Hodge v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc.Hodge v. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc.
OPINION OF THE COURT
(June 10, 2015)
In 2002, the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bluebeard’s Castle Hotel — owned by BCI — is on Bluebeard’s Hill on St. Thomas. To the west of the hotel is Frederiksberg Gade, a public road, and to the south is Beltjen Road, another public road. The hotel is connected to Frederiksberg Gade by a road running up Bluebeard’s Hill that is referred to in the record alternatively as “Vy til Frederiksberg,” or the entrance road to Bluebeard’s Castle. This road connects with a road running directly south of the hotel through the hotel parking lot, which in turn connects with a road leading down the other side of the hill to meet Beltjen Road. The road leading down the other side of the hill connecting with Beltjen Road is referred to in the record as the “cable TV road,” or the hotel exit road. This right-of-way in its entirety from Frederiksberg Gade to Beltjen Road is referred to in the record as “the disputed road.” The disputed road provides the only access to Parcel 39C in Estate Taameberg.
Parcel 39C was created in July 1917, when the larger Parcel 39A was divided in two, creating a new Parcel 39C to the north accessible only through the disputed road, and leaving the remainder of Parcel 39A to the south accessible through Beltjen Road. The West Indian Company then bought Parcel 39C in 1919. In 1939, it built a house and garage on the property, where its employees lived until the house burned down in 1981, leaving only the garage intact. The company then sold the property to Maria Hodge and Lawrence Hodge in 1985.
Lawrence Hodge used the garage to store equipment, accessing it from Frederiksberg Gade through the disputed road without incident until 1994, when BCI constructed a gate across the entrance road near the intersection with Frederiksberg Gade, preventing the Hodges from reaching Parcel 39C from Frederiksberg Gade when closed. Initially, BCI closed the gate daily between 12:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., but closed it permanently in 1996, forcing the Hodges to approach from Beltjen Road by taking the exit road and driving through the hotel parking lot to reach
After BCI blocked access to Parcel 39C entirely, the Hodges filed a complaint against BCI in the Superior Court on November 26, 1997, alleging that the disputed road is, and always has been, a public road, used for over 80 years to access Parcel 39C, and that BCI created a nuisance by blocking access to the road. Alternatively, the Hodges asserted that because the disputed road provided them the only access to their property, they had the right to an easement by prescription. On October 18, 2001, the Government of the Virgin Islands filed a motion to intervene “in order to protect its interest and that of the people of the Virgin Islands in what the Government deems as a public road known as Frederiksberg Gade or Fredericksberg Vy in Estate Taarneberg.” The Superior Court granted this motion on October 29, 2001. The Government then filed its own complaint, alleging that “[f]or decades, said road served as a public access road to [the Hodges’] and other privately owned parcels . . . and as a public means of access to [BCI’s] property,” and that the Government maintained the road and posted signs regulating traffic. The Government alleged that BCI did not have the right to block off the road and did not have permission from the Virgin Islands Department of Public Works (“DPW”) to do so. In a survey map later introduced by the Government at trial, Bluebeard’s Hill was depicted as follows:
The portion of the parcel labeled “39a” marked in pink is Parcel 39C. The blue line near the intersection of Frederiksberg Gade and the entrance road indicates where BCI erected the gate in 1994, and the blue line to the right indicates where BCI placed the chain and “do not enter” sign in 1997, preventing access to the entrance road from the hotel parking lot.
After the Government’s intervention, the Superior Court denied BCI’s motion for summary judgment on April 17, 2002, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the status of the road and rejecting BCI’s argument that the statute of limitations barred the Hodges’ action. Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc.,
The Superior Court held trial from May 28, 2002, to June 3, 2002. In accordance with the parties’ stipulation, the Superior Court determined the road’s status, with a jury sitting in an advisory capacity on this
In its June 17, 2002 findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Superior Court agreed with the jury’s advisory finding that the disputed road is a public right-of-way and has been since at least 1912. The Superior Court held that even without evidence that the road was established as a public right-of-way as provided in the Virgin Islands Code, the road was public because it was a public right-of-way before the transfer of the Virgin Islands from Denmark to the United States in 1917, and there was “no convincing evidence [that] the disputed roadway [was] conveyed to a private party.” The Superior Court also credited evidence that the road is widely regarded as public by the community and has been for decades, and that DPW paved and maintained the road and regulated traffic by posting street signs and establishing speed limits. As a result, the Superior Court ruled in the Hodges’ favor, issuing a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction preventing BCI from blocking the road. The Superior Court later awarded the Hodges $116,008.90 in attorney’s fees and costs in a July 22, 2002 order.
BCI appealed the Superior Court’s ruling to the Appellate Division of the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands on July 26, 2002, which issued an opinion nearly seven years later on April 1, 2009. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc. v. Hodge,
Because of these perceived deficiencies, the Appellate Division vacated
On remand, the Superior Court issued an April 16, 2012 opinion and order in response to the Appellate Division’s mandate. Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc.,
After the Superior Court denied the Hodges’ motion to set aside the judgment on August 24, 2012, they filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on August 27, 2012. See V.I.S.Ct.R. 5(a)(4). BCI then filed a timely cross-appeal challenging the Superior Court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment in 2002 and the Appellate Division’s order that remanded the case instead of ordering an outright reversal of the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order. BCI later filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the Superior Court’s October 4, 2012 order denying its motion for attorney’s fees and costs against the Hodges and the Government on November 5, 2012. See Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle,
II. JURISDICTION
In the 1984 amendments to the Revised Organic Act of 1954 — the de facto constitution for the Virgin Islands
The Legislature implemented the 1984 amendments incrementally. On September 5, 1990, it passed Act No. 5594, granting the Superior Court “original jurisdiction in all civil actions regardless of the amount in controversy,” effective October 1, 1991. 4 V.I.C. § 76(a); 1990 V.I. Sess. Laws 271. The Legislature then passed Act No. 5890 on September 30, 1993, granting the Superior Court “original jurisdiction in all criminal actions,” effective January 1,1994. 4 V.I.C. § 76(b); 1993 V.I. Sess. Laws
By creating this Court, the Legislature completed the process of establishing a local judicial system to operate independently of the District Court and Third Circuit. And with the exception of the Third Circuit’s temporary certiorari jurisdiction over this Court, Congress intended for the relationship between Virgin Islands courts and federal courts to mirror that between state and federal courts. 48 U.S.C. § 1613; Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC,
So when BCI appealed the Superior Court’s judgment in 2002, that appeal went to the Appellate Division of the District Court. And because “Congress provided that the Appellate Division would retain jurisdiction over any appeal filed with it before this Court assumed jurisdiction,” the Appellate Division was able to issue its order vacating and remanding the case to the Superior Court in 2009. Percival v. People,
In a record remand, . . . jurisdiction over the case remains with [the appellate] court, but the record [alone] is returned to the trial court. In those circumstances, the trial court may be directed to clarify or amplify some portion of the record, to make additional findings, to hear further testimony, or to explain a ruling. The point of such a remand is to give the trial judge the opportunity to complete or clarify the record so that [the appellate] court will have an adequate basis for review of the trial court’s rulings. The trial court does not, however, have the authority to amend the ruling that is on appeal. A “case” remand, on the other hand, returns the case to the trial court for all purposes. [The appellate] court retains no jurisdiction over the case and the appeal is terminated. If, after a case remand, a party is dissatisfied with the action of the trial court, the only course available to obtain review in [the appellate] court, is to file a new notice of appeal, once a final order or judgment is entered. That appeal is a new appeal, separate from the previous appeal that was terminated when the case was remanded.
Hypolite,
As this Court previously explained, “after it issued its Bluebeard’s Castle opinion, the Appellate Division . . . issued a mandate and closed the case on June 5, 2009, which is consistent with a case remand and not a record remand.” Martinez v. Stridiron, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2011-0014,
In addition to this Court’s jurisdiction over all final judgments of the Superior Court entered after January 29, 2007, this Court “may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part . . . each interlocutory judgment or intermediate or other order that it is authorized to review.” 4 V.I.C. § 32(c). Thus, “[i]t is well established that prior interlocutory orders” — such as a remand order — “merge with the final judgment... and... may be reviewed on appeal from the final order.” In re Estate of George,
Despite this, BCI asserts that this Court does not have the authority to review the Appellate Division’s remand order. BCI raised a similar argument with the Third Circuit, insisting that “after the Superior Court decides this matter on remand, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court will have no authority to review the Appellate Division’s ruling,” rendering it “effectively unreviewable.”
Because the Virgin Islands is not a state, the administrative federalism imposed by 48 U.S.C. § 1613 does not prevent a Virgin Islands court from “exercising its revised jurisdiction to review a judgment of the District Court made under territorial law.” Parrott,
III. DISCUSSION
The Hodges argue that the Appellate Division erred in vacating the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order and remanding for further proceedings, urging us to set aside the Appellate Division’s order and reinstate the Superior Court’s original order. In the alternative, they assert that the Superior Court failed to comply with the Appellate Division’s mandate on remand by disregarding the original findings of fact without conducting a new trial, and that the Superior Court erred in finding on remand that the road is private property. See
The Hodges argue that the Appellate Division erred in disregarding the Superior Court’s 2002 finding that the disputed road was public before 1917 because that finding was not clearly erroneous. The Hodges also fault the Appellate Division for holding that the Superior Court erred in allowing Muman to testify as an expert at trial without conducting a hearing to determine the reliability of his testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We agree on both points. But before reaching the merits of the Hodges’ arguments, we must first clarify that, as the Third Circuit stated in dismissing BCI’s appeal, this Court is not “required to abide by the Appellate Division’s ruling ... as [the] law of the case” in this appeal.
1. Law of the case
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Pepper v. United States,
This is because the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, as the Territory’s court of last resort, is the successor to the Third Circuit in the Virgin Islands Judiciary. Defoe v. Phillip,
This remains true despite the temporary certiorari jurisdiction the Third Circuit exercised over this Court in “cases commenced” before December 28, 2012.
So while the law-of-the-case doctrine “applies as much to the decisions of a coordinate court in the same case as to a court’s own decisions,” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
As a result, we agree with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that it would be inappropriate to treat a remand issued by the Appellate Division to the Superior Court as the law of the case in a subsequent appeal to this Court.
2. Status of the disputed road before 1917
In vacating and remanding the Superior Court’s 2002 decision, the Appellate Division held that the Superior Court “did not explicitly rely on any of the traditional ways in which a public road may be created,” such as “laying out and acceptance of a road” by the Government, dedication, or prescription.
In reviewing the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order, we use “the same standard of review applied by the [Appellate Division],” Tyler v. Armstrong,
This Court recently explained that
when a territory is transferred to the United States by a foreign country, ownership of public property transfers to the U.S. government, while private property rights remain unaffected____[T]he 1916 treaty transferring the Virgin Islands from Denmark to the United States clearly followed this longstanding legal principle, providing that “[t]his cession includes the right of property in all public, government, or crown lands... and all other public property of every kind or description now belonging to Denmark.”... And following the transfer, Congress provided in the Organic Act of 1936 that “[a]ll property which may have been acquired by the United States from Denmark in the Virgin Islands under the convention... is placed under the control of the Government of the Virgin Islands.” 48 U.S.C. § 1405c(a). Later, in a 1974 amendment to the Revised Organic Act of 1954, Congress provided that “[a]ll right, title, and interest of the United States in the property placed un*692 der the control of the government of the Virgin Islands by section 1405c(a) of this title ... is hereby conveyed to such government.” 48 U.S.C. § 1545(b)(1).
Malloy,
While the Government does not have a deed, there is substantial evidence that the disputed roadway is and has always been public. The testimony offered at trial proved that the disputed roadway has been in existence and has been used to access several parcels of land since at least 1912 — that is, before the Virgin Islands [was] ceded to the United States. Accordingly, the fact that there is no deed, proof of dedication, or evidence of condemnation proceedings is not dispositive, as urged by [BCI]. To the contrary, the evidence clearly shows that the road was already public when these local laws governing the acquisition of public lands were promulgated.
It is clear that, even before 1917, some lands on St. Thomas were public. The public status of these lands was preserved . . . when the Virgin Islands [was] ceded, and title passed, to the United States of America. Later, all such property was placed under the control of, and finally was transferred to the Virgin Islands government. Because there was no convincing evidence of the disputed roadway having been conveyed to a private party, and in light of the abundant evidence of long-term use, the Court concludes that the disputed roadway was, and remains, a public road.
So even though the Appellate Division correctly observed that the Superior Court’s decision “did not explicitly rely on any of the traditional ways in which a public road may be created,” we agree with the Superior Court’s original holding that this is irrelevant where a road was public before 1917 and was never conveyed to a private party. Malloy,
In holding that there was “no support” for this conclusion — a determination that appeared to constitute the primary reason for the remand — the Appellate Division took issue with the admission of Robert
But just three weeks before the Appellate Division issued its opinion, this Court explained that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not, at that point, apply in the Superior Court because “the Legislature of the Virgin Islands . . . adopted virtually all of the 1953 version of the [Uniform Rules of Evidence]” in 1957, which must control the admission of evidence in the Superior Court. Phillips v. People,
The Appellate Division also overlooked 5 V.I.C. § 4927, which has provided since 1965 that “[i]n determining the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this territory, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules of evidence.” 1965 V.I. Sess. Laws 58. Under this section, to the extent that Muman’s testimony
Perhaps more importantly though, regardless of whether Murnan’s testimony was properly admitted, the Superior Court didn’t even rely on this testimony in finding that the road is public. Muman testified that every road in existence in the Virgin Islands before 1917 was a “King’s Road” owned by the Danish government that remained public after 1917, while the Superior Court — relying on the Danish Colonial Law of April 6, 1906
As the Superior Court explained in its detailed findings of fact, the disputed road was included in a 1912 map and identified as “Street to Frederiksberg,” and was later depicted in a July 1917 boundary map with the description of “[t]o the Policemaster St. Thomas.” According to the testimony of DPW commissioner Wayne Callwood, these maps indicate that the road was public at the time the Virgin Islands became part of the United States. He also testified that the Government of the Virgin Islands has treated the disputed road as public property since that time, marking it as a public road on official DPW maps and maintaining the road at public expense — something Callwood testified DPW would not do for a private road. A number of DPW employees supported Callwood’s testimony, recounting the extensive work done at taxpayer expense on the road — including filling potholes, restricting it to a one-way street, posting signs that set a speed limit of 10 miles per hour, along with other street signs to regulate traffic on the road.
Further, while it was undisputed that some of this work occurred at BCI’s request, there was also evidence that much of it occurred without BCI’s permission or knowledge. There was testimony that DPW did this because the disputed road was often used as a bypass for motorists seeking to avoid traffic on Beltjen Road, which is consistent with the testimony of several other witnesses, including a former BCI employee, who agreed that the road has been considered a public right-of-way by the general public and used as such for much of the twentieth century — all without objection from BCI. The conclusion that the general public and surrounding property owners considered the disputed road to be public and relied on it as such is also supported by evidence that in 1917, Parcel 39A was divided into smaller parcels, leaving Parcel 39C accessible only through the disputed road. And after the West Indian Company purchased Parcel 39C in 1919, it used the disputed road to access the house and
In light of this substantial evidence that the disputed road was public before 1917 and remained a public right-of-way after that time, we cannot say that the Superior Court’s conclusion in this regard was clearly erroneous. And while we recognize that there was evidence supporting the opposite conclusion, such as DPW maps from the 1930s that did not appear to include the disputed road, it is not the function of this Court to second-guess the findings of fact of the Superior Court judge who presided over the trial, nor to reweigh the evidence based on nothing more than a trial transcript.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division misapplied Virgin Islands law in vacating the Superior Court’s 2002 judgment that found the disputed road to be a public right-of-way since at least 1912.
B. Metes and Bounds of the Public Road
Due to the Appellate Division’s errors, the Hodges urge this Court to vacate the Appellate Division’s order and reinstate the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order in full. Yet this Court typically will not disturb an order under review if any legal errors were ultimately harmless. See V.I.S.Ct.R. 4(i); St. Croix, Ltd.,
In its 2002 findings of fact, the Superior Court found that the public right-of-way includes the entrance road, “continues along the southern portion of the hotel,” and includes the exit road leading to Beltjen Road, and provided in the permanent injunction that BCI was “permanently enjoined from impairing or obstructing the road known as Frederiksberg Gade beginning at the end of Norre Gade and leading up to Bluebeard’s Castle Hotel and abutting 39c Estate Taameberg, continuing along the southern portion of the hotel and then onto the Beltjen Road.” BCI asserts that this description of the road was erroneous because the Hodges’ complaint only sought to establish the public’s right to access the entrance road in order to reach Parcel 39C, and the Government’s complaint similarly only challenged the constmction of the gate blocking access to the entrance road from Frederiksberg Gade. We cannot agree with BCI that the Superior Court “improperly expanded” the disputed road in its 2002 judgment.
The Hodges’ complaint stated that they were seeking a “declaratory judgment that the public at large enjoys a permanent easement of access, over Frederiksberg Gade, for access to Bluebeards Castle Hotel, parcel 39c Taameberg, and other abutting parcels.” The Government’s complaint similarly alleged that BCI obstructed access to Parcel 39C when it constmcted the gate across this road. Although these complaints were not models of clarity, the Hodges’ complaint expressly stated that they sought “access” to Parcel 39C by the only means available — the disputed road. As the Superior Court found in its 2002 findings of fact, the Government designated the entrance road as a one-way street before this litigation began in 1997 — a fact that appears undisputed in the trial record. So with access to the entrance road alone, the Hodges would be able to travel to Parcel 39C, yet would be unable to leave without committing a trespass or a traffic violation.
Thus, the Hodges’ action for “access” necessarily encompassed the entire road between Frederiksberg Gade and Beltjen Road, as the right of access is one “of ingress and egress [that] attaches to the land. It is a property right, as complete as ownership of the land itself.” City of Memphis v. Hood,
In addition to the notice given by the very nature of the action itself, we note that BCI must have been aware that the right-of-way in dispute at trial encompassed the entire road running between Frederiksberg Gade and Beltjen Road. There was ample testimony in the trial record defining the disputed road as encompassing the entire right-of-way from the entrance road to the exit road, and recounting its public use. Therefore, we
Because the Appellate Division misapplied Virgin Islands law in vacating the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order, and BCI presents no alternative grounds that would allow us to affirm the Appellate Division, we vacate the Appellate Division’s April 1, 2009 order vacating the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order and remanding the case for further proceedings, reinstate the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order, and further vacate the Superior Court’s April 16, 2012 order issued in response to the Appellate Division’s remand.
C. Attorney’s Fees
In BCI’s appeal from the Superior Court’s October 4, 2012 order denying its motion for attorney’s fees, BCI argues that the Superior Court was required to award attorney’s fees under 5 V.I.C. § 541. The Government counters that section 541 contains permissive language, placing the award of attorney’s fees entirely within the Superior Court’s discretion, which the Superior Court properly exercised here by denying attorney’s fees altogether. Section 541 provides that, except in non-frivolous personal-injury actions, “there shall be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment such sums as the court in its discretion may fix by way of indemnity for his attorney’s fees in maintaining the action or
But the parties fail to acknowledge that this Court’s precedent establishes that a motion for attorney’s fees is not ripe for adjudication while an appeal is pending. V.I. Gov’t Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I.,
Given that BCI’s motion for attorney’s fees was not ripe, and we vacate the judgment in which BCI prevailed, we also vacate the Superior Court’s October 4, 2012 order. V.I. Gov’t Hosps.,
IV. CONCLUSION
The Appellate Division of the District Court misapplied Virgin Islands law in vacating the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order, which held that the disputed road providing access to the Hodges’ property is a public right-of-way. The Superior Court did not err in admitting the testimony of Robert Murnan at trial without conducting a Daubert hearing because the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply in the Superior Court during the
Notes
Before October 29,2004, the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands was named the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. See 2004 V.I. Sess.Laws 179 (Act No. 6687, § 1(b)) (amending 4 V.I.C. § 2 by substituting “Superior” for “Territorial” in the name of the local trial court). Nevertheless, we refer to the former Territorial Court by its current name to avoid confusion.
The Appellate Division’s opinion initially stated that it was reversing the Superior Court’s June 17,2002 order, but later in the opinion and in the accompanying order, the court clarified that it was vacating the Superior Court’s order.
Congress authorized the Virgin Islands to adopt its own constitution in 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-584, §§ 1-3, 90 Stat. 2899. After five attempts, the Territory has yet to do so. See Pub.L.No. 111-194,§ 1(2), 124 Stat. 1309 (joint resolution returning the draft Virginlslands constitution to the Fifth Constitutional Convention and urging it “to reconvene for the purpose of reconsidering and revising the proposed constitution in response to the views of the executive branch of the Federal Government”); see generally St. Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel,
The District Court now exercises the same jurisdiction as any other federal district court, with a few exceptions such as continuing concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court over local crimes that are related to federal crimes and proceedings related to the income tax laws of the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a)-(c); see also Bryan v. Fawkes,
Although this section also still provides that the “judicial power of the Virgin Islands shall be vested in... the ‘District Court of the Virgin Islands,’ ” because the Legislature vested the Superior Court with original jurisdiction over all local actions, the District Court no longer exercises the judicial power of the Virgin Islands. Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC,
BCI made this argument specifically with regard to its statute-of-limitations defense, which the Superior Court rejected in denying BCI’s motion for summary judgment in 2002, see
BCI also argues that only the Government has standing to claim that the disputed road is public, and because the Government is no longer participating in this case, the Hodges lack standing to bring this appeal. But as the Hodges correctly point out, standing is at best a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule in Virgin Islands courts, since Article III of the United States Constitution does not apply to local courts and no provision of Virgin Islands law includes a case-or-controversy requirement. Malloy v. Reyes,
The District Court’s appellate jurisdiction over the Superior Court ended more than eight years ago, but many appeals remain pending.
Originally, 48 U.S.C. § 1613 provided that the Third Circuit would exercise certiorari jurisdiction over this Court “for the first fifteen years following [its] establishment.” But on December 28,2012 — following the recommendation of the Third Circuit Judicial Council — President Barack Obama signed H.R. 6116 into law, ending the Third Circuit’s certiorari jurisdiction 10 years early. Despite this, the Third Circuit recently held that the effective date of this legislation — “applying] to cases commenced on or after” December 28, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-226, § 3 — referenced the date a case was commenced by filing a complaint in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, as opposed to the date a case is commenced in the Third Circuit seeking a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. UIW-SIU ex rel. Bason v. Gov’t of the V.I.,
“[T]he doctrine does not apply if the court is convinced that [the] prior decision is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Pepper,
We further note that even if Federal Rule of Evidence 702 applied in the Superior Court during the 2002 trial, it was a bench trial with the jury serving only in an advisory capacity on the question of the road’s status. The Appellate Division failed to acknowledge that the rationale of Daubert was premised primarily on preventing unreliable expert testimony from improperly influencing the jury, a concern that is not implicated when the judge is the finder of fact. See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liab. Litig.,
The complete Colonial Law of April 6, 1906, is reprinted in V.I. CODE Ann. Historical Documents, Organic Acts, and U.S. Constitution at 1-25.
Although BCI does not expressly raise this in its cross-appeal, we also note that the Superior Court did not err in holding that the 1974 quitclaim deed transferring the hotel property to BCI did not include title to the disputed road. BCI acquired the hotel property through a quitclaim deed from a private party in 1974, who in turn acquired title through a quitclaim deed from the United States in 1954. The United States acquired title to the property through the will of James Buchanan Nies in 1933. This chain of title was undisputed at trial, and the Superior Court found that it was “clear that the United States merely conveyed whatever it had received from its predecessor in interest, and there has been no evidence to suggest that its predecessor in interest, or anyone in the chain of title, owned the disputed roadway.”
D.M. Osborne & Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.,
Although BCI also asserts that the Superior Court’s June 17, 2002 order constituted a “judicial taking” in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it failed to raise this issue in its first appeal to the Appellate Division, and failed to raise it on remand to the Superior Court, and we thus consider the argument waived. Rawlins v. People,