. Id . at 5. The 1992 Plan was obligated to pay for his health care costs dating back to February 1, 2003, the date the 1992 Plan was established. Id at 6. The 1992 Plan paid mоre than $4,000 in medical bills for Marcum and his dependent child. Id .
On December 6, 2004, the 1992 Plan notified Bibeau Construction that it was a related person to Valley Services under the Coal Act and, thеrefore, it would be considered jointly and severally liable for the payment of monthly premiums for Marcum. Compl. ¶ 12. The 1992 Plan requested payment within twenty days. Id. Receiving no response, оn October 17, 2005, the 1992 Plan again contacted Bibeau Construction, demanding payment and cautioning that if no payment was received within 15 days, the failure to pay would be treated аs a delinquency. Id . ¶ *3 13. The plaintiffs alleged that Bibeau Construction owed the principal sum of $100,573.90, plus interest, liquidated damages and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. ¶ 14.
The plaintiffs initiated this action in February 2006, see generally Compl., and in September 2007, thеy moved for summary judgment. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12. The court granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of damages. See generally Mem. Op. (May 7, 2009). The plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for relief upon reconsideration . See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration (“Pl.’s Mot.”). With that motion now ripe for adjudication, the court now turns to the relevant legal standards and the parties’ arguments.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Legal Standard for Altering or Amending an Interlocutory Judgment
[1]
A district court may revise its own interlocutory decisions “at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 54(b);
see also Childers v. Slater
,
By contrаst, relief upon reconsideration of an interlocutory decision pursuant to Rule
54(b) is available “as justice requires.”
Childers
,
B. The Court Grants the Plaintiff’s Mоtion to Alter or Amend The plaintiffs argue that the court was correct to deem the defendants liable under the Coal Act. Pls.’ Mot. at 5. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contend that the cоurt’s precise calculation of the statute of limitations for multiemployer pension funds, which is governed by ERISA, requires adjustment. Id. at 5-6. In contrast, the defendants dispute the merits of the court’s ruling in its entirety, arguing instead that all of the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. Defs.’ Opp’n at 2-4.
The Supreme Court has set forth a unique and specific framework to analyze the statute
of limitations for claims involving multiemployer pension funds.
See Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc.
,
Under the
Bay Area Laundry
framework, the arithmetic proceeds as follows: the
complaint in this matter was filed on February 1, 2006.
See generally
Compl. Therefore, the
court is required to count bаckwards by six years to February 1, 2000 and deem the plaintiff’s
claim to be timely inasmuch as it seeks to recover payments that were missed after that date.
Bay Area Laundry
,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregоing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the court’s interlocutory judgment. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 28th day of February, 2012.
RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge
Notes
[1] The plaintiffs filed this motion under Rule 59(e).
See generally
Pl.’s Mot. As the defendants
note, however, Rule 59(e) only applies to final judgments, and the court has not yet issued a final
judgment in this case. Defs.’ Opp’n at 1-2. Because the court’s partial judgment is interlocutory
in nature,
Debrew v. Reno
,
[2] Adjudication of the extent of the damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled requires further briefing on damages, as the parties conducted separate valuations of the plaintiff’s claims. See generally Pl.’s Supplemental Briefing of Damages; Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Supplemental Briefing on Damages. Accordingly, the court cannot determinе the precise amount of damages absent more up-to-date briefings from the parties. The court will therefore issue an order requiring supplemental briefing in light of the court’s present decision.