136 Iowa 32 | Iowa | 1907
Lead Opinion
The facts are not in dispute, and the only difficulty in the case is the application of the law thereto. Por some time prior to April of the year 1899, plaintiffs have been the owners as tenants in common of a tract of land in Blaekhawk county. About the date last named Ever-gene B. Smith, now deceased, claimed to have made a valid contract for the purchase of said land, entered into the possession and use thereof, and thereafter brought an action in
In some States it is provided that, if the demand or cross-claim arises out of the transactions set forth in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiff’s action or is connected with the subject of the action, defendant must present it as a set-off or forfeit his right to claim relief upon it. Brosnan v. Kramer, 135 Cal. 36 (66 Pac. 979); Douglas v. Hastings,
These cases must be squarely overruled, or else it must
No testimony was introduced upon the trial of the present case showing just what was decided by the trial court in the decree in the original case. That is to say, there is no showing that the counterclaim or set-off was not considered passed upon. It may be that the trial court was in error in not rendering judgment-for the defendants in the original case, plaintiffs in this — and this seems to be the fact — but whether in error or not plaintiffs are concluded by the judgment or decree in that case. It is not the correctness of the original decree, but the fact that the parties are the same, that the same matter was involved and might or should have been decided which makes the original decree conclusive. The decree in the original case was a finding that plaintiff therein, defendant here, had no valid contract for the land. The counterclaim pleaded this fact, and asked for judgment for use and occupation. Plaintiff’s right to recover herein is based upon the same identical issue and the same facts
The petition proceeded upon the theory that there was testimony as to the value of the rents and profits or of use and occupation, and doubtless this is true, else no such request would have been made of us, and the petition was probably overruled, because, as the case involved the title to real estate, the final decree should be rendered in the district court. If there was no testimony as to the value of rents and profits or of use and occupation, then the petition was properly overruled, and upon a proper showing to the district court such testimony might and should have been admitted; but if, as is more likely the case, and as the petition for rehearing itself shows, there was testimony introduced on the 'original hearing to justify a recovery on the counterclaim, then the petition was overruled, for the reason that the final decree should be entered in the district court. That being
Summing up on this proposition: If the petition for rehearing properly raised the issue as to defendants right in the main action to recover for use and occupation or for rents and profits, that is the end of the case, for the petition was overruled. If it did not, then the reversal of the case here simply left it in the district court as one already submitted upon issues joined, none of which were withdrawn, and for a decree upon the pleadings and testimony as the case then stood, subject to the holding of this court upon appeal. Testimony had already been taken as to the value of rents and profits or of use and occupation, or none such had been introduced, and it matters little which is true, for in either -event the issues were related in such a manner and so stood when the case was finally disposed of that the decree dismissing the petition was binding upon all parties as to all matters in issue. The decree was not- by agreement, nor did Smith dismiss his case. It was decided by the trial court after the procedendo was returned and upon all the issues and testimony in the case. We feel sure that there was testimony in the record which would have warranted a judgment and decree for defendants in the main case, plaintiffs in this, for damages for rents and profits, else these defendants would not have presented the petition for rehearing that they did
There are many reasons why such a decree should not be rendered in this court. In the first place, as already indicated, the action involved the title to lands, and the final decree should be entered where the land is situated. Again, the case was decided in favor of Smith, the purchaser, in the lower court, and plaintiffs here were decreed to make specific performance. Testimony as to rents and profits and use and occupation would be confined to the time of trial in the district court, and there would be no showing as to values after that trial and down to the time of the reversal here. Moreover, no such showing could be made without a supplemental petition, and that could not be filed in this court. Upon demand to the district court, the title would be adjudicated and the party entitled to rents and profits accruing in
Before closing, it is well to note again the vital distinction between this case and some from other States and doubtless some of our own where distinct and unrelated issues are presented and the record does not show upon which the decision turned. In such cases parol evidence is sometimes admissible to show that a particular one was not passed upon or decided. See Am. Em. Co. v. Fuller, 83 Iowa, 606; Griffith v. Fields, 105 Iowa, 362, and other like cases. But that is not the situation here. Here the issues were all related. If plaintiff Smith had a good land contract, he was entitled to specific performance thereof, and defendants in the main suit were not entitled to have their title quieted or a money judgment for damages. Judgments by estoppel must be mutual, so that, had the decree been for Smith, that would have ended defendants’ counterclaims. If-that be true, then the decision being the other way is likewise conclusive. If Smith did not have a valid contract, then under the issues defendants Ilogle et al. were entitled to have his, Smith’s petition dismissed, their title quieted, and a money judgment for damages. They secured a part of this relief in the main action, and, instead of appealing therefrom, or asking more in that proceeding, they accepted the results thereof, and then commenced action for the same relief which they had asked and were entitled to, but did not receive in the former case. This is clearly a splitting of causes of action, and to our minds a case where neither Smith nor his administratrix should be made to defend again against a claim already once presented, and never withdrawn. If a defendant presents a counterclaim embracing items, all more
The order of the trial court directing a verdict for defendant and the judgment entered thereon are correct, and they are affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) — The plea of res judicata, or prior adjudication, is among the most familiar known to our procedure, and most of the general rules of the law governing it are well settled; but so great is the multitude and variety of the cases that the boundary lines between those falling within any given rule and those falling within some recognized exception are not always easy to trace. Stated, generally, the fundamental proposition of res judicata, is that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits of any litigated question is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action in the same, or any other court so long as that judgment remains unreversed, and not in any way vacated or annulled. 23 Cyc. 1106. As simple as this rule may seem in statement, its analysis and application to a given state of facts are not always obvious. Whether a given record shows a judgment on the “ merits ” of a particular controversy is an inquiry upon which courts and counsel of equal ability, learning, and experience may and often do differ. So, also, the question when and how far extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine what was in fact adjudicated in the former
Turning to the case at bar, let us ascertain, if we may, just what the record seems to disclose as being within the contemplation of the court in entering the final judgment against plaintiff for costs. It will be remembered that said action was begun in equity for the specific enforcement of a contract for the sale of land. The defendants (who are plaintiffs herein) denied the alleged contract, and in a cross-bill asked to have the title quieted in themselves and for judgment against said plaintiff (defendants’ intestate) for the use, rents, and profits of the land. Upon this cross-petition, the plaintiff took issue by denial. Thus it will be seen the pleadings presented two distinct issues; each party affirming one and denying the other. The original decree of the district court upholding the alleged contract and ordering its enforcement involved of necessity the dismissal of the cross-petition. The reversal of that decree upon a finding of this court that Smith had no enforceable contract for a conveyance had the effect to restore the parties to the positions they occupied prior to the entry of said decree. Smith’s petition now stood for dismissal upon the strength of the decision of this court holding his contract to be unenforceable, while' the issue upon the cross-petition stood for trial. Under these circumstances, the district court entered a judgment against Smith for costs. .So far as the record shows, this entry does not expressly dismiss the cross-bill, does not mention it, in fact, and no costs are ordered taxed with reference to it. In my judgment the judgment as entered against plaintiff for costs should be construed as being referable solely to the issue in which he was plaintiff, and on which we had held him not entitled to the relief demanded. If we are to hold that there was an adjudication of the issue taken upon the cross-bill, it must be a matter of inference
The effectiveness of the doctrine of res judicata extends to all matters necessarily involved in the judgment; that is, to every fact which the court was required to find before entering the judgment which is pleaded as a prior adjudication or on which it must necessarily have been founded, but it extends no farther. Porter v. Wagner, 36 Ohio St. 475; Hamner v. Griffith, 1 Grant, Cas. (Pa.) 193; Hutchinson v. Dearing, 20 Ala. 798; Bank v. Ludlum, 56 Minn. 317 (57 N. W. 927); Coutant v. Feaks, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 330; Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt. 223; West v. Platt, 127 Mass. 372. The conclusiveness of a judgment as an estoppel upon the parties goes only to those matters without proof or admission of which the judgment could not properly have been entered. Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200 (96 Am. Dec. 733) ; Lea v. Lea, 99 Mass. 493 (96 Am. Dec. 772) ; Zanesville v. Gaslight Co., 1 O. C. D. 123.
Nor does the estoppel extend to matters not expressly' adjudicated, and which can only be inferred by argument or construction from the judgment, except where they are necessary and inevitable inferences in the sense that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding such points. 23 Cyc. 1297, and note 87. These rules are well established, and their justice and propriety are too self-evident to call for argument in their support. If, then, the record in the former case showed in express terms a dismissal, of the cross-bill on its merits, or contained any statement that the trial court considered or passed upon the claim thereby asserted, or if the terms of the judgment against Smith for costs were such that it could not properly have been entered without passing upon the merits of the cross-bill, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the plea of prior adjudication, and the appellant would be completely estopped. But none of these conditions exist. There is no
The necessary result of the decision that Smith had no enforceable contract for the purchase of the land was to affirm the right of the other parties to recover damages upon their cross-bill for the use of the property while wrongfully held by Smith; and it is incredible that in entering judgment against him for costs, a judgment which followed as a matter of course upon the determination of the appeal adversely to his claims, there was any purpose or intention to foreclose or estop these plaintiffs from asserting that right.
There is- another well-settled rule of law applicable to this class of cases, which may be stated as follows: Where it appears from the record of the proceedings in the former case that several distinct issues have been joined or litigated, on one or more of which the judgment in question may have passed without indicating which of them was thus
Perhaps the most frequently cited precedent upon the point is Russell v. Place, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, although the rule had been frequently applied in earlier cases. It is there stated that, to effect a conclusive estoppel by prior adjudication, “ it must appear either upon the face of the record or shown by extrinsic evidence that the precise question was raised and determined in the former suit. If there be any uncertainty on this head, as, for example, if it appear that several distinct matters may have been litigated upon one or more of which the judgment may have passed without indicating which of them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was rendered, the whole subject-matter of the action will be at large and open to a new contention unless the uncertainty be removed by extrinsic evidence showing the precise point involved and determined to apply the judgment and give effect to the adjudication actually made, when the record leaves the matter in doubt, such evidence is admissible.” This language was quoted by us with approval in Griffith v. Field, 105 Iowa, 362, and held applicable to a plea of former adjudication where we say: “We think there is no doubt that the same facts were at issue in the two cases, but, instead of it appearing in the other case that the issue as to the breach of contract was determined, it seems quite clear that it was not. The burden is with the defendant in this case to make it appear that the issue was determined. . . . Without question, there were two issues presented in that case. The most that can
In Porter v. Wagner, 36 Ohio St. 471, Wagner had brought a prior action for specific performance, which Porter contested, and joined with his answer a cross-petition to rescind the contract and to recover advance payments made by him. The court finding Wagner not entitled to specific performance, the suit was dismissed, and thereafter Porter brought action at law to recover on the same demand which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in former action, and to this claim Wagner pleaded the decree above referred to as a prior adjudication. The defense was not allowed, the court saying, in substance, that, in view of the fact that two or more issues were involved in the prior litigation, the question to be decided was not what the court might have decided but what it did in fact decide. It is said by the Alabama court that, to come within the rule of res judicata, “ the issue must be broad enough to embrace the subject, it must, in fact, have been considered or be so blended with the subject considered as to have become a qualifying part of it, and it must have been decided upon its merits.” Haas v. Taylor, 80 Ala. 459 (2 South. 633). Where several issues appear to have been joined in the former action, and doubt arises as to whether one of them was or was not determined by the judgment, the testimony of the judge who tried the case has been held admissible upon the question. Perkins v. Brazos, 66 Conn. 242 (33 Atl. 908) ; Wood v. Faut, 55 Mich. 185 (20 N. W. 897) ; Follansbee v. Walker, 74 Pa. 306. See, also, Insurance Co. v. Mardoff, 152 Pa.
The trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant, and a new trial should be ordered.