142 Wis. 229 | Wis. | 1910
On March 25, 1905, the common council ■of the defendant city adopted a resolution requesting the
Plaintiff brings this action to recover the balance alleged
The answer of the defendant denies the execution of the contract by the defendant city. This denial of execution is based on the provisions of the general charter law applicable to cities of the fourth class. The board of public works of the city did not participate in the letting or execution of the contract; the contract is not countersigned by the comptroller ; there is no indorsement by him that the necessary funds are on hand or provided for; and the contract is not signed by the mayor and city clerk in behalf of the city.
The statutory provisions prescribing how and by what officers such contracts are to be let and executed are contained in ch. 40a, Stats. (1898). The officers of the city to whom the statutes commit the power of erecting school buildings1' miist perform this public function. Sec. 925 — 52, Stats. (1898), vests in the common council the power of erecting and constructing public buildings. If the council shall have determined to undertake such an enterprise, the estimated cost of which shall exceed $200, then such work “shall be let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder,” in the manner and upon the conditions of sec. 925 — 90, by the board of public works or such officers as shall be designated to discharge its duties. Sec. 925 — 18 empowers the council by a two-thirds vote of its members to designate other public officers or another board to perform the frxnetions and duties of the board of public works; but the record in this case discloses nothing to show that the common council of the defendant city has taken any steps to dispense with the board of public works or to designate any other public officers or any
It is manifest from the foregoing statement of the facts, and it is conceded by the appellant, that the plaintiff and the defendant wholly failed to comply with the provisions of these statutes, which provide the mode of contracting by the city. It is, however, contended that the common council had power to erect public buildings, and that its action authorizing the school board to act for the city in letting the contract was a valid substitution of the school board for the board of public works. It appears by the record of the proceedings that the council at no time determined, pursuant to sec. 925 — 78, that the school board should constitute the board of public works; nor did it ever by official action attempt to dispense with the board of public works and itself assume to exercise the duties and powers of such board. The city attorney, the comptroller, and the engineer were therefore the duly constituted members of the board of public works, and as such the only municipal agency authorized to perform its duties and powers. It is undisputed that they
“The general rule is that a municipality is without authority to make a contract. having any vitality whatever otherwise than for the objects and in the manner prescribed by law, and that one in form entered into in any other manner than substantially that provided by law, where the provisions in that regard are coupled with a prohibition to otherwise contract, imposes no liability on the municipality, even though it is performed by the opposite party.” Chippewa B. Co. v. Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 96, 99 N. W. 603, and cases cited; Appleton W. W. Co. v. Appleton, 132 Wis. 563, 113 N. W. 44.
The statutory requirements to contract for the erection of this sehoolhouse are very explicit and definite, and, since they have been disregarded in the essentials pointed out, it inevitably follows that the alleged contract was of no force or validity and therefore created no binding obligation on the city.
It is, however, asserted that acceptance of the sehoolhouse
The trial court properly ruled that no contract had heen proved and that the complaint should be dismissed.
By the Court. — Judgnent affirmed.