Plaintiff, a minor, appeals from a judgment declaring that a certain liability policy issued to him by the defendant Universal Underwriters Insurance Company (“Universal”) does not include uninsured motorist coverage. (Ins. Code, § 11580.2.)
The facts are quite simple. Plaintiff, then 16 years old, purchased a motorcycle from one Darby, who was the owner of B & D Enterprises. At that time he signed an application for insurance. The application form shows two of plaintiff’s signatures. The upper signature appears in the middle of the page, below a schedule which sets forth a premium of $55 for *419 a ‘‘combination policy.” A combination policy is elsewhere described as one which provides liability, collision, fire and theft protection for 12 months. At the bottom of the page, in heavy print, there appears the following:
“Note: Uninsured Motorist Coverage is Not Required to satisfy the Financial Responsibility Law and you may elect, if you wish, to avoid this additional premium charge by signing below in the space provided.
“If you do not sign below it will be necessary for you to add $15.00 annual charge to above premiums if you have applied for liability coverages.
“In consideration of the issuance of this policy without an additional premium charge, I hereby request that Uninsured Motorist Coverage not be added to my liability policy: /s/ John L. Holland.”
There is a conflict in the evidence with respect to whether or not the blanks in the form were filled out at the time plaintiff signed the application. To the extent that this conflict may be relevant to the resolution of any of the problems presented, it was impliedly settled against plaintiff who made no request for special findings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.)
On appeal plaintiff advances three contentions :
1. Uninsured motorist coverage was not deleted from the policy;
' 2. If such coverage was deleted, the agreement deleting it can be disaffirmed by a minor under 18; and
3. The trial court did not find on all issues' tendered to it by the pleadings.
" None of these contentions have merit.
I.
The application for insurance was signed by the minor. The policy that was eventually delivered to him was ■ signed by a representative of Universal. In the box on the face of the policy where a premium charge for uninsured motorist coverage ' would generally be shown, there is a stamp: '“Waived by Separate Agreement. ” Attached .to the policy is an indorsement reading as follows: “In'consideration of this policy' having been issued without a premium charge for' Family Protection Coverage," the 'named- insured and the Company, :in accordance with the provisión "of Section 11580.2(a) of the California Insurance Codé which permits the insured and the *420 Company so to agree, do agree that the provision of this policy covering damages for bodily injury which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle has been waived by a separate agreement and such policy provision is void and of no effect, /s/ Logan P. Mann Authorized Representative. ’ ’
' This, we think, is adequate compliance with the statutory provision that1 ‘ [t] he insurer and any named insured may by agreement in writing delete the provision covering damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (a).)
Plaintiff argues that there is no single writing signed by the insurer and the insured. No such requirement is in the statute. In
Weatherford
v.
Northwestern etc. Ins. Co.,
Plaintiff also argues that the statute requires that the uninsured motorist coverage be “deleted” rather than not included in the first place. This, with all respect, seems a quibble. It is true that there is a strong policy in favor of the coverage
(Mission Ins. Co.
v.
Brown,
The precise point now advanced was decided in
Myers
v.
National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
. “Webster’s New- International Dictionary (2d ed.) -gives these definitions of ‘delete’:■‘to-obliterate or blot out; erase, *421 expunge; dele.’ ‘Dele’ is defined as meaning ‘To erase; cancel, delete; mark for omission. ’
“It would be strained construction of the statute to hold that an applicant for insurance could not voluntarily and understandingly in his written application ‘mark for omission’ this provision of a policy, the deletion of which is permitted by law. Whether he has done so is a matter of fact.”
II.
Plaintiff claims that, as a minor, he has the power to disaffirm the agreement deleting the uninsured motorist coverage. (Civ. Code, § 35.) Although the argument is couched in terms of disaffirmance, what it really amounts to is a contention that uninsured motorist coverage cannot be effectively deleted from a policy issued to a minor: if plaintiff is correct, what minor would fail to disaffirm after an accident with an uninsured motorist ?
Plaintiff is aware of the equitable principle that minors, if they would disaffirm a contract, must disaffirm the entire contract, not just the irksome portions.
(Babu
v.
Petersen,
Frankly, we are not impressed. It is one thing to say that he who affirmatively deals with a minor, does so at his peril.
(Burnand
v.
Irigoyen,
Plaintiff purchased liability insurance without uninsured motorist coverage. There is no rule which says that because he is a minor he can suddenly claim to have bought more than he actually did. Section 35 of the Civil Code does not turn a noncontract into a contract. Once the requirement of section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code with respect to the 1 ‘ agreement in writing” is satisfied, we know of no public policy which demands that it be ignored. In point of fact, we think it would be a disservice to minors to rule otherwise. We can take judicial notice of their problems in obtaining liability insurance at rates which would seem reasonable to adults. There is nothing in the law to prevent liability insurers from refusing to deal with persons who do not agree to delete uninsured motorist coverage. If we went along with plaintiff in this ease and, in effect, added such a prohibition to the law, it might well become even more difficult for minors to protect themselves and others from the consequences of accidents for which they are legally liable.
III.
In his complaint plaintiff claimed that Universal practiced fraud, deception and undue influence on him. He now asserts that the court should have made findings on those issues. He points to no evidence which would support a finding in his favor. Indeed it would be surprising if the record contained any. At the outset of the trial the parties stipulated that there were basically only two issues in the case, namely those we have already discussed in the opinion. Not a word was said about fraud, deception or undue influence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Aiso, J., and Reppy, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 30,1969. Peters, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Notes
As noted, the policy issued by Universal twice refers to a “separate agreement. ’ ’ Quite obviously this is merely a reference to the fact that the plaintiff’s agreement in writing deleting the uninsured motorist coverage is contained on a separate paper. Such a reference seems highly desirable in view of the holding of
Hendricks
v.
Meritplan Ins. Co.,