210 Mo. 338 | Mo. | 1908
This suit was instituted by plaintiff to recover the statutory penalty of five.’ thousand dollars for the death of her husband, John Holland, who was killed by one of defendant’s engines through the alleged negligence of defendant’s servants in operating said engine.
The deceased was run over and killed on February 25, 1904, about 8:10 p. m., by one of defendant’s engines attached to a passenger'train going south on Fifth street, in the city of St. Joseph. This street ran north and south, and the Burlington Railway Company had its tracks laid thereon for a distance of seven or eight blocks, and the defendant, under a contract with the Burlington company, operated its trains over the same tracks. The street, while occupied by railroad tracks, was also used as a public thoroughfare by pedestrians. There were two main tracks on Fifth street, the east track being used for north-bound trains, and the west track for south-bound trains.
Cedar street crosses Fifth street, and north of Cedar street is a cross-over track connecting the two main tracks, which cross-over track connected with the west track at a point about 225 feet north of Cedar street, and connected with the east track at the north line of-Cedar street. All passenger trains going south took this cross-over, passing from the west to the east track, but all freight trains going south did not do so, but kept on the west track. There was a switch at each end of said cross-over' track, and switchmen to operate them.
John Holland, the deceased, was about sixty years of age, and was a section hand in the employ of the Burlington railroad at the time he was killed. He was walking north on Fifth street between the two main tracks, and was struck by the engine of the train when he reached the cross-over track, while the engine was ■crossing from the west to the east track. , The head
A. H. Rehard, who was fireman on the engine in question, testified that he saw Holland walking north between the tracks. The last time he saw him before he was struck Holland was at‘ about the south frog between the two tracks,” and was still coming north. As the engine had at this time entered the cross-over track, and was headed in a southeasterly direction, witness, who was on the left side of the engine, was unable to see Holland after that, the engine obstructing his vision. He did not think deceased was at the time in a position of danger, and he gave no warning to the engineer. He said he rang the bell continually from the time the train left the Union station up to the time deceased was struck; that the train was running about five miles an hour at the time he last saw deceased between the tracks; that a train going at that rate of speed could be stopped in twenty or twenty-five feet by use of the air brake; that from the time he last saw the man before he was struck the train did not run more than fifteen or twenty feet before the air brakes were applied, and that the train ran twenty-five or thirty feet after the application of the air-brakes. This witness also testified that the train stopped or almost stopped at Oak street, which was one block north of Cedar street, for the reason that the east track was blocked by a Burlington train which was standing at the water tank south of Cedar street, the rear car of the Burlington train being about on a line with the north line of Cedar street, and that the engine on which witness was did not cross over till the Burlington train had pulled out.
Witness Frank Hahn, testifying for the plaintiff, said that he was a laborer and had been around railroads all his life. He lived on the corner of Fifth and
Plaintiff in her petition pleaded, and also introduced in evidence, over'the objection of defendant, section 2 of a special ordinance of the city of St. Joseph granting the Burlington Railroad the right to lay and maintain tracks on Fifth street, which section provided:
*346 “Said railroad company shall not have the right to run their cars over the right of way herein granted at a greater rate of speed than five miles per hour, and the city council may by ordinance prescribe the penalty for violation of this section.”
Plaintiff also pleaded in her petition, and introduced in evidence, sections 1 and 6 of a general ordinance of the city of St. Joseph, which are as follows:
“Section 1. No locomotive engine, railroad joassenger car or freight car shall be driven, propelled or ran upon or along any railroad track within said city at a greater speed than the rate of five miles per hour. ’ ’
“Section 6. Bell to be Bung. The bell -of each locomotive engine shall be rung continually while running within said city.”
The defendant offered no testimony, but at the close of plaintiff’s case asked for a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant, which was by the court refused, and defendant excepted.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000', and judgment was rendered accordingly, from which judgment, after ineffectual motions for a new trial' and in arrest, defendant appeals.
Defendant insists that there is no evidence whatever to support the verdict of the jury.
There were but two witnesses whose testimony tended to show how the accident occurred, both being-introduced by the plaintiff, one of said witnesses, A. PI. Rehard, being fireman upon defendant’s train at the time of the accident, the other witness being Frank Plahn, a laborer,, who lived at that time at the northwest corner of Cedar and Fifth streets. The latter’s testimony was that when the train passed him at Fifth and Sycamore streets it was, in his judgment, running at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour. But, according to his testimony, the place where the train passed him was about four blocks, or twelve hundred feet,
It is, however, said for plaintiff that witness Re-hard was still in the defendant’s employ at the.time of the trial, that he was to blame for the death of the deceased, and that'plaintiff is not bound by all of his statements even if he was her witness, as there was other evidence which contradicted him.
Mr. Greenleaf says: “It is exceedingly clear that the party calling a witness is not precluded from proving the truth of any particular fact by any other competent testimony in direct contradiction to what such witness may have testified.” [1 Greenleaf on Ev. (16 Ed.), sec. 443b.] But this does not help plaintiff’s case, because, when properly analyzed, there is no material conflict'between the testimony of Rehard and .Hahn.
As to whether or not the bell was ringing at the time of the accident, counsel for plaintiff concede in their brief that that is a matter of no importance, as they asked for no instruction upon that point. They concede that Holland knew of the presence of the train on the west track, but assert that he could not know that it was going to take the cross-over track; that the headlight, though he saw it, would not notify him that the traip was coming on the cross-over track, and that if he stepped toward the west and got on the west track, and the train continued down that track and struck him, he would have been negligent, as that was the main track. Allowing these things to be true, they do not tend to show that the defendant was negligent in the operation of its train at the time of the accident, nor would such conditions justify the deceased in going upon the track so near in front of an approaching train as to endanger his safety. The defendant owed the deceased no other or greater duty than to exercise ordinary care and caution in looking out for and avoid-'
The fireman testified (and there is no evidence to the contrary) that when he first saw the deceased he was between the west track and the cross-over track, coming north, and that he was there and when he last saw him in no danger at all, and that the engineer, as soon as he discovered deceased in a place of danger, sounded the alarm whistle three or four times in rapid succession, put on the emergency brake, and did everything that he could do to stop the train in the shortest possible time.
Plaintiff, however, says that John Holland had the right to presume that defendant’s train would not he run at a greater rate' of speed 4han five miles an hour, and to act upon such presumption until he knew, or hy the exercise of ordinary care ought to have known, to the contrary. The only evidence with respect to the speed of the train at the time of the accident was the testimony of the fireman, and, as stated before, he testified that the train was not then running at a rate of speed exceeding five miles an hour. In all of the cases relied upon hy plaintiff as supporting her contention, namely, Hutchinson v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 246; Eckhard v. Railroad, 190 Mo. 593; Riska v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 168; Weller v. Railroad, 164 Mo. 180, there was 'evidence tending to show that the train was running at a rate of speed in excess of that fixed hy ordinance, or there was a failure to observe the requirements of the ordinance in some other respect. But even if the train in question was running at the time of the accident at a rate of speed in excess of that prescribed hy the city ordinance (which we do not concede), and the defendant was, therefore, guilty of negligence per se, the conduct of the deceased in going upon the track
In Schmidt v. Railroad, supra, it is said: “The rule of contributory negligence is not changed or abrogated by reason of a statute or ordinance imposing the duty on account of the violation of which the injury resulted. [Weller v. Railroad, 120 Mo. 653.] The statute does not absolve persons' approaching a public railway crossing from exercising’ common prudence to avoid danger, nor shift the responsibility to another should injury ensue from the failure-, to- exercise it. [Kenney v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 284.]” The same rule is announced in the following cases: Boyd v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 381; Sweeney v. Railroad, 150 Mo. 396; Moore v. Railroad, 176 Mo. 546; Evans v. Railroad, 178 Mo. 508; Ries v. Railroad, 179 Mo. 1.
There is no escaping the conclusion that the deceased saw the approaching train. He must, therefore, have been absorbed in other matters, or have misjudged the speed of the train and determined to take the risk of being caught by it before he could .cross the track. But, whatever -may have induced his action, his conduct can only be characterized as the grossest recklessness. The demurrer interposed by the defendant to the evidence should have been sustained.
The judgment is reversed.