153 Va. 904 | Va. | 1929
delivered the opinion of the court.
Lucien Hodge has been convicted under an ordinance of the city of Winchester on a warrant charging him with selling ardent spirits unlawfully, and sentenced to confinement in jail for sixty days and fined $100.00. The only assignment of error is that the evidence does not support the conviction.
It is claimed, first, that there is no proof that the accused sold ardent spirits within the jurisdiction of the city of Winchester.
Two Winchester policemen testified that, receiving a telephone call about nine o’clock p. m. to come to the
Upon this testimony it is claimed that it is not shown that the sale was made within the city of Winchester, or within three miles of the corporate limits! This might have been persuasive had there been no other evidence. The accused, Hodge,' himself, however, who was perfectly familiar with the city of Winchester and' its boundaries, testified that it took him some time to fix the car and that he drove around Winchester but did not drive out of the city of Winchester with them; and that they had a punctured tire which he fixed, and that he was trying to quiet them when they were arrested. Ealey and Shuey nowhere claimed that they knew the boundaries of the city of Winchester. Whether in fact they went outside of the city, or how far outside they went before the sale was made, is not shown, but it is clear that when they started as well as when arrested, they were in the city. The evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
In addition to this, the question cannot be raised here for the first time, because of Rule 22 of this court, 149 Va., pages xii and xiii, which provides that “Questions of venue in civil and criminal cases must be raised in the trial court before verdict in cases tried by a jury, or before judgment in all other cases. Venue, save in exceptional cases, cannot be raised thereafter, nor for the first time in this court.”
It is also claimed that the evidence fails to show that the accused sold the ardent spirits to Shuey and Ealey.
In Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 773, 109 S. E. 418, 419, this court said: “It is not alone the actual completed sale of ardent spirits which falls within the condemnation of the statute. It also forbids the taking even of the first step towards the making of the sale.” In that ease it was held that an offer to sell whiskey constituted a violation of the statute.
In Watts v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 879, 39 S. E. 706, 708, this is said, which may be applicable under the facts of this case: “It is suggested that the facts could not do more than make Watts an accessory before the fact; but ‘at common law, in misdemeanors, there are no accessories, all concerned being principals.’ 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, section 223.”
In Brown v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 736, 107 S. E. 809, 810, 16 A. L. R. 1039, this is said: “Every person who is present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or inciting the same by words, gestures, looks or signs, or who, in any way, or by any means, countenances or approves the same, is, in law, assumed to be an aider and abettor, and is liable as principal.” Daingerfield v. Thompson, 33 Gratt. (74 Va.) 148, 36 Am. Rep. 783; Kemp's Case, 80 Va. 450.
We perceive no reason for disturbing the judgment.
Affirmed.