165 S.E. 203 | S.C. | 1932
July 29, 1932. The opinion of the Court was delivered by This appeal is from an order of Hon. W.H. Grimball, Circuit Judge, striking out of the complaint certain allegations upon motion of the defendant. It, therefore, becomes necessary to report in connection herewith the complaint, the notice to strike out, and the order of Judge Grimball.
The order from which this appeal is taken must be affirmed. In addition to the reasons assigned by the Circuit Judge, a few additional observations may be pertinent.
The facts need not be here repeated, as they are fully set forth in the pleadings and order which we have directed to be reported. We will, therefore, confine our remarks to the law applicable to those facts.
The exceptions present two main questions: (1) Was there error in striking out Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the complaint; and (2) was there error in striking out portions of Paragraph 13, thereby depriving the plaintiff of a valid and legal claim? Consideration of these questions will be taken up in the order named.
These three paragraphs of the complaint refer to the purchase of the capital stock of the defendant by International Paper Company; that certain shares of stock were issued to *464 a citizen of Spartanburg and to two citizens of Atlanta, Ga., in order that they might be qualified as directors; and that a meeting of the stockholders of the defendant was later held at which the three citizens above referred to were elected directors. The motion to strike out was made upon the ground that those paragraphs contained allegations which were irrelevant, redundant, and immaterial.
Many times has the word "irrelevant" been defined by the Courts. The definition in Mutual Lumber Company v.Southern R. Co. in
The cause of action as alleged in the complaint is for breach of contract. As the complaint was complete without allegations as to who owned the stock and who constituted the board of directors of the defendant, it cannot be soundly held that those allegations had a vital connection with the cause of action. The allegations were, therefore, irrelevant and were properly stricken out on motion. See Watford v. J.K. Windham Co.,
The portions of Paragraph 13 which were stricken out of the complaint had to do with allegations of malicious and fraudulent intent, the same being the basis for punitive damages. If punitive damages be not a proper element in this case, then it goes without saying that the order of the Circuit Judge was correct. Our attention will, therefore, be directed to this inquiry.
There are two leading cases in this State on the subject of damages for breach of contract. They have been often cited and universally followed. They are Sitton v. McDonald,
Donaldson v. Temple,
"It is needless to say that proof of the mere violation of a contract will not support an allegation of fraud," is the language of the Court in Caldwell v. Duncan,
The motives of one who breaches a contract may be disregarded in estimating the amount of recoverable damages. Only in cases of a fraudulent act accompanying *466
the breach can the recovery be more than such damages as are the natural and proximate result of the breach.Prince v. State Mut. Life Insurance Co.,
In Givens v. North Augusta Electric Imp. Co.,
In Latimer v. York Cotton Mills,
The correctness of the principles embodied in the foregoing authorities can hardly be disputed. The appellant, however, contends that his case should be governed by the cases of Sullivan v. Calhoun,
The second case relied upon (Winthrop v. Allen) was a tort case. The opinion states that the allegations as to breach of contract were merely preliminary to the action on tort. It is true that the opinion in this case tends to criticize cases *467 of Prince v. State Mut. Life Insurance Company and Givensv. North Augusta Electric Imp. Co., above cited, yet when it is considered that the Winthrop case was dealing solely with a claim in tort while the Prince and Givens cases were in contract, the criticism can be easily understood and the cases readily reconciled. In the Winthrop case the defendant set up a counterclaim in tort against a suit by his landlord for rent under a rental contract. The Circuit Judge dismissed the counterclaim, and upon appeal to this Court the respondent relied upon the Prince, Givens, and similar cases. In reversing the ruling of the Circuit Judge in dismissing the counterclaim which was based on tort, the Court said: "Even if the language we have quoted is susceptible of the interpretation that punitive damages are recoverable when there is a breach of contract accompanied with a fraudulent act, but that such damages cannot be recovered, when the tortious act is committed willfully or wantonly, then it is a mere dictum which is not to be followed."
It is perfectly clear that punitive damages are always recoverable for a "tortious act committed willfully or wantonly," but we cannot say that the Winthrop case intended to overrule the long line of cases following Welborn v. Dixon, which dealt solely in contract. In fact, the doctrine of Welbornv. Dixon, can be traced back to Rose v. Beatie, 2 Nott McC., 538, which, in turn, relies upon several old English cases for its authority.
Following the Winthrop case in holding that reference to the contract may be merely preliminary to the action in tort are the cases of St. Charles Merc. Co. v. Armour Co.,
In addition to the Winthrop case, another case arises to somewhat becloud the issue. Huffman v. Moore,
This charge is not authorized by the case of Sullivan v.Calhoun, and the case should be overruled as being in conflict with the adopted view of the South Carolina cases, if warranty be a contract and if the cause of action be on contract. However, we gather from the meager report of the case that the real foundation of the suit was based on tort. In this view the decision can be sustained on the strength of the above quotation from the Winthrop case. There may be an agreement to give a warranty to a contract, but the warranty itself is not the contract; it is merely collateral or incidental thereto and, to that extent, is a part thereof.
After this discussion of the authorities, we return to the case before us. According to the appellant, his cause of action is for a "breach of contract of employment," and, as before stated, he seeks to bring himself under the rule as to punitive damages recognized in the cases ofSullivan v. Calhoun, Winthrop v. Allen, and Bradley v. InsuranceCo.,
The making of a contract is a legal right enjoyed by the public generally, and no man is denied the right to break a contract; but in so doing he makes himself liable for the consequences in such damages as are the natural result of his act. The mere fact that a contract was broken does not carry with it the stigma of fraud, bad faith, malice, or wantonness. Frequently a contract is broken from dire necessity or the utter inability of one party to perform, and such cases would be entirely free from fraud or other evil intent. To further illustrate the difference between claims for punitive damages in suits ex contractu and suits in tort, acts of willfulness will support punitive damages in tort cases (Vance v. Ferguson,
The Judgment of this Court is that the order of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BLEASE and MESSRS. JUSTICES STABLER, CARTER and BONHAM concur.