Lead Opinion
This appeal is taken from a final decree upon a submission on the bill and the exhibits thereto, and a decree pro confesso regularly had on the bill.
The .rule of chancery practice in this state is well settled that every fact well pleaded in a bill is taken as confessed on a decre pro confesso. There is another rule of law which requires the citation of no authorities to sustain, and that is, when certain facts are established, reasonable conclusions of the existence or the nonexistence of other facts may be deduced therefrom by the court or jury trying the case. The purpose of the bill is to enjoin the respondent, appellant here, from prosecuting her suit in ejectment at law for the recovery of the 20 acres of land described in the bill. The complainant relies upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais on the facts stated in the bill, which must be taken as true on the decree pro confesso. The bill avers that complainant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The bill also shows that the respondent, Alice
While it is not necessary, where the land occupied by the deceased husband at the time of his death does not exceed in area and value that which the law allows as a homestead, for the widow to institute proceedings in the probate court to secure her homestead rights, yet the statute authorizes such proceedings, and she may pursue that course if she chooses to do so. As was said in the case of Tartt v. Negus, 127 Ala. 301, 28 South. 713:
“The statute authorizes proceedings in the probate court for setting apart the homestead, and they may be resorted to with advantage for the purpose of establishing the exempt character of the particular property by record evidence.”
The respondent voluntarily resorted to- the probate court to establish her homestead claim, and doubtless she had her reasons for doing so, and by those proceedings she put herself on record as declaring to the world that she had no claim of homestead in any other land of her deceased husband than the 60 acres described in her petition in the probate court, and of course none in the 20 acres in dispute. The cqmplainant, relying on these representations solemnly made of record,- in good faith and without notice, actual or constructive, of any claim of interest by the respondent in the 20 acres, six years or more after the proceedings in the probate court, pur
Upon a review of all the facts averred in the bill, which facts must be taken as admitted in the case, we hold that the respondent is estopped in equity from setting up her claim to the land; and the decree of the chancellor appealed from, granting the complainant relief, will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Rehearing
ON REHEARING.
It must be assumed, from the averments of the bill of complaint, that the respondent, as the widow of her deceased husband, acquired the legal title to the entire 80 acres, which was all the land owned by her said husband at the time of his death, and that the respondent, the plaintiff in the action of ejectment, would be entitled to recover as to the 20 acres involved, and which is a part of said 80 acres, but for the contended for equitable estoppel arising out of respond
In the case of Hodges v. Hodges, 172 Ala. 11, 54 South. 618, this court did not hold that the probate proceedings in question would operate as an equitable estoppel against this respondent. It may be that the sec
In this case there was-a decree pro confesso against this respondent, but in order to sustain said decree, upon appeal, no essential fact will be supplied by intendment; and as the averments of the bill are insufficient to authorize the relief prayed for and granted, this court will reverse the decree rendered by the chancery court.—National Building Association v. Ballard, 126 Ala. 155, 27 South. 971.
The application for a rehearing is granted, the judgment of affirmance is set aside, and the decree of the chancery court is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.