Hogben v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

69 Conn. 503 | Conn. | 1897

Hamersley, J.

The undisputed facts do not necessarily establish a valid contract of insurance between the defendant and Ellen K. Cannon. It is not enough for such purpose that the defendant signed a policy of insurance in pursuance of Mrs. Cannon’s application, and tendered it to her. The testimony tends to prove, if it does not clearly show, that after signing the application Mrs. Cannon changed her mind; that she refused to accept the policy when tendered, and never received it; that neither she nor the beneficiary named in the policy paid the first premium or any premium, or authorized payment of the same. In such a state of evidence it would be error in the court to hold that the undisputed facts, viz: the signing of an application, with the execution and tender of the policy, necessarily prove a completed contract of insurance between the defendant and Mrs. Cannon. Rogers v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 41 Conn. 97; Whiting, Admr., v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 240. This question is not definitely passed upon in the charge.

The court, however, couples the facts of the application, the execution of the policy and the tender, with other undisputed facts, viz: that the plaintiff paid the premiums up to the time she attempted to surrender the policy; that two or three years prior to such attempted surrender she wrote the defendant that she held the policy on Mrs. Cannon’s life, telling how she claimed to have come by it and offering to surrender it on return of the premiums paid, if the transactions were not straightforward; that the defendant received this letter and thereafter continued to receive premiums from the plaintiff on account of the policy,—and thereupon the court tells the jury that “ these facts being proved and uncontradieted, the defendant was bound by the policy, and the plaintiff, though she acted in entire good faith in taking the policy and in advancing the premiums, which the defendant denies, cannot recover in this action.”

If this statement of the law applicable to the facts recited, *510is incorrect, it was error for the court, on such grou'nd, to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. It is plainly impossible for the defendant to be bound by a contract which never existed. If Mrs. Cannon had died before the surrender of the policy, it may be that the defendant, through an application of the doctrine of estoppel, might have been compelled to pay the amount of insurance to the plaintiff. But that does not make the contract valid. It does not affect the liability of the defendant to return money paid under an honest mistake induced by its false representations. When the plaintiff discovered her mistake she returned the poliejr and demanded the return of the premiums. This she had the right to do, if she had acted in good faith. Her money had been paid in reliance on a valid contract, and not on the chance of an estoppel. She could not be compelled to keep up these payments because the defendant, in the event of the death of the insured, might be es-topped from denying the truth of its representations. Nor was the defendant entitled to retain the premiums as compensation for the risk sustained. Whatever the risk may have been, it was not sustained as the result of a contract between the parties, but was incurred wholly through the defendant’s own wrong. If, indeed, death had occurred, and the plaintiff had received the amount of insurance, she would then by her own act be estopped from claiming a return of the premium; but she cannot be prevented from reclaiming her money, paid under a mistake, because the defendant, if it had retained the money, might be. estopped from taking advantage of its own wrong in causing the mistake. We see no ground on which this part of the charge can be sustained; none was suggested in argument.

We cannot consider whether the evidence on the question really tried to the jury, i. e., the good faith of the plaintiff, is so conclusive that the plaintiff cannot be said to have been injured by the error in the charge. The conclusion is one to be drawn from conflicting testimony, and one of fact, which the jury were not permitted to pass upon. The control a trial court may properly exercise is very large, both before and *511after a verdict; but questions of fact in issue and material to a judgment, upon which there is evidence sufficient to support a verdict, must be submitted to a jury. Occum v. Sprague Manufacturing Co., 34 Conn. 529, 538; Cook v. Morris, Exr., 66 id. 196, 211.

Upon the testimony reported, the jury might be justified in finding that the payments were in fact and intention made by the plaintiff in the execution of a wagering contract on the life of Mrs. Cannon, which the law holds to be both immoral and illegal. The charge does not state the law applicable to such a state of facts, either in respect to the effect of an honest belief on the part of the plaintiff, induced by the defendant, that the transaction was legal, or as to the position of the payments while held by the defendant pending the termination of the life which is the subject of the wager; in the view taken by the court this was unnecessary. So these questions, while evidently in the case, are not presented by this record.

There is error in the judgment of the Superior Court, and a new trial is granted.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.