*1 HOLCOMB HOLCOMB and Leona James EXCHANGE FARMERS INSURANCE 495 S.W. 2d 73-20 May delivered Opinion [Rehearing denied. 1973.] June Henry, L. by: Troy Associates 6- McCourtney Bon for appellants. Boswell, McGehee, Laser, ir
Cockrill, Sharp appellee. Holcomb owned a Fred Jones, J. James Justice. wife, Holcomb, own- Maverick and his Leona
1971 Ford Plymouth. ed a both had They separate liability Exchange Insurance policies issued Farmers on their Mr. Holcomb had unin- automobiles. respective sured on but Holcomb motorist his Ford Mrs. had her on rejected Ply- Plymouth mouth. Mr. Holcomb was his driving wife’s were damaged Holcomb he and Mrs. it was when *2 negligence injured the of caused in a collision filed suit Mr. and Mrs. Holcomb motorist. uninsured against motorist, against uninsured the Farmers Sammy $25,000. The Walker, trial court the sum of for summary judgment. granted motion for a Farmers’ appeal Holcombs contend this court the On to policy relied on in the insurance the exclusion public against policy under the unin- is void and Farmers statute; that material issues there are sured motorist fact in Farmers’ motion granting dispute trial erred summary judgment. for question, Ann. Ark. Stat. 66-4003 § statute 1966) (Repl. as follows: reads covering insurance, “No automobile maintenance, arising any delivery ownership, or use out of the for shall or motor vehicle be delivered issued respect to motor State with this garaged registered principally or in this vehicle State unless mental supple- therein or thereto, in not limits less than described amended, section of Act of 1953 [§ 75-1427], provisions approved under In- filed with and per- Commissioner, surance for the legally sons insured thereunder who are entitled damages operators recover from unin- owners or bodily injury, sured vehicles sick- motor because of including resulting disease, death, therefrom; ness or provided, coverage required however, that the under applicable this not be where section shall policy reject coverage.” sured in the named shall policy Under involved in this case Hol- James ve- comb is the 1 and insured Item under hicle described is a Maverick. The is divided liability, covering pertaining I, II, into Part and Part bodily injury benefits caused part motorists. but exclusions are set out under each Certain company agrees: under Part I the pay damages legally “To all to becomes insured obligated pay because of:
(A) any person, damage bodily injury (B) and/or arising ownership, property main- out of the loading unloading, including use, tenance the automo- automobile or a non-owned described bile.”
In Part I “Definition of Insured” Named policy provides: “If the named in Item of the Declarations individual, the includes
is an his term ‘named insured’ spouse if a household.” resident of same And in provides: I under “Definition of Insured” Part *3 unqualified “The word includes ‘insured’ (a) automobile, respect with described
(1) insured, the named and (2) any person using while other such automobile any person organization legally and responsible other or use,
for its use the actual by of such automobile is the insured or permission; with his and respect automobile, (b) to a non-owned with (1) relative, the named insured or (2) any person organization other or not own- hiring ing ble for its legally responsi- or such automobile if by relative,
use the named insured or a only or insured in the event such named but occurrence; legally the liable relative provided auto- the actual use of non-owned persons (1) (2) by above is mobile permission of the owner.” is defined Automobile” Under I “Non-Owned Part as: by regularly or owned or automobile not “[A]n
frequently resi- named insured used household, a substitute other than dent of the same automobile.” the named not owned
“[A]n household, while tem- as the same or porarily resident owner, permission with the used with- automobile when for the described a substitute breakdown, use because of its normal drawn from servicing, repair, or destruction.” loss policy, coverage (C) II, com- Under Part pany agrees: operator pay sums which owner
“To all legally respon- be motor vehicle would damages pay to the insured because sible bodily injury accident, insured, caused sustained ownership, arising main- out of pro- vehicle; of such uninsured motor tenance or use Coverage (1) that, A of this vided at the time of such accident.” effect must provides: in Part II the Under “Definitions” following apply Part in Part I “The definitions injury’, ‘Damages’, ‘Newly Acquired ‘Bodily Au- II: ‘Relative’, tomobile’, ‘Substitute Automobile’, ‘Non-Owned Automobile’, . . . ‘Named Insured’” *4 Described Automobile means the automobile describ- policy ed in the Declarations for Uninsured which covered, insurance is indicated as Motorists cluding newly acquired a or a substi- tute automobile. ' (1) relative, the narr. or a
Insured means insured (2) any person occupying other wh ±e an insured (3) any person, respect vehicle, to with motor bodily damages he is entitled to recover because of by injury sured under applies an in- Part II sustained to which (1) (2) or above.” policy provides: Under in Part II the “Exclusions” * * * apply policy II: does not under Part “This (3) bodily occupying insured while an (other than or wheel motor vehicle
an automobile by vehicle) a named insured owned an motor insured household, or in the same resident relative being through struck such vehicle.” Mrs. was that Holcomb contention It Farmers’ spouse a resident of Mr. Holcomb and an insured as of the same occupying vehilce) clusionary therefore, household, both were (other motor than insured motor vehicle a insured, the ex- within owned policy. agreed court The trial clause presented appeal question this contrary Farmers, on so the policy void or exclusion is is whether the specifical- supra. public policy 66-4003, More § under question ly Holcomb’s whether Mr. and Mrs. protection against uninsured motorist policy Mr. followed and on Holcomb’s automobile riding protected them while in another automobile and on which the uninsured motorist owned them precise rejected. protection question The had been
presented here has been this not before previously but the reached courts other states have provisions policy different facts results under simi- statutory provisions lar to the case at bar and to our own. In the similar Arizona case of Owens v. Allied plain- Mut. Ins. 15 Ariz. P. appealed summary judgment tiff insured from a company. plaintiff favor his insurance The owned a Chevrolet on which he had uninsured motorist cover- age driving but was his uninsured Studebaker when injured in a with an uninsured motorist. he was collision plaintift protection against The contended that his un- policy insured on motorist under the Chevrolet driving him extended to cover while the uninsured Studebaker. contained an identical provision bar, as does the the case at apply effect afforded did “to bodily injury occupying to an insured an auto- while (other automobile) mobile than the owned *5 plaintiff’s case, the insured.” The sole contention bar, appellants’ as is contention in the at case exclusion was valid because statute mandated uninsured motorist insured even the named for though might driving he be an uninsured motor- self-owned uninsured automobile. The Arizona with practically ours its ist statute was identical meaning. wording In identical with ours and was said: Owens court nothing requires in the
“We can see statute which uninsured motorist insurer to extend policy policyholder one to a who has elected not by him, vehicle owned so as to to insure another might driving give at such times as he Any interpretation that uninsured vehicle. other purchase an insured to one would allow policy vehicle and claim on one owned coverage thereunder for himself others driving any while number of other uninsured auto- mobiles also owned him.” quoted previous In a Owens the footnote to from a Arizona case which it was said: “ light purpose, question ‘In of that stated whether or not the statute is intended to restrict privilege of an individual to contract with his personal recovery insurance carrier to exclude his own under the policy terms in the event of his in- own jury. nothing We read in the statute which states such a restriction nor do we find ourselves com- ” pelled by public policy to so construe this statute.’ McElyea Safeway Illinois case of plaintiff N.E. insured a owned Safeway Chevrolet one-half ton truck on which had “Family Coverage” issued a with Protection provision an uninsured motorist similar to the one in bar, exclusionary provid- the case at and with an clause ing apply bodily that the endorsement did not “to jury occupying to an insured while an automobile (other automobile) than an owned a named insured or relative resident in the same household plaintiff . . . injured .” The insured was struck and riding motorcycle a hit and run vehicle while he own- plaintiff company ed. The sued his insurance under the provision uninsured motorist of his on the truck complaint and the trial court struck his and dismissed the action. The Illinois mandatory statute made it for issuing companies to assume *6 (uninsured motorist) automobile an additional risk on liability policies. affirming the trial court that appellate case, of Illinois the court said: policy public find between the “We no conflict and the state Section of this as evidenced 755a exclusionary provisions motorist the uninsured present policy.” endorsement in Shipley American v. case of In the 1968 Nebraska plain Wis., Co. 158 N.W. 2d Standard automobile and motor tiff insured owned a Chevrolet cycle. motorist He had insurance with uninsured motorcycle. coverage but on his on none injured motorcycle He was other uninsured when his collided with an motorcycle. His suit on the uninsured policy was dis his automobile motorist endorsement of missed ground stated. cause on the that no of action provisions policy a similar The contained similar policy in the case bar and in as the at exclusion company The clause. on the exclusion relied surance motorcycle within coming considered the as court provision and the automobile” “owned prohibited delivery of an automobile statute Nebraska ** * liability policy for the legally “unless persons who are insured thereunder * * * damages operators of un from to recover motor vehicles. entitled insured Supreme Court of
...” The holding judgment to do other affirmed the Nebraska wise would unreasonable. appellants Virginia of All case
The cite being Meeks, 153 S. E. a case state Ins. Co. in the case at with similar facts and exclusion as Virginia bar, in court that uninsured which the held motorist coverage an insured automobile extended on class, injured owner, as while one of a Virginia driving his uninsured automobile. The pointed out that case
statute, amended, as,
“as named ‘the defines the term ‘insured’ household, and, resident of while the same spouse insured, and relatives such . either, . while in a motor vehicle or otherwise. Virginia court then said: language limit restrict used does “Here the the *7 in he is insured while to the named policy. by the operating On covered the vehicle contrary, him while he extends to vehicle, is, vehicle,’ motor ‘in motor a ” ‘or otherwise.’ supra, 66-4003, point Ann. § Ark. Stat. here that We out pro- bar, no such applies contains the case at which vision. correctly argue appellants case that the Florida The Guaranty Fidelity Webb, Co. v. 191So. & of United States appellee trial, 869, was over relied on at 2d Supreme Mul Florida Court the case turned Ins. So. lis v. State Farm Mut. Automobile 2d compared the state’s The Florida court in Mullís 229. responsibility Mo with the Uninsured financial statute complementary provisions found that the torist Act and the uninsured of the two Acts indicated the intention that motorist provide specific bene act should uniform and bodily public damages for fits to members of the injury to cover negligence and unin caused of insolvent sured motorists. appellants Aetna cite the California case of Rptr. App. Hurst,
Co. v. Cal. 3rd 83 Cal. motorcycle his In that Hurst owned a case 1067. by liability wife owned an automobile covered riding coverage. was uninsured motorist Hurst morcycle injured by his when he was policy provision motorist. The and the exclusion bar, were similar to the ones the case at but as supra, Meeks, Allstate v. not. The the statute was Califor- doing nia court held the exclusion to be but in ineffective pointed so, out California statute defined mem- sured in two classes of which the claimant was a ber of the first class, that the definition family, “the who are insured covered insured ‘while wise,’” named insured occupants or other- of a motor vehicle (Our emphasis). appel- adopted
Apparently has the view Nevada urge Mut. Farm in the at bar. In State lants on us case Hinkel, Co. v. 488 P. Gordon Automobile Ins. motorcycle operating Hinkel, minor, a owned a involved in an with an uninsured him and was accident father covered motorist. Gordon’s by owned an automobile coverage. policy with uninsured motorist statutorily expressed public The Nevada court found the policy company be, of that state to “that an insurance may not issue motor vehicle an automobile or protect which from owners does the insured operators vehicles, uninsured motor unless the coverage.” rejects then The court such reject young, held that since Hinkel’s did not father coverage, house, his he and the residents of his *8 spouse either, and the relatives of were entitled unin- limitation, sured his that motorist without and coverage dependant upon he is is not whether or not any kind of vehicle. knowledge in most that common matter of It is a injuries and two automobiles related use coverage insisted broad involved. Under the drivers are on single purchase appellants, protect himself could one automobile owner on an family against loss caused financial his entire and them are themselves while each of uninsured motorists driving We and automobiles. uninsurable Legis- opinion such was not the intent are of the in the 66-4003. § lature enactment 66- Ann. § therefore, Ark. conclude, Stat. that We liability insu- between contracts not restrict 4003 does this of automobiles companies owners and rance hold appellants, we urged and the extent state valid bar was case at in the exclusion case. in this effective judgment is affirmed. George Fogleman, J., Smith Harris, Rose C. JJ., dissent. dissenting. My A. reasons Justice, Fogleman, John
dissenting impression in this are case of first pitifully align regret with a First, this court itself I to see deciding Second, minority I think such a case. small something the un- into reads that the decision either there, or reads some- that is not motorist act insured probably thing I would there. While out of it that is reasons, I feel further of those in the absence not dissent Ark- urged court’s decision leaves because the to do so point out, position, appellants ansas in the absurd requiring insur- carrier to offer the automobile liability policy providing persons under the ance with against required indemnity up amounts place, bodily injury by at uninsured motorist at except occupying nation, an owned when least automobile, ance, or, insured this insur- the owner carried no on which did, un- if did not contain an he absurdity is clause. The by of this result further a statement in Winslow Drummond’s illustrated Coverage Approach suggested “Uninsured Motorist —A Consistency,” p. Ark. L. Rev. 171: comparison categories A of the first “insured” two leads to the obvious conclusion that the named family sured and member of his in the same any automobile, occupying household need not be much less an insured automobile, at the time in order for to be extended. situated, category, words, other if one of this however injured through negligence of an uninsured coverage. motorist, there is *9 agree
I applied with that statement and think it should pertinent in that Other statements this case.1 article include: the exclusion statement of Mr. Drummond’s 1I am not unaware where recovery cases prevent in those designed
coverage here is involved within only coverage purchased for one automobile motorist household, injury while sustains particular of the household and a member motorist premium family for uninsured occupying which no a second car on Co., only Ins. 201 So.2d coverage paid. Hilton v. Citizens been He cites has distinguished (Fla. App. 1967) authority. acknowledges that Hilton was 904 He Powell, 1968), ground (Fla. App. on the in Travelers Indem. Co. v. So. 206 2d 244 coverage both (as here) the same carrier that in the latter case authority for it as an My analysis me to doubt of Hilton causes vehicles. an rate, validity of such any any about doubt At author’s statement. Ins. Automobile Farm Mutual dispelled Mullis v. State exclusion has been recalled must be invalid. It Co., (Fla. 1971), it was held where So.2d 229 252 written 1969. Drummond’s article was drat 524 question
All courts which have considered the are purpose public policy in accord that the of or under- lying compulsory uninsured motorist guarantee injured statute is to that the insured will position be in the same in the event of attrib- negligence utable to the of an uninsured motorist as injured insured would be through if he were negligence carrying liability of a motorist insurance required by to the extent responsibility the financial question. law of the state in words, In other recovery insured’s should be the same in either situa- more, tion—no no less.
[*] # # purchases A liability motorist who his on automobile does for so the benefit anof the motorist who unidentified party. third hand, On the other purchases uninsured motorist does so for his own benefit family and the any benefit of his passengers in his automobile. Uninsured surance is not contrary, insurance. To the is, effect, it similar very accident insurance, and health payments
to automobile medical insurance. purpose our act is to establish a means providing indemnity persons insured under liability policy injuries arising out of operation of a motor vehicle an uninsured motorist required by in an amount not less than the minimum Safety Responsibility Motor Vehicle Ins. Act. Travelers Prop. Co., Co. v. National Farmers U. & Ark. Cas. 252 624, 585; Heiss, & 480 S.W.2d Executrix v. Aetna Cas. Surety 474, 699; Ark. Farm Bureau S.W.2d Mitchell, 395; Mut. Ins. Co. Ark. 458 S.W.2d Bradshaw, MFA Mutual Co. v. Ark. Any purchaser in S.W.2d 252. “automobile covering liability arising ownership, surance main out of * * * tenance or use motor vehicle delivered delivery respect issued for vehicle in this State with motor registered principally garaged in this State ” * * * clearly “coverage option, entitled, *10 is at his to * * * supplemental thereto, therein or in not less than * * * protection persons limits described for the legally insured thereunder who are entitled to recover operators damages motor of uninsured or owners from disease, bodily injury, in sickness or because of vehicles resulting cluding and cer death, more therefrom” —no 1966). (Repl. tainly Ann. 66-4003 Ark. Stat. § him less less. no contrary gives Any exception is or exclusion public me policy purposes our act. It seems to language a result of the statute dictates that the clear directly contrary majority.
to that reached recognized right parties to con We have policy, long so as terms tract reference to such a public policy contrary and the are to contract may contravened, statutes, even not be but that these approval Travel of the Insurance Commissioner. Co., Prop. & Cas. Farmers U. ers Co. National previous decisions, supra. that, the the I under our submit is that both. It clear exclusion here contravenes coverage required nothing with the whatever to do has liability policy If this is issued. vehicle for which the clear, the need fact were not otherwise may pro liability policy, but not be vided supplementally, conclu seems to lead to no other liability selling sion. The insurer automobile prospective purchasers simply required is offer to its to liability liability policy insurance, of separate damage either in the indemnity any policy, against personal persons done to insured under its indemnity required in the minimum amounts are responsibility act—no the motor vehicle financial simply more, no less. no There is “uninsured motorist protection coverage” premised automobile, on majority. brings
This me to a consideration of authorities from question. Clearly majority supports other my position. on the states a my First, however, I direct to will attention Owens v. Allied Mutual Ins. 15 Ariz. authority leading (1971), seems be the which to P.2d 402 upon quite appellate majority which the relies. The Arizona statute similar to This intermediate ours. decision say upon rickety foundation, a rests only requirement least. That court not failed see a persons insured under driving policy, which covered them when anywhere, any contrary failed to find but also *11 526
authority. Furthermore, the Owens court did not rational simply ize It in in its result. concurred the reached result Rushing (La. Co., v. Allstate Insurance So. 216 2d 875 App. 1968); Hodges, Indemnity National Union Co. v. McElyea (Fla. App. 1970); Safeway 238 673 Ct. So.2d App. Co., (Ill. 452, Insurance 131 Ill. 2d N.E. 266 146 2d App. 1970). interesting It though is to note even that by each of these intermediate courts has been decisions impaired, undermined and its authoritative effect the ma jority only accepts authoritative, Owens as it also McElyea. finds succor in effectively McElyea was overruled in Doxtater v. 547, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 8 Ill. 3d (1972). Doxtater, 290 In N.E.2d 284 the court said that virtually pre the before issues it were identical to those McElyea, McElyea prior sented in but that was decided Supreme to the decision of the Illinois Court Barnes v. Powell, (1971), 449, 49 Ill. N.E.2d 377 County Goodpasture, Madison Automobile Ins. Co. v. (1971). overruling McElyea 555, Ill. 2d N.E.2d 289 opinion rendered, the extent it conflicted with the the language appropriate is so situation Doxtater us, previous decisions, before our statute and our I take liberty quoting extensively from the Illinois court’s recognition of the effect of Barnes. It said: proposition were Numerous authorities cited for the legislative purpose that behind 143a was Section compensation will “to assure that be available to policyholders, event of an unin compensa motorist, sured to at same least extent injury by tion is available for a motorist who compliance Responsi with the Financial bility (49 379.) Law.” at at N.E.2d Ill.2d legislature It was further noted that “the intent of the pro uninsured motorist would generally against injuries tect an insured caused uninsured, motorists who are hit-and-run motorists, complement would that this the liabil ity coverage.” (49 379.) at at Ill.2d 275 N.E.2d Therefore, that, it was held to the extent that the policy definition conflicted with the breadth of cov erage statute, envisioned it could be of no force and effect. recognize of Barnes v. the facts
Although
we
bar,
at
we
distinguishable
the facts
from
Powell are
Supreme Court’s
overlook
cannot
nonetheless
legislative
regarding
be
intent
therein
statements
ap
interpretation
expansive
*12
143a.
Section
hind
majority
leads us to conclude
plied
of that
a
Supreme
bar,
presented
our
that,
the issue at
with
interpret
of the Insur
Section 143a
would
Court
companies to
to insurance
direction
Code as a
ance
provide
for “in
vehicle
motor
injury,
whether,
regardless
sureds,”
time of
at the
operated
occupied
vehicles declared
the insureds
in
in two other states
statutory
highest
subject policy.
that the
coúrts
We note
recently
have
invoked similar
to enforce
constructions
(State
bar.
Farm Mutual
facts identical to those at
Hinkel, Nev.,
1151;
488
Automobile Ins. Co. v.
P.2d
Co.,
Mullis v.
Fla.,
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
State
So.2d
Shipley
229, Contra:
v. American
252
Wisconsin,
109,
183 Neb.
158
Standard Ins. Co.
238;
Co.,
v.
15
Owens Allied Mutual Ins.
N.W.2d
App. 181,
See
v.
Ariz.
Aetna
also Vantine
Cas. &
Co.
(8th Cir.)
Vaught
1296;
Farm
v. State
Fire & Cas. Co.
Bryant
539;
v. State Farm Mutual Auto
413 F.2d
817).
Co.,
897,
mobile Ins.
Va.
140
S.E.2d
only
great circumspection
It that we will
ruling
vintage McElyea
overturn
Safeway
of as recent a
as
v.
However,
Insurance Co.
as the intermediate
obligated
Illinois,
court of
we are
review
to adhere
statutory
applied by
Supreme
constructions
our
conformity
Court and to decide issues in
with the
logical
Further,
extensions of such constructions.
jurists
ignore
weight
we cannot
and trend of
authority
jurisdictions
outside of
Accord
Illinois.
ingly,
precedent
Powell,
based on the
of Barnes v.
compel
as well as on
Ill.2d
275 N.E.2d
ling
precedent, we hold that Exclusion
out-of-state
(b)
to Ervin Doxtater
the insurance
issued
Code.
conflicted with Section 143a of
By
Insurance
Code,
virtue
of that
said exclusion
of Section 442
limiting the
could be
Doxtaters’ uninsured
force and effect in
of no
coverage. Hart-
motor vehicle
Indemnity
Holada,
ford Accident and
Co. v.
Ill.
App.2d 472,
359. To
262 N.E.2d
the extent that the
McElyea
Safeway
Co.,
case
v.
Insurance
conflicts
holding, it
with this
is overruled.
Indemnity
Hodge,
Co.
suffered
National Union
v.
has
Supreme
It
reversed
the Florida
similar fate. was
a
Court,
(Fla. 1971).
Farm
Mullis
State
Whenever is inflicted family by neg- sured or insured members of his *13 ligence motorist, of an uninsured under whatever conditions, insureds by locations, circumstances, or of such happen they time, to be in at the are covered liability pur-
uninsured motorist insurance issued requirements They may suant to of Section 627.0851. pedestrians injury, they may be at time of such riding public be conveyances (including in motor vehicles of others or in they may occupy motor vehicles motorcycles) by
Honda owned but which are not “insured automobiles” of named insured. family protection
Uninsured motorist or is by protect intended the statute to the described insureds thereunder to the extent of the limits de- 524.021(7) legally scribed in Section “who are en- damages, namely titled to recover those from owners operators or of uninsured motor vehicles because bodily injury” by away” and is not “whittled exceptions. exclusions and Bodily injury public to a member of the due produced by accident, motor vehicle whether negligence of an automobile insured or by an uninsured motorist has the same financial impact injured public, loss on the member of reciprocal eyes public and in the our 627.0851, chapter and section laws, F.S. protection damaging to just acute and is F.S.A., the injured as public he whether the member conveyance public riding in a pedestrian or while automobile.” “uninsured in an motorist statute public of the uninsured The specific provide 627.0851) (Section uniform and is to public to cover to members benefits insurance negligence by bodily injury damages caused statu- and such motorists or uninsured of insolvent prescribed torily is not reduc- fixed exceptions exclusions and ible more insurers’ pro- persons provided for the benefits are than insurance secured tected Responsibility compliance Law. the Financial liability in- writing automobile or carriers Insurers reciprocal uninsured motorist surance and are not provisions pen law to insert dtted lia- reduce the they policies exclude or issue that coverage prescribed for the class bility persons law legally entitled who are thereunder operators of damages from owners recover bodily injury. motor vehicles because Mullis Certainly Hodge rule of authoritative. Gilligan subsequently applied in Florida been has 1972); (Fla. App. Liberty Co., 265 So.2d Mutual (Fla. App. Yosemite Ins. 254 So.2d Navarro v. *14 Employees 1971); Smith, Ins. Co. v. 257 Government 1971); (Fla. App. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Mutual So. 90 (Fla. 1972). Santiesteban, So. 2d 102 auspicious. Rushing more has been little The fate of appear in Louisi- ever been to have followed It does not in a factual back- decision ana. In a much better-reasoned ground nearly parallel us case before more much Appeals Rushing, another the Court than was quite result from a different Louisiana Circuit reached negative Rushing. question in answered 1972), (La. App. Elledge Warren, So. 2d 912 majority here. in the affirmative answers the same as ap- reasoning Again of the Louisiana some propriate our consideration: society whereby
There existed in our a situation financially irresponsible people acquire could capable great damage. drive vehicles Because irresponsibility insurance, their financial and lack of they respond were unable to their victim damages under LSA—C.C. Art. This created a 2315. injured people class of in our state who were left who, without recourse and without some form of might relief, become wards of the state. Insurance plans (such responsibility law) as the financial ori- coercing purchase ented toward motorists to insur- removing highways they ance or did developed. them from the if proved not, plans ineffective. Other had to be plans itself, an effort to forestall distasteful to industry plan compensa- the insurance set forth a tion for the innocent victims of the uninsured motor- surveying problem, ists. In it became evident to legislature our that the source of the harm was a danger peculiar to the use automobile and industry capable most and most interested resolving problem closely was the one most re- lated thereto in terms of economics and self interest legislature Therefore, —the automobile insurers. our upon seized industry the solution set forth the insurance offering and made the of uninsured motorist protection mandatory precedent a condition before companies could conduct business in Louisiana. injuries By The evil and the existed. the terms of statute, perpetuates upon our whenever evil itself availing holder himself of coverage (or policy), insureds under his. he is to be compensated injuries. for his In Booth v. Freeman’s Company, Fund Insurance La. 218 So.2d (1969), Supreme our Court concluded “that the intent of our uninsured motorist statute and the policy endorsement issued thereunder is to afford they to the insured when become negligence inhocent victims of the of uninsured mo- *15 torists.” See also Valdez v. Federal Mutual Insurance Company, Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. 223, 411, 413 272 77 (1969). liberally “. . . Such statutes must be con-
531 comp- of providing objective this out carry to strued of no their fault through injured for those ensation own.” intermedi- the Arizona follow we should Clearly, v. Shipley decision the Nebraska leaves This court. ate 109, Wisconsin, Neb. 183 Ins. Co. Standard
American
of
the
alone, except
standing
(1968),
See
567
of an
Cannon v.
App.
Underwriters,
American
275 N.E.2d
(Ind.
1971),
rejected
attempt
injuries
where the court
company
to limit
operating
while the insured
occupying
or
an insured
upon
automobile,
the same basis and rationale as the
majority rule;
Casualty
Surety
Vantine v. Aetna
&
Company,
Supp.
(D.C.Ind. 1971),
355 F.
wherein an
virtually
exclusion
identical to the one in issue was held
being
void as
virtually
conflict with a
identical Indi
statute,
ana
McElyea
pointed
and the
infirmities
are
out.
conclusion,
appropriate
language
I find
in Motor
Bittler,
ists Mut.
Co. v.
14 Ohio
Misc.
Ohio
Op.
(1968),
frequently
Since the stitutes chiefly uninsured motorists con- personal indemnification in the nature of accident insured, is, insurance for the named there special provision the absence of exclusion, procuring no need for his paying for two such injury. special contracts for one This indemnification contract person, becomes effective because a third operates insured, an automobile without Bodily Injury Liability coverage. because adoption judgment I would reverse considering jurisdictions majority position statute, and would indicated our clearly is the question result, the consistent with a desirable produce erosion expressive, prevents which the act *17 exclusions, limitation. exceptions coverage by the Chief to state I am authorized Justice in this dissent. Smith join Rose George Mr. Justice Arkadelphia Elgin CITY WHEELER et al S.W. CR 73-17 21, 1973 May delivered Opinion