Hogshead v. HogsheadHogshead v. Hogshead
In a dissolutiоn settlement agreement the wife, appellee, relinquished her interest in jointly held property and special interest claims against property in thе husband‘s name and the husband, appellant, promised to pay the wife lump-sum payments of $100,000, $20,000 and two payments of $25,000 and alimony of $1,000 per month, $500 of each monthly payment up to $30,000 to be considered as lump-sum alimony.
The ex-husband later sought modification arguing that the total $200,000 of “lum-psum alimony” was payment for the ex-wifе‘s property rights and since the $30,000 of lump-sum alimony payable periodically (monthly) had now been paid, the $1,000 monthly payment to the wife should be considered pure permanent periodic alimony subject to modification based on a material change in the wife‘s needs and the husband‘s ability to pay oсcurring since the dissolution.
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The trial court denied both requests for modification and ordered the husband to make a contribution to the wife‘s attorney‘s fees. The husband appeals.
The trial court construed the agreеment for monthly payments to the wife to partake of the nature of a true property settlement agreement and payment for her relinquishment of special equities in properties held by the husband and accumulated through the joint efforts of the parties during their marriage, and, accordingly, concluded that, although the husband was suffering financial setbacks, the evidence did not establish “the strongest and most compelling reasons justifying modification.” However, the сourt denied the wife‘s petition for modification because she did not show a sufficient need to justify an increase in the monthly payments. Therefore, it is aрparent that the trial court applied a different standard in denying the wife‘s request than was used in denying the husband‘s request.
Because true property settlement agreements cannot be modified and yet all agreements for child and spousal support are subject to modification upon a substantial material change in neеd or ability to pay, in order to avoid the litigation that follows misunderstandings that naturally arise from the quid pro quo concept of “consideration” in negotiated agreements settling multiple issues between parties to marital controversies, careful counsel should never draft binding non-modifiable property settlement agreements so they are, or appear to be, in consideration of agreements for support. True property settlement agreements should always be supported solely by their own mutual promises or recited extraneous consideration and should never refer to, or be incоrporated in the same document with, modifiable agreements relating to spousal or child support.
We agree with the husband that the monthly payments due thе wife after payment of the $30,000 of lump-sum alimony is permanent periodic alimony and is subject to modification under
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the husband to make a contribution to the wife‘s attorney‘s fees on the record in this case.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
ORFINGER, C.J., dissents with opinion.
ORFINGER, Chief Judge, dissenting.
If the trial court committed error in applying a different standard to the wife‘s request for an upward modification of the alimony payment than it applied to the husband‘s request for a reduction, the wife does not appeal that order, so that issue as *77
There is no written and signed property settlement agreement here. Instead, as the trial was about to start, the husband‘s attorney announced a property settlement agreemеnt to the court, the parties stipulated to it, and the transcribed proceeding as reported by the court reporter is the record of that agrеement. In exchange for her receiving lump sum and periodic payments, an automobile, and title to a jointly-held certificate of deposit, the wife relinquished ownership of or any equity in a great deal of property, both individually and jointly owned, or owned by a corporate trust or joint venture in which the spouses were individually or jointly involved. She also relinquished to the husband ownership of stock in several corporate enterprises, the marital residenсe, certain vacant property, a trust owning numerous parcels of property, as well as an airplane, mobile home, and various bank accounts.
In Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1967), the supreme court held that if the wife has relinquished special equities in her husband‘s business, legal title to property jointly held with her spouse, or has otherwise relinquished valuable property rights in return for which the husband has promised to pay a stipulated monthly sum, such monthly payments are not treated as alimony but аs contractual obligations not subject to modification. Relying on the Salomon reasoning, our sister court in Mills v. Mills, 339 So.2d 681, 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (per curiam) held that where a separation agreement contains prоvisions whereby one party surrenders substantial property interests and at the same time is to receive periodic payments designated as alimony, such agreement is not modifiable. See also, Goldin v. Goldin, 346 So.2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). In the recent case of Bockoven v. Bockoven, 444 So.2d 30 (Fla. 5th DCA, 1983), this court recognized the principle that an agreement may constitute a settlement of property rights notwithstanding the fаct that it provides for periodic payments to one spouse. As such, the property settlement is not subject to modification in the absence оf fraud, deceit, duress, coercion or overreaching. See also, Fagan v. Lewis, 374 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Although the parties here referred to the periodic payment from husband to wife as “alimony,” it is the purpose of the payment and not the form used or labels attached to it by the parties which must guide the court. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953). See also, Rubio v. Rubio, 347 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In other words, we should look to substance, not to form.
The trial judge found that the “agreemеnt was a true property settlement agreement and the monthly amount to be paid the wife was arrived at upon consideration of her agreement to relinquish special equities which she may have had in property held by the former husband and accumulated through the joint efforts of the parties during their marriage.” The court thus found the husband‘s obligation to be contractual, and not subject to modification. The interpretation of a contract is a matter for the trial judge, whose interpretation should not be reversed unless it is clearly incorrect. See Murphy v. Murphy, 370 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The record here adequately supports the trial court‘s interpretation of the agreement and we should not disturb it. I therefore dissent, and would affirm.