33 S.E.2d 275 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1945
Lead Opinion
Where agents are employed to sell land at a certain price, for a specified sum as their commission, the same to be paid when a sale is made, and they expend time and effort to effect a sale, the owner may not, without lawful cause, revoke the contract at his mere option before the expiration of a reasonable time for performance; and a consummation of a sale by the owner, within a reasonable time, with a customer procured by the agents, at a price greater than that authorized to the agents, renders the owner liable to the agents for the specified commission.
Upon the trial of the case the jury found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs made a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and they except to that judgment. *180
The verdict for the defendant was not authorized unless there was a revocation of the contract of agency dated June 11, 1942, on which the plaintiffs sued. The defendant seems to assume that there was such revocation because of the two options to purchase given by him — one to the plaintiff Tomlin on the same day the agency to sell was created, and one to the plaintiff Holland in October, 1942. Much of the evidence adduced upon the trial related to these two options, and it seems altogether probable that they may have influenced the jury's verdict. "Generally, an agency is revocable at the will of the principal" (Code, § 4-214 (1)); but "the burden of proving the revocation is generally upon the party asserting the revocation." Foddrill v. Dooley,
Where agents are employed to sell land for a specified commission to be paid when a sale is made, and they expend time and effort in endeavoring to effect a sale, the owner can not, without lawful cause, revoke the contract of agency at his mere option and before the expiration of a reasonable time for performance. If no time limit be fixed in the contract for its performance, the agents are entitled to a reasonable time, and if, before the expiration of such reasonable time, the owner, without lawful cause, revokes the contract, he is liable to the agents in damages for so doing. The measure of damages would be determined by the terms of the contract. *181 McMillan v. Quincey,
Judgment reversed. Felton, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
The plaintiff in error contends that the verdict was not authorized by the evidence, and relies on the general grounds of the motion for a new trial for a reversal of the judgment of the trial court. The defendant, in the contract sued on, authorized the plaintiffs to sell his property for the sum of $11,000, and he was to pay them a commission of $1000 for so doing. This contract was made June 11, 1942, and the defendant sold his property on March 16, 1943. Between these dates there were a number of conferences and transactions between the parties with reference to the property in question. The plaintiff Tomlin, on the same date said contract was made, took a 90-day option to *182 buy the property at $11,000, and at the expiration of the 90-day period sought to have it renewed or extended, but the defendant refused to renew or extend it. In October, 1942, the other plaintiff, Holland, took a 30-day option from the defendant on the property at $12,500; and he talked with the defendant about the property a number of times thereafter and before it was finally sold by the defendant, but the defendant told him all along that his price for the property was $12,500 net to him. Prices on real estate in Marietta and in the vicinity of the Bell Bomber site were advancing rapidly during the periods above mentioned, and the defendant was keeping pace with the changes, and was advancing the price on his property. I think the jury was authorized to find from the evidence that the contract sued on had been revoked by the subsequent negotiations and transactions between the parties with reference to the sale of the property in question, as disclosed by the record, and that the defendant was to have $12,500 net for his property. I am thoroughly in accord with the principles of law stated and cited by the majority of the court, but do not think the same authorize or require a reversal of the judgment under the facts of this case. I am of the opinion that the verdict in favor of the defendant was authorized by the evidence, and that the judgment of the court overruling the motion for a new trial should not be disturbed by this court.