55 Mo. 40 | Mo. | 1874
delivered the opinion o'f the court.
This was an action of ejectment, brought in the Hickory Circuit Court on the 5th day of February, 1870, by respondent against the appellants, to recover certain lands in the petition described. The petition was in the usual form. The defendants in their answer simply denied the allegations of the petition. The cause was tried by the court, a jury having been waived by the parties. It was admitted on the hearing that the defendants were in possession of the lands sued for. At the trial the plaintiff read in evidence a deed dated the 17th of April, 1866, from Henry W. Holland, to himself, for the lands in controversy. He then read in evidence a patent from the United States, conveying a part of the lands sued for to Henry W. Holland, and also other deeds to other parts of the land, by which he attempted to derive title from the United States to Henry ~W. Holland; but in this he failed as to a small part of the land. It was also shown by the evidence of the plaintiff, that there was a small improvement with a log house on part of the land, and that several years since, Henry W. Holland was residing on the land, and that the monthly rents were worth from two to three dollars. The defendants on their part read in evidence a deed from John
The plaintiffs then, to destroy the efficacy of the deed read by defendants, offered and read in evidence the entire*transcript of the proceedings, and judgment, and execution in the cause commenced in the Hickory Circuit court, of Torbert vs. Charles A. Pippin, Benjamin H. Massey, Alexander Foster, Henry W. Holland and a number of other persons. The transcript being admitted by the defendants to be a transcript of the same cause and judgment upon which the special execution was issued, under which defendant Johnson purchased the land in controversy from the sheriff. From this
“To Benjamin H. Massey and Henry W. Holland: You are hereby notified that an amended petition, of which the above is a copy, has been filed in the above named cause.”
After this notice, and after the suit had been dismissed as 'to all of the defendants who had been _ served with a summons, and had appeared, on the 31st day of July 1867, the
It also appears from the evidence, that defendant Foster died on the 4th day of July, 1863; that defendant Massey died during the pendency of the suit.
This being all of the material evidence in the cause, the court at the request of the plaintiff declared the law as follows:
1st. As both pltff. and defendant claim title from and through Henry W. Holland, it was sufficient "for plaintiff to show a derivative title from him, without proving his title further back.
2nd. The deed read in evidence by plaintiff from Henry W. Holland and wife, dated the 17th day of April, 1866, was sufficient to convey to plaintiff all the estate of Henry W. Holland at the time, only subject to the attachment lien of plaintiff in the cause of Joseph W. McClurg, Edward B. Torbert and Marshall W. Johnson, vs. Charles A. Pippin, Benjamin H. Massey, Henry W. Holland and others,' if any such lien then existed, and such attachment lien would be of no avail to defeat plaintiff’s title, .unless the same has ripened into a valid judgment against said Henry W. Holland.
3rd. The said Marshall ~W. J ohnson, one of the defendants in this cause, being the grantee in the deed, read in evidence by defendants to rebut plaintiff’s title and being one of the plaintiffs in the attachment suit upon which defendants found their said deed, and a party to said record, does not stand in the position of an innocent purchaser, but being privy to, and cognizant of any irregularities in the proceedings, holds his deed subject to such irregularities if any exist.,
5th. The judgment in the Pettis Circuit Court was rendered on the amended petition there filed, and not on the original petition filed in said cause in this court; and the said publication was not sufficient to notify the said Henry W. Holland of the nature and. amount of said amended petition, or the nature or amount thereof, although the same may have been posted up in the clerk’s office. And the said Marshall W. Johnson did not by a purchase of the land under said judgment, and an execution issued thereon, acquire such title or intei’est in said lands as will defeat plaintiff’s title acquired by his deed from Henry W. Holland and wife.
The defendants objected to these declarations of law and their objections being overruled they excepted. The court then refused the following declarations of law asked for by the defendants and they again excepted. 1st. “That the plaintiff in this suit can recover only on the strength of his title and has shown, by the evidence he has introduced that the title to the North-east quarter of the South-east quarter of section ten was in one, Henderson.” 2nd. “ That the title to the south-west quarter of section fifteen was in Owens ; and that
Judgment was rendered by the court in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the lands with nominal damages. A motion was filed by the defendants for a new trial, which being overruled, defendants again excepted and bring the case here to be reviewed.
Both parties claim title to the land in controversy through Henry W. Holland. The plaintiff, by deed directly from Holland and wife, and the defendants by virtue of a sheriff’s deed which is founded upon an atttachment, judgment and an execution, under which the land was sold by the sheriff of Hickory county, to defendant Johnson;- the levy of the attachment being prior in date to plaintiff’s deed. In such case it was only requisite for the plaintiff in order to make a prima facie case, to deduce his title from Henry W. Holland the common scource of title. And it makes no difference that hé has unnecessarily attempted to prove the title to have existed in the one, who is the common source of title, and failed so to do. The defendant necessarily admits the title of the one under whom he claims, the only question being, whether the plaintiff or defendant have the better title derived from the
It is insisted by the defendant that the court erred in its third declaration of law given at the request of the plaintiff. By that declaration of law, the court declares the law to be, that Marshall W. Johnson having become the purchaser of the land in controversy under an execution in which he was one of the plaintiffs, is not to be considered an innocent purchaser, .but holds his deed from the sheriff subject to any irregularities which may exist in the judgment or proceedings under which the execution issued and the sale took place. In one sense this instruction may be correct, but as applicable to the case under consideration it is not. If a plaintiff in an execution issued on an irregular judgment becomes the purchaser at sheriff’s sale, made under the execution, he will hold the property subject to have his title defeated by an after reversal of the judgment. When the judgment is reversed his title ceases, and he must restore the property still remaining in his hands; but the title is good until the judgment is reversed. If the property however is purchased by a stranger, the title of the stranger will remain good in a general way, even after the judgment shall be reversed. (Gott vs. Powell, 41 Mo., 416, and cases there cited.) It is not pretended that the judgment" under which Johnson purchased has ever been reversed, so that it will be seen that the declaration of law was erroneous as applicable to this case.
It is next objected by the defendants that the court erred in making its fourth declaration of law on the part of the plaintiff By that declaration of law it is asserted that if the publication made in the attachment suit against Henry W. Holland and others, omitted to state the amount of damages claimed, although the notice was regular in every other respect, and had been regularly published, a judgment rendered under such constructive notice and a subsequent sale of the
It appears from the record in this case, that after the publication had been made in the case of McOlurg and others against Henry W. Holland, eial., the plaintiffs in that suit filed an amended petition, in which they declared for the taking of the same goods named in the original petition, but stated the value of the goods to be much greater than was stated in the original petition, and also stated that the goods were forcibly and maliciously taken ; wherefore the plaintiffs claimed
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Judge Sherwood did not sit.