Hoe v. Wilson

Apr 18, 1870
Versions:76 U.S. 501
19 L. Ed. 762
9 Wall. 501
1869 U.S. LEXIS 988
Mr. Justice SWAYNE

delivered the opinion of the coux’t.

The case presented by the record, so far as it is necessary to state it, is as follows: The complainants represent themselves to be heirs-at-law of Ann R. Rermott, deceased, and allege that they bring their bill against the defendant “ for themselves and the other heirs-at-law of the said Ann K. Dermott.” The bill alleges that by virtue of a decree of sale in the ease of Zephaniah Jones v. Stringfellow and others, wherein these complainants and others were defendants, Wilson, the defendant in this suit, became the purchaser of certain real estate of the said Ann B. Dermott, deceased, which is particularly described; that this purchase was made by Wilson on the 2d of January, 1867, from the trustees named in the decree; that long prior to the purchase, and prior to the rendition of the decree under which the sale was made, Wilson was, by order of the court in that case, appointed receiver of the estate of Ann B. Dermott, with authority to manage and rent the property, which appointment he accepted, and executed his bond as such receiver, which was accepted and approved; that he collected a large amount of rents as such receiver; that he was receiver down to the time of the purchase in question, and still continued to be such. It is averred that by reason of his fiduciary relation to the property in question he was incapacitated to purchase; that the sale is void at the election of the complainants; and that they elect to avoid it, and to have the property resold at the risk of Wilson. The bill prays for appropriate special, and for general relief. Wilson answered. The answer admits the decree of sale, the sale by the trustees appointed to make it, the purchase by Wilson, and that he was receiver as alleged in the bill. It denies that he was incapacitated to buy, and insists that the sale was valid. It avers that he has paid all the purchase-money, and received a deed for the property.

We pass by the questions whether the proper remedy of the complainants was not by appeal from the order of the court below confirming the sale, and whether the bill is not fatally defective on its face in not averring such confirmation before it was filed. These points have been fully argued, but the view which we take of the case renders it unnecessary to decide them. The defence that the validity of the sale is res judicata by reason of the proceedings of these complainants, touching the order of confirmation, is not set up in the answer, and cannot, therefore, be considered.

But Zephaniah Jones, the complainant in the suit in which the decree of sale was made, and the other heirs-at-law of Ann R. Dermott, are indispensable parties. No relief can be given in the case before ns which will not seriously and permanently affect their rights and interests. According to the settled rules of equity jurisprudence the case cannot proceed without their presence before the court. The objection was not taken by the defendant, but the court should, sua sponte, have caused the bill to be properly amended, or have dismissed it, if the amendment were not made. Instead of this being done the cause was heard and decided upon its merits. This was a manifest error. The decree must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below. In that court both parties can take leave to amend and can modify their pleadings so as to exhibit the ease as they may desire respectively to present it. If testimony be necessary that also can be taken. We do not consider the supplement to the record filed in this court as before us. It was not in the case in the court below. To recognize it here would involve the exercise of original instead of appellate jurisdiction. Whether it was competent for the receiver to buy at the sale made by the trustees is a point upon which we express no opinion. We have not reached it, and have not, therefore, had occasion to consider the subject.

It is ordered that the decree of the court below be reversed, and that the cause be remanded, with directions to that court to proceed

In ooneormity to this opinion.