Ned Hodkinson, Appellant-Appellant, v. Ohio State Racing Commission, Appellee-Appellee.
No. 17AP-33 (C.P.C. No. 16CV-9590)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 7, 2017
[Cite as Hodkinson v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 2017-Ohio-7494.]
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on September 7, 2017
On brief: Graff & McGovern, LPA, and John A. Izzo, for appellant. Argued: John A. Izzo.
On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Charles E. Febus, for appellee. Argued: Charles E. Febus.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Ned Hodkinson, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his administrative appeal from an October 6, 2016 letter indicating that appellee, the Ohio State Racing Commission (“commission“), would not review his challenge to the racetrack judgеs’ inaction against another harness racing driver for alleged interference during a particular horserace. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On July 29, 2016, Hodkinson was the trainer and harness racing driver of a horsе, Grubich Girl, which finished eighth (last) in the seventh race at Scioto Downs racetrack. Hodkinson alleges that the driver of another horse improperly interfered with
{¶ 3} On August 8, 2016, counsel for Hodkinson requested a continuance of the hearing, which the hearing officer granted. The commission subsеquently requested that the hearing officer dismiss Hodkinson‘s appeal due to the absence of a reviewable issue. In opposition, Hodkinson argued that the commission had jurisdiction over his appeal, аnd he requested an additional continuance until a decision was reached on the motion to dismiss.
{¶ 4} On October 6, 2016, the hearing officer denied Hodkinson‘s second request for a continuance, indicating that she would make a recommendation regarding the motion to dismiss following the hearing scheduled for late October 2016. On the same day, the director of licensing for the commission sent a letter to Hodkinson informing him that the scheduled hearing was cancelled and would not be rescheduled. The letter states, “Pursuant to
{¶ 5} Hodkinson appealed to the trial court from the October 6, 2016 letter. The commission moved to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The trial court granted the commission‘s motion to dismiss
{¶ 6} Hodkinson timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} Hodkinson assigns the following errors for our review:
[1.] The common pleas court abused its discretion when it dismissed Mr. Hodkinson‘s administrative appeal.
[2.] The common pleas court abused its discretion when it decided there was no authority holding that a racing judge‘s failure to make a call during a race is a basis for an administrative appeal.
III. Discussion
{¶ 8} Hodkinson‘s first assignment of error asserts the trial cоurt erred in dismissing his administrative appeal. This assignment of error presents the issue of whether the trial court properly determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the October 6, 2016 letter informing Hodkinson that thе commission would not consider his challenge to the racetrack judges’ “decision” not to call interference against another driver during the race at issue.
A. Subject-matter Jurisdiction
{¶ 9} Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court‘s power tо hear and decide a particular class of cases and is therefore a threshold issue. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19; see Turner v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 180 Ohio App.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-6608, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (“Whether there is subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold question that will prevent a court from reaching the underlying issues in a case.“). Our review of a trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is de novo. Great Lakes Courier Serv., LLC v. State Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-2, 2016-Ohio-3143, ¶ 6.
{¶ 10} A court of common pleas has the power to review proceedings of administrative officers and agencies only to the extent granted by law.
B. Common Pleas Court Jurisdiction Under R.C. 119.12
{¶ 11} Pursuant to
C. Powers of the Commission
{¶ 12} The commission, which consists of five members appointed by the governor, is vested with broad regulatory authority over horse racing.
{¶ 13} The rules regarding harness racing provide for the presence of three judges at the racetrack—a presiding judge and two associate judges. See
D. Analysis
{¶ 14} As set forth above, Hodkinson alleges another driver improperly interfered with him and his horse during a race at Scioto Downs racetrack. The racetrack judges did not take any action against the other driver. Hodkinson sought to appeal that inaction, or interference “no call,” and the October 6, 2016 letter from the commission‘s director of licensing informed Hodkinson that the commission would not entertain his appeal and “consider[ed] the matter closed.”
{¶ 15} We find that the trial court correctly determined there was no “adjudication” for the purpose of
{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, Hodkinson asserts the trial court erred in finding no authority holding that the racetrack judges’ failure to find a violation during a horserace can be the basis for an administrаtive appeal. Hodkinson argues the commission had the authority to hear his challenge. Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of Hodkinson‘s appeal, this assignment of error is moot.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 17} Having overruled Hodkinson‘s first assignment of error, rendering moot his second assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.