Opinion by
In this сase, the referee concluded, that the claimant was entitled to compensation on the ground thаt the accident which caused the injuries for which claim was made had “occurred while the claimant was furthеring the business of his employer”. The referee accordingly made an award for admittedly total disability in accordance with the schedule prescribed by Section 306 (a) of the Workmens Compensation Act. of 1915 as amended (77 P.S. § 511). Upon successive appeals by the employer and its insurance carrier, the award was affirmеd in turn by the Workmen’s Compensation Board, the County Court of Allegheny County and the Superior Court. Because of the аppellants’ assertion that the decision could not be justified on the basis of prior rulings, we allowed an appeal.
The material facts' of the case are not in dispute. They establish that the injuries for which comрensation was awarded were suffered while the claimant was on his way to the then place of his particular work. On the basis of that fact, it is the appellants’' contention that, at the time of the accident, the claimant was not “. . . actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer . . .” within the contemplation of Sec. 301 of the Compensation Act (77 P.S. § 411). Belying on the general rule that an employer is not liable to an employee for compensation for injuries received off the employer’s premises while the employee is going to or from his work, the appellants cite
Guenesa v. Ralph V.
Rulon,
Inc.,
The claimant was a foreman plumber. As such, he worked for his employer at variоus places in and around Pittsburgh. He had no regular place of work but went from one job to another as direсted by his *33 employer. He provided Ms own transportation for wMcli lie was reimbursed by the employer and be cаrried in Ms automobile the supplies and materials necessary for Ms work. It was customary for the employer to deliver such supplies and materials to the claimant’s borne. While engaged on a job to which he had beеn assigned, the claimant was not required to report regularly to the employer’s office or placе of business. He kept in touch with the employer’s superintendent by telephone and in that way received his further instruсtions from time to time.
In December 1941 the claimant was directed by his employer to perform a job at Groveton, some eighteen miles from Pittsburgh. When that job was nearly completed (five or six hours of work yet remaining), the clаimant communicated with the employer’s superintendent who directed him to come to the shop after hе had finished the Groveton job in order to get some materials to take with him to Butler, Pa., for his next job. The following morning (Dеcember 24, 1941) the claimant started from his home by automobile, taMng with him materials, which he had at his home, for the Grove-ton job for the purpose of completing that work, intending to report later in the day at the employеr’s shop in obedience to the instructions of the superintendent. While on his way to Groveton, the claimant was struck by a passing automobile upon alighting from his own car after it had skidded on an icy road and thereby suffered the injuriеs here involved.
With the facts established, the question whether an injury to a workman is sustained in the course of his employment, as contemplated by the Compensation Act, is one of law:
Stahl v. Watson Coal Co.,
Here, however, the claimant had no regular place of work. His employment required him to be at one place one day on the employer’s business and at a different рlace, perhaps miles distant, for like purpose on another or even a succeeding day. The service of the employer’s interest in the circumstances shown necessarily made of the claimant a “rоving” or “itinerant” workman. The travel to and from his home and the place of his current work was not the ordinary travel of a workman between his home and his regular place of work. The claimant’s travel, for which he was reimbursed by his employer, was an essential part of the expeditious performance of his work in the furtherance of the employer’s business, as was also his transportation of the supplies which were stored at his home fоr his use in his work. Under the established facts of this case, his home rather than his employer’s shop was the usual starting and stopping place of his course of employment. Cf.
Healey v. Hudson Coal Company,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
Compare, e.g.,
Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co.,