86 Minn. 214 | Minn. | 1902
Appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the particular point being that it appeared from the face thereof that the cause, as alleged, was barred by the last 'sentence or provision of section 5927, G. S. 1894.
A concise statement of the main facts as set out in the complaint seems necessary. The plaintiff was a minor resident of this state on August 29, 1877. On that date one Turrell was duly appointed as his guardian by the proper probate court, and thereupon executed a bond in the usual form, with one Honner as one of the sureties. This bond was duly approved, and Turrell entered upon the discharge of his duties as such guardian. The plaintiff having become of age, Turrell filed his account in the probate court, July 27, 1896, from which it appeared that the sum of $634 was then due from him on account of plaintiff’s estate, and this account was
It is a construction of this sentence which is involved, and this is not an easy task, for difficulties are met when holding that it has no application here, as was the view of the court below, and also when attempting to construe it as urged by defendant’s counsel. We confess that it is of doubtful meaning, and that it is not clear just what was intended by the use of the word “claim.” Does this mean a claim which may be allowed or established in some proceeding in another court, or a claim allowed or established in another proceeding in the probate court, or has it reference solely to a claim allowed and established against the estate of the decedent whose property has passed into the hands of his heirs, devisees, or legatees, in spite of the existence of a demand which should have been paid in administration? Plaintiff’s claim against Turrell was allowed and established July 27, 1896. It was
Counsel have not been able to present a case in point, nor have we succeeded in finding an authority which covers it directly. In Horst v. McCormick, 30 Neb. 558, 46 N. W. 717, it seems to have been assumed, with the same statute in force, that the “claim” to be allowed and established was one against the decedent whose estate was being followed, and not elsewhere, or in some distinct proceeding. The point now before us was not raised. The section wherein appears this short statute of limitations is first found in our legislation in territorial days. R. S. 1851, c. 57, § 53. It was copied from Wisconsin, and originated in Michigan, but instead of the language, “liable for any debts under the provisions of the law,” which now precedes the limitation clause, the words were, “liable for any debts as mentioned in this chapter.” The change was made in the Revision of 1866, c. 77, § 16, when the section was transferred from chapter 53 to chapter 77, relating to actions by and against executors, administrators, and heirs, — a transfer noted in Bryant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 271 (313). In Markell v. Ray, 75 Minn. 138, 77 N. W. 788, the limitation clause was considered, and held not applicable to the case then pending. It was said in passing, “In what court, or in what manner, this section contemplates that the claim shall be allowed or established we need not consider.” It has never been construed, although also referred to in Oswald v. Pillsbury, 61 Minn. 520, 63 N. W. 1072, and in Lake
While we here have a case in which the decree of distribution of the estate of the surety was made almost one year prior to the accounting by the guardian, we can easily imagine one where the decree assigning the estate is not, and cannot be, made until after the expiration of the year subsequent to the allowance and establishment of the claim against the guardian. In any given case the heirs at law could easily delay the making of a final decree assigning the estate to them until after the expiration of the statutory period. Thus it would-be wholly within the power of heirs to bar the bringing of an action to determine their liability upon a contingent claim, as this was, until the statute runs and the right is lost; for a claimant could not inject himself into the probate proceedings for the purpose of compelling an early and seasonable distribution of the property. It is obvious that the statute ought not to be construed so as to put it wholly within the power of heirs, devisees, or legatees to prevent the enforcement of a proper claim against them, based upon the fact that they have received property from a deceased person which, in justice, should have been appropriated to the payment of a demand against him.
We are not required in this' case to decide what claims are referred to or covered by the statute. It may be that claims against persons who have deceased pending litigation which has been successfully continued against their personal representatives are contemplated. It may refer to claims against an estate which have been presented in the course of the probate proceedings,
Order affirmed.