89 Va. 265 | Va. | 1892
delivered the opinion of the court.
The first error assigned here is that the court erred in overruling the motion of the accused to quash the indictment, because the finding of the grand jury upon the indictment was not recorded, as is held to be necessary in Cawood’s Case, 2 Va. Cas. 527; Price’s Case, 21 Gratt. 864. This case, in. that respect, is not defective. The record shows that the grand jury returned into court, and presented “ an indictment against Octavia Hodges for murder—a true bill ”; which indictment is recited. The circuit court did not, therefore, err in this action, as the finding of 'the grand jury was duly recorded.
The second assignment of error is as to the exclusion by the court of the testimony of a witness, Edwards, as to a transaction occurring several months before the homicide in question, and now under investigation, and in no way connected with it. The bill of exceptions shows as to this that, on the trial of the cause, the prisoner introduced one Henry Edwards as a witness in her behalf, and the following question was asked him by counsel for the prisoner: “ Question. State whether or not, some time in the month of March, before the homicide under consideration, you were at the house of the prisoner, and saw any conduct on the part of the' deceased towards prisoner that indicated a purpose on the part of the deceased to make an assault upon her, for the pur
The third assignment of error is as to the qualification of a juror, made after verdict, that the said juror had before the trial expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Our statute provides that “no exception shall be allowed against any juror, after he is sworn upon the jury, on account of age or other legal disability, unless by leave of court.” Section 3155, Code Va. Section-3154 of the Code provides that “ the court shall, on motion of either party in any suit, examine on oath any person who is called as a juror therein, to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is
“Affidavit.—This day personally appeared-before me Moor-man Tatum, and made oath that on Saturday last, the 9th day ■of May, 1891,-he heard James DeWitt, who was a member of the jury who tried and convicted Octavia Hodges, who was •charged with the murder of Ii. J. Cunningham, say that he had been summoned as a member of the jury to try the said Octavia Hodges, and that he could not-serve because he had formed and expressed the opinion that the said Octavia Hodges ought to be hung. ■ ,
“ Given under my hand this, the 13th day of May, 189-1.
“W. H. Perdue, J. P.”
And thereupon said juror, James De Witt, being in court, was duly sworn ; and, -in answer to questions propounded, •denied that he had told said Tatum, what he alleges in his
The next assignment of error is 'as to the action of the court in refusing the instructions asked for by the accused, and in giving others asked for by the commonwealth, atfd giving still others not asked' for by either side, on the motion of the court.
The record shows that the prisoner moved the court to give the following instructions—viz.:
“ 1. The court instructs the jury that all questions of motive, intent, and heat of blood are left exclusively to the jury, and, though bare fear is not a justification of homicide, timidity of disposition may be looked to by the jury in determining whether the accused had reasonable grounds to apprehend that she was in danger of great bodily harm.
*270 “ 2. The court instructs the jury that if a man, though in no great danger of serious bodily harm, through fear, alarm, or cowardice, kill another, under the impression that great bodily harm is about to be inflicted upon him, it is neither murder nor manslaughter, but self-defense.
“ 3. The court further instructs the jury that, if they have reasonable doubt as to whether the prisoner thought she was in danger of great bodily harm, or upon any other material point, they must give the prisoner the benefit of said doubt, and find lier not guilty.
“ 4. The court further instructs the jury that a person need not be in actual imminent danger of his life, or of great bodily harm, before he may slay his assailant. It is sufficient if he has a reasonable belief, from the facts as they appear to him at the time, that he is in such imminent danger.
“ 5. The jury are further instructed that if a person believes that another intends to do him great bodily harm; that communicated threats have been made by the deceased against the prisoner; that the prisoner was at home, and that the deceased made demonstrations causing the prisoner to believe that the deceased intended to attack her—then the prisoner had the right to defend herself; and if, in so doing, it was necessary, or if it appeared to her to be necessary, to kill her antagonist, the killing is justifiable, on the ground of self-defense.”
"Which motion the court overruled, and to the opinion of the court in overruling said motion, and refusing to give said instructions, the prisoner, by counsel, excepted.
The court, at the instance of the commonwealth’s attorney, gave the following instructions :
“ 1. Murder is the unlawful killing of another, with malice, which may be express or implied, and is distinguished in Virginia as murder in the first and murder in the second degree.
“ 2. Every homicide in Virginia is presumed in law to be murder in the second degree; and, in order to elevate the*271 offense to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof is on the commonwealth, and to reduce the offense to manslaughter the burden of proof is on the prisoner.
“ 3. To constitute murder in the first degree, the prisoner must have been incited to the killing by malice, and the killing must have been wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing on the part of the prisoner; but a mortal wound, given with a deadly weapon, in the previous possession of the slayer, without any, or upon slight, provocation, is prima facie wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, and throws upon the accused the necessity of proving extenuating circumstances.
“ 4. To sustain provocation as a defense to murder, it must be shown that the prisoner, at the time of the fatal blow, was deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation received; and in deciding this question, whether this was or was not the case, regard must be had as to the character of the provocation, to the nature of the act by which death was caused, to the time which elapsed between the provocation and the act which caused death, to the prisoner’s conduct during the interval, and to all the circumstances tending to show the state of her mind at the time she committed the offense.
“ 5. Even the necessity relied upon to justify killing must not arise out of prisoner’s own misconduct.
“ 6. dSTo provocation whatever can render a homicide justifiable, or even excusable. The lowest grade to which it can reduce homicide is manslaughter; and, if the prisoner killed the deceased suddenly, without any, or without considerable, provocation, the law implies malice, and the killing is murder.”
“The court further instructs the jury that the bare fear that one intends to commit murder, or other atrocious crime, however well grounded, unaccompanied by any overt*272 act indicative of. any such intention, will not warrant killing the party by way of prevention. There must be some overt act indicative of imminent danger at the time.
“ 2.' There must be some act by the deceased meaning present peril, or something in the attending circumstances indicative of the present purpose to make the apprehended attack. The act 'so done, or circumstances thus existing, must be of such a character as to afford a reasonable ground for believing there is a design for committing a felony, or to do some serious bodily harm, and imminent danger of carrying such design into immediate execution.”
The court gave the following instruction of its own motion:
“ If the jury believe from the evidence that the deceased did any act, or that the circumstances brought about by him were of such a character as to afford the prisoner at the bar reasonable ground for believing that the deceased designed to kill her, or to inflict on her great bodily harm, and there was imminent danger of carrying such design into execution, under such circumstances the killing would be excusable, although it may turn out that appearances were deceptive, and that there was no design on the part of the deceased to kill prisoner, or to do her great injury.”
At the instance of the prisoner, by counsel, the court gave the following instruction :
“ The court instructs the jury that justifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in the necessary, or apparently necessary, defense of one’s self or family from great bodily hai*m, apparently, attempted to be committed by force, or in defense of home, property, or person, against one who apparently endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony on either.
“ The court further instructs the jury that, where a man is threatened with danger, the law authorizes him to determine, from appearances and the actual state of things surrounding*273 him, as to the necessity of resorting to force ; and, if he acts from reasonable and honest conviction, he will not be held criminally responsible for a mistake as to the actual danger, where other judicious men would have been mistaken ; for, when one man attempts to injure another, it gives the injured man the right to make use of such means to prevent injury as his behavior and the situation make necessary.
“ The court further instructs the jury that where a person is attacked, and when, from the nature of the attack, he believes that there is a design to take life, or to do him great bodily harm, then the killing of the assailant under such circumstances will be excusable or justifiable homicide, although it should after appear that no injury was intended, and no real danger existed.
“ The court further instructs the jury that, where killing takes place in a combat, in determining whether or not the prisoner thought she was in danger of great bodily harm, the jury ought to consider the relative strength and size of the parties.”
The objection to these instructions is stated, in general terms, as follows: “Petitioner deems it unnecessary in her petition to enter into a lengthy discussion of the question of law embraced in the instructions she asked for, and which were refused by the judge. She deems them obvious and well-established principles of law, which ought to have been given to the jury, and the refusal of the court to give the instructions, as she believes, greatly operated in her conviction.”
We perceive no error in the instructions giveD or refused. The court cannot be required to instruct juries on mere general, abstract principles of law, however correct, unless these principles are applicable to the case. But the accused in this case has no cause of complaint that her instructions were not all given, because those actually given upon
The next and last assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling the motion of the accused to set aside the verdict of the jury as contrary to the law and the evidence. In considering this question upon the evidence certified, upon the familiar principles of a demurrer to evidence, it is manifest that there is no error in this action of the court. The eyewitnesses to the homicide describe it as follows : The deceased and two other male companions were all day at the house of the defendant, playing cards and drinking intoxicating liquors, in which the woman participated without reserve. The deceased, who was in liquor to a certain degree, getting drowsy, laid on this 'woman’s bed and went to sleep. He was a sewing-machine agent, and tried to sell a machine to one of his companions, and said he would leave one at the house of the witness (Frailin), and that he was going home with Frailin. "When he waked from his sleep he seemed anxious to start— put his arms around his neck, and tried to pull him up,'saying, “Let’s go; let’s go.” "Witness replied, “Wait a few minutes.” Witness got up, when Greer, a man present, said, “ Bill [meaning witness] is not going,” and caught witness by the hand. Deceased asked Greer what he had to do with it. Prisoner then said to deceased, if he wanted anybody to go he had better go himself. Deceased replied, “ I will go when I d-d please.” Prisoner then said, “If you don’t go,'you had better go.” Deceased replied, “ Ho one can put me out.” Greer then let go of Frailin, and Frailin took his seat on the bed. Prisoner seemed to get angry, and said, “ If you don’t go I wt.11 shoot you.” Deceased said, “ Shoot and be d-d.” She w-ent to the back part of the house, [room is meant], and he followed her, opening his coat and saying, “Shoot.”
Judgment affirmed.