Hoffman v. HoffmanHoffman v. Hoffman
In a final judgment of dissolution entered on March 29, 1973, the court provided for an award of child support of $300.00 per month for each of the parties’ three children which “shall continue until each child is emancipated, or self-supporting.” Over five years later, in the order which is now under review, a successor judge determined that the support required by the judgment for the oldest child terminated when she reached the age of 18. This was error.
In Manganiello v. Manganiello, 359 So.2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), this court clearly established the law to the contrary of the determination below. At 359 So.2d 27-28, it was held:
“The law is well-settled that a divorce decree entered prior to July 1, 1973, requiring a husband to make child support payments to his wife, either until majority or without specifying a termination date therein, obligates the husband on the face of the decree to make child support payments until the child reaches his twenty-first birthday. The only method by which a husband may absolve himself of such obligation of support prior to the child reaching twenty-one is if he files a motion to modify under
Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1977) , and is able to show that the child has since become married or self-supporting. This result is in no way changed bySection 743.07, Florida Statutes (1977) , lowering the age of majority to eighteen because the statute by its express terms does not operate retroactively to alter or change child supportawards made prior to July 1, 1973, the effective date of the statute. Finn v. Finn, 312 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1975); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1975); Adams v. Adams, 340 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Field v. Field, 291 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).” [emphasis supplied]
The husband-appellee points out that the final judgment involved in this case provided that support would cease when a child “is emancipated,” rather than, as in, for example, Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1975), when he or she attains “majority.” This argument is unsound. As the appellee concedes, the only basis for concluding that the child in question has become “emancipated” is that she has reached 18, the age of majority as provided by
The order below is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.