[¶ 1] Mitchell Holbach appeals from an order dismissing a temporary disorderly conduct restraining order Holbach had petitioned for against Joy Dixon. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] Holbach filed a petition for а disorderly conduct restraining order with the district court in September 2006. The petition alleged Dixon had “a long history of unbecoming conduct towards [Holbach],” including threats, obscene letters, and stalking behavior. The petition specifically alleged Dixon’s conduct occurred between July 19, 2006, the day Holbach was released from jail for stalking Dixon, to September 11, 2006, the date Holbaсh filed the petition. The court issued a temporary restraining order, which prohibited Dixon from contacting Holbach until the district court could hold a hearing to determine whether a permanent restraining order would be issued. Holbach appeared without counsel, and Dixon appeared with counsel through the use of an interactive video network (IVN).
[¶ 3] At the hearing, Holbach argued Dixon had a long history of inappropriate contact with him. To support his assertions, Holbach sought to introduce letters and -postcards from Dixon, all of which predated the time frame Holbach alleged on his petition. Holbach presented no evidence that Dixon had contacted him after July 19, 2006. Despite Holbach’s attempt to introduce these letters and postcards, the court limited Holbach’s argument to the dates alleged in his petition. Dixon denied all of Holbach’s allegations and denied initiating any contact with him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court stated Holbach had failed to establish reasonable grounds that Dixon committed an act of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the temporary disorderly conduct restraining order.
[¶ 4] After the court issued its order, Holbach filed a notice of appeal. Holbach also has filed numerous petitions, motions, and letters with the district court and the Supreme Cоurt. On March 6, 2007, Hol-bach filed a “Motion for Oral Argument and to Reconsider Order Striking Appellant’s Evidence” in the Supreme Court under N.D.R.App.P. 27. In support of the motion, Holbach filed a certified transcript that provided additional information about the district court’s use of IVN. On December 26, 2006, the district court held a hearing to address Holbach’s correspondence with the district court concеrning TVN. The district court noted that, even after filing a notice of appeal, Holbach “[had] virtually flooded the clerk’s office with a number of requests recently.” The court concluded:
And I am just here to tell you today, Mr. [Holbach], that I made that decision to allow Ms. Dixon to appear via television. As I recall, that request was made by Ms. Dixon, was communicated to someone аt the Domestic Violence Crisis Center who in turn communicated that request to me — and based upon the inherent authority of the Court, I granted Ms. Dixon’s request to appear in that fashion.
This violates no confrontation rights of yours. These are not criminal proceedings, and that is the long and the short of it. With that explanation, I just believe that there is no longer any need for you to be filing any additiоnal materials with the clerk requesting, you know, “What’s the authority for — what was the authority for Ms. Dixon to appear by t.v.?” I authorized that appearance, in that fashion, under the inherent authority of the Court, and that is theend of it. Thank you very much. The record is closed.
II
[¶ 5] On appeal, Holbach argues the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dixon to appear by IVN and had improper ex parte contact with Dixon’s counsel to аrrange its use. Holbach also argues the judge violated the North Dakota Rules of Judicial Conduct; Dixon’s counsel violated the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct; he was denied due process and equal protection; his supporting evidence, namely letters and postcards from Dixon to Holbach predating the dates Holbach alleged in his petition, were imprоperly excluded from evidence; the use of IVN denied Holbach the right to confront witnesses against him; the presence of a domestic violence advocate unduly influenced the сourt; and Dixon is not a domestic violence victim. Dixon argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order.
[¶ 6] Generally, the grant of a restraining order is discretionary, and a district court’s decision must be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Meier v. Said,
1.“Disorderly conduct” means intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person. Disorderly conduct does not include constitutionаlly protected activity.
2. A person who is a victim of disorderly conduct ... may seek a disorderly conduct restraining order from any court of competent jurisdiction in the manner provided in this seсtion.
3. A petition for relief must allege facts sufficient to show the name of the alleged victim, the name of the individual engaging in the disorderly conduct, and that the individual engaged in disorderly conduct. An affidavit made under oath stating the specific facts and circumstances supporting the relief sought must accompany the petition.
5. The court may grant a disorderly conduct restraining ordеr ordering the respondent to cease or avoid the disorderly conduct or to have no contact with the applicant if:
d. The court finds after the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in disorderly conduct. ...
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01 (emphasis added). A person who petitions for a disorderly conduct restraining order must allege specifiс facts or threats that adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person.
See Cusey v. Nagel,
[¶ 7] We have also held due process is required throughout the restraining order proceedings.
Meier,
Ill
[¶ 8] Holbach argues the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dixon to appear by IVN and had improper ex parte contact with Dixon’s counsel to arrange its use. We conclude any error in allowing Dixon to appear by IVN was harmless.
[¶ 9] When a party wishes to use IVN, the party must first provide notice to all other parties and obtain approval from the district court. N.D. Sup.Ct. Admin. R. 52, § 2(B). The court can, however, authorize a party to appear by IVN on its own motion. Id. at § 2(A). Here, Dixon sought to appear by IVN. She communicated her request to a third party at the Domestic Violence Crisis Center, who then communicated Dixon’s request to the сourt. There is no indication in the record that Holbach received prior notice of Dixon’s request to use IVN. Based on the communication from the Domestic Violence Crisis Center, the judge determined that it would be appropriate for Dixon to appear by IVN.
[¶ 10] Failure to give notice violated N.D. Sup.Ct. Admin. R. 52(2)(B), but we conclude Dixon’s appearance by IVN could not change the result of the proceeding. Holbach presented absolutely no evidence that Dixon engaged in a specific act constituting disorderly conduct during the dates alleged in the petition.
See
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(3) (requiring a petition to contain sufficient facts to allege a specific instance of disorderly conduct). Holbach’s petition contained mere generalities, complаining that Dixon had “a long history of unbecoming conduct towards [him],” including threats, obscene letters, and stalking behavior. Holbach failed to present any evidence to support his generalities, which is insufficient to establish reasonable grounds for a restraining order. Holbach failed to show “the facts and circumstances presented ... [were] sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that acts constituting disorderly conduct have been committed.”
Wetzel,
IV
[¶ 11] We conclude the district court’s use of IVN was harmless error. We have