Kimbеrly HODGES, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
No. SC 87513.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Feb. 27, 2007.
Rehearing Denied April 17, 2007.
Donald L. Schlapprizzi, St. Louis, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Galen P. Beaufort, William D. Geary, Kansas City, for Amicus Curiae, City of Kansas City, Mo.
RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge.
I.
The City of St. Louis (City) appeals the judgment of the circuit court awarding damages to Kimberly Hodges after her mother died of injuries from a car accident caused by a City police officer. Hodges filed a cross-appeal challenging the constitutionality of the statutory limitation on damages payable by a public entity. The Court holds that the officer is an agent of the City for рurposes of vicarious liability and the limitation on damages is constitutional. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
II.
Ann Martin was injured in March 2003 after her car was hit in an intersection by a police car driven by Officer Willie Walker traveling without lights or sirens in the wrong direction down a one-way street
Hodges settled with Walker and the Board.1 The City asserted the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity and moved for summary judgment. The circuit court overruled the motion, and the pаrties proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of Hodges and awarded damages of $1.2 million.2 The court reduced the judgment to $335,118—the statutory limitation on damages payable by a public entity under
Hodges objected to the limitation and moved to set aside the judgment.4 The City moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court overruled all motions, and the parties appealed. The City claims that it cannot be vicariously liable for Walker‘s negligence because police officers are agents of the Board, not the City. Hodges challenges the constitutionality of the limitation on damages.
III.
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a state stаtute.5 The standard of review for constitutional challenges to a statute is de novo.6 The standard of review of the trial court‘s denial of a motion for JNOV and directed verdict is the same; the Court must determine whether the plaintiff made
IV.
As a general rule, the negligent conduct of a police officer in the operation of a motor vehicle while on duty states a claim for vicarious liability against the city that the officer serves.10 However, the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City are unique in that their officers are employed by boards of police commissioners, not the cities. The City contends, therefore, that Officer Walker is not an agent of the City for purposes of vicarious liability; only Walker‘s actual employer, the Board, is responsible for his negligence. Ms. Hodges asserts that Walker is a dual agent of the state and the City as a matter of statutory law and at common law.
Agency Relationship Created by Statute
Referring to the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City,
The members of the police force of the cities covered by sections 84.010 to 84.340, organized and appointed by the police commissioners of said cities, are hereby declared to be officers of the said cities, under the charter and ordinances thereof, and also to be officers of the state of Missouri, and shall be so deemed and taken in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of this state or the ordinances of said cities. (emphasis added)
This Court confirmed the statute‘s creation of a dual agency relationship over a century ago in Carrington v. City of St. Louis.11 There, the City was held liable for a dangerous condition created by an officer on City premises. The statute has not changed substantially since that time. Then, the Court stated:
“It is plain, from these provisions of the law, that the police force constitutes a department of the city government. While these officers are state officers for some purposes, they are also city officers. They are none the less city officers because, for reasons deemed best by the legislature, they are under the control of the commissioners, and not the assembly. We see that by express law they are made city officers ... We conclude that as to the act in question [the city police оfficer] was the officer and agent of the city ...”12 (emphasis added)
The City argues that Carrington has been eroded by subsequent holdings and should not be followed. Specifically, in
[A] member of such police force (like other agents) may be called on to act in a dual capacity and in a dual rеlation; and that is made his precise standing in the quoted statute which makes him both an officer of the city and the state. It says so in so many words, and there can be no two ways about it. Those cases, then, dealing with him from the angle of his state capacity and relation, militate not at all against his having a city relation and being a city officer also. Moreover, the city pays him for his services, and this case no little illustrates the truth of the authenticated and venerable saying: “The ox knoweth his master‘s crib.”15 (emphasis added)
In light of
Limitation on Damages
Hodges contends that the statutory cap on damages payable by a public entity for the negligence of a public employee violates the equal protection clause of the
The liability of the state and its public entities on claims within the scope of sections 537.600 to 537.650, [sic] shall
not exceed ... three hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a single accident or occurrence.
The statute further provides for an annual adjustment based upon economic data supplied by the federal government. There is no dispute that the applicable limit in this case is $335,118.
This Court upheld the constitutionality of
V.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
WOLFF, C.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH, TEITELMAN and RUSSELL, JJ., concur; PRICE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed: LIMBAUGH, J., concurs in opinion of PRICE, J.
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority opinion. Respondeat superior liability is based upon control of the sеrvant by the master. Missouri statutes place exclusive control of the Saint Louis police department and all of its officers in the state-appointed board of police commissioners, not in the City of Saint Louis. Accordingly, respondeat superior liability cannot, as a matter of law, lie against the City for the acts of a Saint Louis police officer.
I.
Missouri law has clearly and consistently held that respondeat superior liability is only imposed upon a party if that party exercises control over a servant or agent relative to the negligent actions at issue. “The right of control as to the mode of doing the work is generally held to be the principal consideration in determining the relationship.” Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 339 Mo. 982, 98 S.W.2d 717, 723 (1936) (emphasis added).
“In determining whether one is such character of agent as to make the employer liable for the acts of the alleged agent, definitions serve as a ‘general outline of the field of inquiry, as is recognized in the universal expression to the effect that each case must depend upon its own surroundings, facts, and circumstances, and be subjected to established specific tests in aid of the ultimate and decisive test, right of control.‘”
Barnes v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills, 341 Mo. 563, 108 S.W.2d 58, 61 (1937) (emphasis added). “Respondeat superior is inapplicable unless a master-servant relationship exists. If there is no right to control, there is no liability.” Kaplan v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 166 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Mo.App. 2003).
Only if a master-servant rеlationship exists between the parties does the doctrine of respondeat superior act to impose liability on an employer. To determine if respondeat superior applies, it must be determined whether the person sought to be charged as a master had the right or power to control and direct the physical conduct of the other
II.
The state of Missouri has deliberately chosen to place the police department of Saint Louis under state, not local, control. Chapter 84, RSMo 2000.1 This was done by the creation of a board of police commissioners made up of the mayor of Saint Louis and four other members appointed by the governor with the consent of the Missouri Senate.
Notes
The role of the city of Saint Louis relative to the police department is simply to fund it.
said cities, or other persons whatsoever, who shall forcibly resist or obstruct the execution or enforcement of any of the provisions of sections 84.010 to 84.340 or relating to the same, or who shall disburse any money in violation thereof, or who shall hinder or obstruct the organization or maintenance of said board of poliсe, or the police force therein provided to be organized and maintained, or who shall maintain or control any police force other than the one therein provided for, or who shall delay or hinder the due enforcement of sections 84.010 to 84.340 by failing or neglecting to perform the duties by said sections imposed upon him, shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars for each and every offense, recoverable by the boards by action at law in the name of the state, and shall forever thereafter be disqualified from holding or exercising any office or employment whatsoever under the mayor or common сouncil or municipal assembly of said cities, or under sections 84.010 to 84.340; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with the punishment, under any existing or any future laws of this state, of any criminal offense which shall be committed by the said parties in or about the resistance, obstruction, hindrance, conspiracy, combination or disbursement aforesaid.
Sec. 84.220 .
III.
The majority bases its opinion on
The members of the police force of the cities covered by sections 84.010 to 84.340, organized and appointed by the police commissioners of said cities, are hereby declared to be officers of the said cities, under the charter and ordinances thereof, and also to be officers of the state of Missouri, and shall be so deemed and taken in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of this state or the ordinances of said cities.
Carrington did not find the city liable under respondeat superior. Instead, Carrington found that the City was directly liable on a premises liability theory:
[I]t is the unquestioned duty of the city to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for persons traveling thereon, and it is liable in damages to one injured by reason of negligence in this behаlf. We conclude that as to the act in question Balte was the officer and agent of the city, and that his knowledge of the condition of the trapdoors was notice to and knowledge thereof on the part of the city.
Id. at 242. The above-quoted language merely held that the officer was an agent only for the purposes of imputing notice to the city. Significantly, Carrington notes that Saint Louis police officers “are under the control of the [board of police] commissioners, and not the [city] assembly.” Id. at 241.
Wander, also, does not apply. It dealt only with the question of whether an officer is an agent of the city for the purposes of exemption from recеipt of a fee for testifying in city court. Wander, 165 S.W. at 1072-73. Wander did not involve any torts nor did it address the master-servant relationship or respondeat superior liability.
IV.
One case directly addresses the issue at hand. It is directly on point. In Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932), a woman was injured when she fell in an elevator shaft at a Kansas City police station. Id. at 486. This Court found the city of Kansas City could not be held liable, stating:
“The police station and the elevator therein was entirely under the control of the police board, which was a state agency. A municipal corporation has no inherent police power, but derives it solely from delegation by the state. In this state, the Legislature had not seen fit to delegate completely to Kansas City the function of maintaining a police department, but had retained control thereof in the state by placing upon the Governor of the State the duty of appointing the police board which would have charge of such functions there. While the police board was in charge of the station, there was nothing the city could do about it. As said in 19 R.C.L. 1114, s 394: ‘The rights and powers of a municipality are subject to the will and control of the legislature, and it lies within the power of the legislature to take the control of some municipal department out of the hands of the municipality and turn it over to some board of state officers. When this has been done, upon rudimental principles of justice the municipality cannot be held liable for the negligence of such officers, regardless of the nature of the function they are administering.‘”
Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
Also, in Crigler v. City of St. Louis, et al., 767 F.Supp. 197 (E.D.Mo.1991), Judge George Gunn, formerly of this Court, ruled that the City of Saint Louis could not be liable under
Even if such evidence was sufficient to support plaintiff‘s contention that an official policy of racial discrimination exists, plaintiff would be unable to demonstrate the existence of a material factual dispute with respect to the City‘s liability, because the City has no direct control оver the activities of the Board of Police Commissioners or its employees. ... The division of authority between the City and the Board of Police Commissioners set forth in Mo.Rev.Stat. sec. 84.010 indicates that neither the City nor its agents possesses the authority to make official policy concerning the actions of the Board of Police Commissioners or individual police officers.
Crigler, 767 F.Supp. at 199–200.
V.
I agree with the portion of the majority opinion that upholds the constitutionality of the statutory damage caps. The legislature has determined that damage caps protect Missouri businesses and individuals from the threat of unjustified and excessive verdicts. That determination, howеver, does not mean that such caps are without flaw.
Here, a jury awarded plaintiff a verdict of $1.2 million for the death of her mother. After payment of $335,118 on behalf of the police officer for his direct negligence and $335,118 on behalf of the Saint Louis police board under respondeat superior liability because the police officer acted under the board‘s control, plaintiff is left with a $529,764 shortfall.
While statutory damage caps allow for full compensation of individuals with lesser damages, they do not allow for full compensation of individuals who suffer more significant injuries or death. The remedy for this problem, however, lies with the legislature to reexamine the amount and the manner in which the caps should be applied to catastrophic cases.
The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed.
purposes by such cities for departments of city government, an estimate of the sum of money which will be necessary for the subsequent fiscal year, to enable them to discharge the duties hereby imposed upon them, and to meet the expenses of the police department. Such estimate shall include, but not be limited to, all reasonably anticipated revenues of such boards from all sources including, but not limited to, grants from the federal or state governments, governmental agencies or other grantors and forfeitures of property and proceeds of forfeited property, a table of organization, line items for personnel, supplies, maintenance, repairs, services and contractual requirements, and a statement comparing receipts and expenses for the last prior full fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the fiscal year to which the estimate pertains. Said boards shall forthwith certify such estimate to the board of common council or municipal assembly, as the case may be, of said cities, who are hereby required to set apart and appropriate the amount so certified, payable out of the revenue of sаid cities, after having first deducted the amount necessary to pay the interest upon the indebtedness of said cities, the amount necessary for the expenses of the city hospital and health department, the amount necessary for lighting the city, and any sum required by law to be placed to the credit of the sinking fund of said cities. During a fiscal year for which an appropriation has been so made, said boards shall not transfer funds appropriated for one line item of such appropriation to any other line item without the prior approval of the municipal board of estimate and apportionment.