Hoke v. PeopleHoke v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Sheldon
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The plaintiff in error, John Finley Hoke, was convicted of -the crime of forging a draft for $1000, purporting to be drawn by the Merchants’ National Bank of Peoria; upon the Merchants’
It appears from the evidence that Hoke was a book-keeper in the Merchants’ National Bank of Peoria, a corporation organized under the National Banking act, and there he, without authority, filled up, in his handwriting, the draft in question,, which had been signed in blank by the assistant cashier, and delivered the same to one Gf. I. Brówn in payment of margins-upon certain deals of Hoke on the board of trade, and that no-money was paid therefor by Brown to Hoke or the bank. Hoke at the time made false and untrue entries in the books of the-bank, in order to conceal the fact of the unlawful issuance of the draft. The draft was afterward paid by the Merchants’’ National Bank in the ordinary course of business.
Counsel for plaintiff in error, in the opening of their written argument, say: “We desire expressly to restrict the review of this case to but one question, viz: Did the court have jurisdiction, and did it err in refusing appellant’s instructions on that point ? We contend that the offence charged in the proof against appellant was cognizable in the Federal courts, and was therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the State court.”’
Section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is-as follows:
’ “Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk or agent of any association, (referring to national banks,) who embezzles, abstracts or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of the association,’ or who, without authority from the■ directors, issues or puts in circulation any of the notes of the-association, or who, without such authority, issues or puts-forth any certificate of deposit, d/raws any order or bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, assigns any note, bond, draft,, bill of exchange, mortgage, judgment or decree, or who makes any false entry in any book, report or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud thet association, or any other
It is urged that the offence established by the proof upon the trial of this case, is an offence under this section of the statutes of the United States, and that, being an offence thereunder, it is punishable in the United States courts alone.
The act of Congress, March 3, 1875, (sec. 1, Sup. Eev. Stat, 173,) provides: “That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, etc., * * * arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, etc. * * * And shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law.”
Chancellor Kent, in respect of the concurrent power of the-States in matters of judicial cognizance, observes: “In the-, judicial act of 1789, the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, conferred upon the courts by that act were clearly distinguished, and marked. The act shows, that in the opinion of Congress, a grant of jurisdiction, generally, was not, of itself, sufficient to vest an exclusive jurisdiction. The judicial act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the circuit courts, of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where the laws of the United States should otherwise provide; and this accounts for the proviso in the act of 24th February, 1807, (c. 75,) and in the act of 10th of April, 1816, (c. 44,) concerning the forgery of the notes of the Bank of the United States, declaring that nothing in that act contained should be construed to deprive the courts of the individual. States
In Eells v. The People, 4 Scam. 498, Bells had been indicted under a statute of this State making it an offence to harbor and secrete any negro slave, or to hinder or prevent the lawful owner of such slave from re-taking him, and the point was made in the defence, but hot sustained, that the offence described in the indictment was precisely such an offence as was indictable under the fugitive slave law of Congress of 1793. The Court, by Shields, J., there said: “This (the State) law prescribes a rule of conduct for our own citizens. If the State
The indictment in this case is for the crime of forgery. In the offence described in section 5209, above, of the United States law, which is claimed as being the same as that shown by the proof here, the offender is an officer or clerk of a national bank, who, without authority from the directors, draws any order or bill of exchange, with intent to injure or defraud, etc. The offences do not appear to be the same. Under this indict-1 ment for forgery there could not, we apprehend, be a conviction . for the offence described in section 5209. Nor would an indictment charging merely the offence described in that section, ¡sustain a conviction for forgery. The objects of the United ’ States law and the State law appear to be different. The purpose of
There is thus manifestation in the legislation of Congress that section 5209 is not directed against the crime of forgery; that the offence provided against in that section is of less degree than that of forgery; and that it was not the intent to suspend,
The cases cited in behalf of the plaintiff in error are mostly cases relating particularly to the execution of some Federal statute, or to some act done within some Federal tribunal. The distinction is taken in State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83, between cases where the alleged criminal act is done in the course of the execution of the laws of the United States, and where not so done, and favoring the idea that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts may exist in the former class of. eases, and not in the latter. The same distinction was recognized in The People v. Kelly, 38 Cal. 145, as one properly taken. The offence here charged was not committed in the course of the administration of any law of the United States. In Commonwealth v. Luberg, 94 Pa. St. 85, a conviction in the State court, of the offence of making false entries in the books of a national bank by the receiving teller of the bank, was sustained. But in Commonwealth v. Felton, 101 Mass. 204, it was held that the offence of the embezzlement of the funds of a national bank by its cashier was exclusively cognizable by the courts of
While the case does not seem to be entirely clear, upon the authorities, we are disposed to hold that the crime charged in the indictment, or that established by the proof, is not excluded from the jurisdiction of the State court.
The judgment will he affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.