MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leonard Holdren filed suit against defendant General Motors Corporation alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., arising out of his employment with Gen *1281 eral Motors. Plaintiff also asserts several common law claims against his supervisor, defendant Kenny White, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and battery. Finally, plaintiff asserts a vicarious liability claim against defendant General Motors for the torts allegedly committed by defendant Kenny White. 1
This matter is presently before the court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs common law tort claims (doc. # 70). For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is granted in its entirety and plaintiffs tort claims are dismissed. 2
I. Facts 3
Plaintiff Leonard Holdren began his employment with defendant General Motors Corporation in October 1959 at defendant’s Leeds facility in Kansas City, Missouri. In 1988, plaintiff transferred to defendant’s plant in Lansing, Michigan. Six years later, in 1994, plaintiff transferred to defendant’s Fairfax plant in Kansas City, Kansas.
At the Fairfax plant, plaintiff was first employed as a superintendent of the trim shop. In defendant’s corporate hierarchy, a superintendent is an eighth-level salaried employee with responsibility for an entire process segment and with supervisory responsibility over sixth- and seventh-level management employees. Superintendents, in turn, report to an Area Manager, who is responsible for an entire department. In July 1995, plaintiff transferred to the paint area as a superintendent. At some point during the next year, plaintiff temporarily moved to work in final process.
In April 1996, defendant Kenny White became paint Area Manager at the Fairfax plant. Three months later, plaintiff transferred back to the paint area and began reporting directly to Mr. White. According to plaintiff, Mr. White pressured him to discipline, demote or discharge several paint department supervisors who reported to plaintiff, most of whom were over the age of forty. Plaintiff refused to follow Mr. White’s instructions.
On March 14, 1997, Mr. White placed plaintiff on an informal Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). According to plaintiff, at the time Mr. White placed him on the PIP, he told him that he would not successfully complete the PIP. On May 1, 1997, plaintiff was placed on a formal PIP, which set forth specific objectives with respect to plaintiffs performance. Plaintiff was informed that if he did not complete the objectives set forth in his PIP, his employment would be terminated.
Later in May 1997, plaintiff fell and injured his knee. Over the next several months, plaintiff was either on leave or performing light duty assignments. During this time, plaintiff was not performing his duties as a superintendent in the paint department. In late September 1997, defendant’s personnel director informed plaintiff that management had determined that he would be unable to successfully complete the PIP and that he would be demoted and would lose his company vehicle upon his return to active duty.
On the first day plaintiff returned to work from sick leave, and on other occasions thereafter, plaintiff encountered Mr. White in the Fairfax plant. On these occasions, plaintiff claims that Mr. White said to him, “How are you doing, buddy?” or “How are you doing, old buddy?” while placing his hands on plaintiffs back or lightly tapping him with a single sheet of rolled-up paper. According to plaintiff, these encounters were humiliating and degrading.
*1282 Plaintiff claims that he has suffered emotional distress and physical injuries as a result of negligent or intentional tortious conduct by defendants.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
at 670-71. In attempting to meet that standard, a mov-ant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party’s claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party’s claim.
Id.
at 671 (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson,
Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut;” rather, it is an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”
Celotex,
III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff claims that defendant Kenny White’s actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. In support of his claim, plaintiff asserts that Mr. White engaged in a “campaign of coercion, intimidation and pressure” against plaintiff. Specifically, plaintiff highlights Mr. White’s directive that plaintiff target older employees for forced retirement or discharge. Plaintiff also claims that he was set up for failure when Mr. White placed him on a PIP that was impossible to complete and ultimately led to his demotion after thirty-eight years of employment. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Kenny White maintains that plaintiff has not shown that Mr. White’s conduct was outrageous or that he has suffered the requisite emotional distress. As set forth below, even assuming that plaintiffs emotional distress was sufficiently severe, plaintiff has not set forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant Kenny White intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiff. Thus, summary judgment in favor of defendant Kenny White is appropriate on plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
As this court has previously noted, Kansas has set a very high standard for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress or, as it is sometimes referred to, the tort of outrage.
Butler v. City of Prairie Village,
As described above, plaintiffs claim stems from Mr. White’s alleged effort to rid the workplace of older employees by pressuring plaintiff to target such employees for forced retirement or termination. Moreover, according to plaintiff, Mr. White intentionally positioned plaintiff for failure by placing him on a PIP that Mr. White knew plaintiff could not accomplish and, eventually, demoted plaintiff. In support of his claim, plaintiff first directs the court to the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in
Dawson v. Associates Financial Services Co.,
Here, there is no evidence that Mr. White had reason to believe that plaintiff was “particularly susceptible” to emotional distress.
5
In fact, plaintiffs deposition testimony suggests that plaintiff successfully endured personal and professional hardships without emotional difficulties and that he suffered from emotional distress only after Mr. White began his purported campaign against plaintiff. In such circumstances, plaintiffs al
*1284
leged susceptibility to emotional distress does not render Mr. White’s conduct more egregious.
See Wiehe v. Kukal,
Plaintiff also cites
Dawson
in support of his argument that “the relative position of tortfeasor to victim” must be considered in analyzing plaintiffs emotional distress claim.
See Dawson,
Plaintiff next draws a vague analogy between his case and several Kansas federal and state
decisions
— Bernard
v. Doskocil Cos.,
Here, there is no evidence that Mr. White engaged in any conduct during plaintiffs employment in an effort to intentionally inflict emotional distress upon plaintiff. Even assuming Mr. White pressured defendant to discharge older employees and placed plaintiff on the PIP as part of a concerted effort to drive plaintiff out of his position, such evidence suggests that Mr. White was attempting only to rid the workplace of older employees. In fact, plaintiff emphasizes in his papers that Mr. White put plaintiff on the informal PIP because of plaintiffs age and because plaintiff would not follow his directive to rid the workplace of older employees. Although Mr. White’s conduct, if true, is quite possibly discriminatory and a potential basis for other relief, it was not aimed at causing plaintiff severe emotional distress. Rather, it was aimed at driving older workers, including plaintiff, from the workplace.
Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concludes that plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against defendant Kenny White for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To constitute sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct, the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
*1285
beyond the bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”
Bolden,
IY. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff also claims that defendant Kenny White’s actions constitute negligent infliction of emotional distress. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Kenny White contends that plaintiffs claim fails because he has failed to show that he has suffered emotional distress in conjunction with a physical injury as a result of Mr. White’s conduct. As set forth in more detail below, the court agrees. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is granted.
It is well settled under Kansas law that “there can be no recovery for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another unless accompanied by or resulting in physical injury.”
Humes v. Clinton,
Apparently aware of the physical injury requirement, plaintiff has set forth a laundry list of physical symptoms and ailments in an effort to support his claim. Plaintiff claims, for example, that he has difficulty breathing and has experienced weakness, fatigue, headaches, gastrointestinal discomfort and sexual dysfunction. Plaintiff also claims that his “nerves” have been affected and that, as a result, his doctor has prescribed Paxil. Both federal and Kansas courts have repeatedly held that such symptoms are insufficient to support the “physical injury” requirement of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. McDonald’s Corp.,
Plaintiff also claims that he suffered a knee injury in conjunction with his emotional distress. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that he “hurt his knee at work because of the psychological pressure under which he was laboring post-informal PIP.” The record is devoid of any evidence supporting a connection between plaintiffs knee injury, his emotional distress, and Mr. White’s alleged conduct. The court could not begin to speculate how plaintiffs emotional distress resulted in torn knee cartilage.
See Hoard,
Finally, plaintiff claims that on April 11, 1997, he reported to the doctor because of a five-day period of coughing and sleep disturbances. The doctor noted that plaintiff suffered from a upper respiratory infection with symptoms such as fever, swollen glands, stuffy nose, sore throat, muscle aches, and chest pain. Plaintiff has offered no evidence, however, which would indicate that he became ill because of his emotional distress or as a result of any conduct engaged in by Mr. White. As with plaintiffs knee injury, it would be speculative at best to connect plaintiffs infection with the emotional distress he contends he suffered as a result of Mr. White’s conduct.
In sum, despite plaintiffs exhaustive list of physical symptoms, the record presented to the court contains no evidence of any physical injuries sufficient to sustain plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court grants defendant Kenny White’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
V. Battery
Plaintiff also asserts a battery claim against defendant Kenny White. 6 Specifically, plaintiff claims that Mr. White, on several occasions, placed his hands on plaintiffs back or tapped him with a single sheet of rolled-up paper, while asking plaintiff how he was doing or calling him “buddy.” Although plaintiff concedes he suffered no physical harm from these contacts, he claims that the contacts, in light of the nature of the relationship between plaintiff and Mr. White, were offensive, degrading and humiliating.
In order to establish a battery under Kansas law, plaintiff must show “an unprivileged touching or striking, done with the intent of bringing about either a contact or an apprehension of a contact that is harmful or offensive.”
Marten v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,
As set forth above, plaintiff concedes that Mr. White’s contacts were not physically harmful; rather, plaintiff argues that the contacts were offensive. In order for a contact to be offensive for purposes of a battery claim, the contact must be one which would offend “a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 (1965). In other words, the contact “must be one which would offend the ordinary person and as such one not unduly sensitive as to his personal dignity.” Id. § 19 cmt. a. Thus, the question presented here is whether an ordinary person would be offended if someone (who was an opponent in a civil lawsuit) tapped him or her with a single sheet of rolled-up paper or touched him or her on the back during the course of a casual greeting.
Even if plaintiff despised Mr. White and plaintiffs filing of a lawsuit against Mr. White strained the relationship between them, the contacts described by plaintiff cannot be considered offensive. The interactions described by plaintiff
are conditions generally inherent in every working situation. Although the amount and type of interaction with supervisors, co-workers, or customers may vary depending on the type of working situation, *1287 some interaction is inherent. tei’action involves greeting. Human in-
Fuls v. SAIF Corp.,
Moreover, there is simply no evidence in the record suggesting that Mr. White intended to harm or offend plaintiff by touching him or tapping him during the course of his greeting plaintiff. Significantly, plaintiff does not allege that Mr. White was angry, upset or rude during these encounters. In fact, the evidence suggests only that Mr. White, at least on occasion, was attempting to be cordial to plaintiff despite plaintiffs lawsuit against him. In the absence of any showing by plaintiff that Mr. White intended to harm or offend plaintiff by his contacts, summary judgment in favor of defendant Kenny White is appropriate.
See Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co.,
In sum, the court concludes that Mr. White’s conduct, as described by plaintiff, would not offend a “reasonable sense of personal dignity.” Moreover, plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence suggesting that Mr. White intended to offend plaintiff by his conduct. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Mr. White on plaintiffs battery claim is appropriate.
VI. Vicarious Liability Against Defendant General Motors
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendant General Motors is vicariously liable for the torts allegedly committed by defendant Kenny White. Because plaintiffs claim against defendant General Motors derives from plaintiffs claims against defendant Kenny White, the court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs claims against Kenny White mandates the dismissal of plaintiffs vicarious liability claim against defendant General Motors.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs tort claims (doc. #70) is granted and these claims are dismissed in their entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
.Plaintiff initially asserted a negligence claim against General Motors based on its alleged failure to train and supervise defendant Kenny White, as well as a loss of consortium claim against both defendants. Plaintiff failed to address either of these claims in his papers, however, and, thus, has apparently abandoned these claims. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to these claims is granted.
. Defendant General Motors has filed a separate motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADEA claims. This motion is not yet ripe for the court’s ruling. When it is, the court will issue a separate order with respect to plaintiff’s ADEA claims against defendant General Motors.
. In accordance with the applicable summary judgment standard, the facts are uncontroverted or related in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
. According to plaintiff, he was particularly susceptible to emotional distress because of his age, his emotional investment in his career of thirty-eight years, and his financial reliance on his career. As defendant Kenny White points out, if such facts were sufficient to render an employee "particularly susceptible” to emotional distress and, thus, sufficient to render an employer’s conduct outrageous, all long-term employees who suffered adverse employment actions would be able to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
. Plaintiffs only evidence that Mr. White had knowledge of plaintiffs alleged susceptibility to emotional distress is that Mr. White filed his answer to plaintiff's complaint, in which plaintiff alleged emotional distress, on December 24, 1997. This fact is irrelevant because it does not show that Mr. White had prior knowledge of plaintiff's alleged condition.
. Plaintiff initially asserted an assault claim in conjunction with his battery claim. Both parties focus their arguments only on plaintiff's battery claim and, thus, it appears that plaintiff had abandoned his assault claim. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs assault claim is granted.
. Defendant Kenny White also maintains that plaintiff consented to the contacts and, thus, his contacts were privileged. The court need not address this argument in light of its determination that plaintiff’s battery claim fails for the other reasons cited by defendant.