having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The effect of the charge, as delivered, was, that although a common carrier is not responsible for the destruction or loss of goods by the act of a public enemy, he is nevertheless bound to use due diligence to prevent such destruction or loss. If his negligence or want of proper attention contrib *258 uted thereto be wou-ld be liable therefor. It was uot necessary, in this'case, that there should have been fraud or collusion with the Indians, or wilful negligence on the part of th® defendant, or hisuigeuts, to render him liable. Supposing the express agent to have been a suitable person for the duty he had to perform, all -that the charge exacted of him was, such care and attention as he naturally would have taken of his own goods, that'is, ordinary care and attention.
Surely, the law requires this degree of diligence, and wTould make the defendant liable for the want of it, that is, for -ordinary negligence. Whether such negligence was or was not proved, was fairly left to the jury?
The only point, it seems to us, on which any doubt could arise as to the entire accuracy of the charge, is, as to the degree of care and attention required of the defendant himself in the selection of*the agent. The court held that it was his duty to provide for this hazardous business a cool, self-possessed, pirudent man, of good judgment and forethought. Now, surely, no one would-think of employing a man wanting in any one of these qualifications to carry his own goods across the Plains at that time. Ordinary prudence would dictate that such a man was essential for that hazardous service. Here, again, the charge really requires of the defendant to do nothing more than, as a prudent man, hé would do in the transaction of his own business; in other words, it only exacts ordinary diligence and attention at bis hands. Ordinary diligence, like most other human qualification's or characteristics, is a relative term, to be judged of by the nature of the subject to which it is directed. It would not be any want of ordinary care or diligence to intrust the shoeing of a horse to a common blacksmith, but it would be gross negligence to intrust to such a person the cleaning or repair of a watch. A man who would be perfectly competent to perform the duties of an express messenger now, on the Union Pacific Railroad, with a commodious express car at his service, might have been a very -unfit and incompetent agent in 1865, when nothing but a mail-coach traversed the prairie, and roving ‘bands of hostile Indians infested the route.
*259 'Now, whether th.e agent in charge of the line, on this occasion, was such a man as should have been employed could only be judged of by what he did, or what he neglected to do; and it was fairly left to the jury to say whether his conduct was such ás a proper and competent man would have pursued; or whether it was wanting in that respect; and the court took the pains to warn the jury that the result-is not always a true criterion whether a man pursued a prudent course or not. They must judge fairly- in reference to all the circumstances.
We do not mean to be understood as laying down any different rule from that which.was laid down by this court in the late case of Railroad Company v. Reeves * namely, that ordinary diligence is all that is required of the carrier to avoid or remedy the effects of an overpowering cause. We think that when this case, with all its circumstances, is fairly considered, this was all that the judge who tried the cause exacted of the defendant, and that the question of negligence was fairly left to the jury.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
10 Wallace, 176.