17 Ind. 488 | Ind. | 1861
Indictment against the appellant for a rape. Trial, and conviction. On the trial, the defendant offered himself as a witness, but the State objecting, he was rejected. This ruling presents the only question arising in the case.
The trial was had after the act of March 11, 1801, (Acts 1861, p. 51,) took effect. That act repeals § 238 of the code,
This act, in itself’ has no reference to the competency of witnesses in criminal cases. Its terms limit its application to civil causes. But the act on the subject of practice, &c., in criminal actions, contains the following provision: “The folloAving persons are competent witnesses: First. All persons who are competent to testify in civil actions. Second. The party injured by the offense. committed. Third. Accomplices, when they consent to testify.” 2 R. S. 1852, § 90, p. 372.
It is insisted, that inasmuch as by the act of 1852 all persons who are competent to testify in a civil action, are made competent witnesses in criminal actions, and as by the act of 1861 parties are competent witnesses in civil causes, it follows that they are competent to testify in a criminal cause.
The solution of this question depends upon the construction which shall be given to the provision of the act of 1852, making “ all persons who are competent to testify in civil actions,” competent witnesses in criminal causes.
Was this provision intended to adopt the law as it then stood, upon the subject of the competency of witnesses in civil actions, or was it intended to adopt such law with all the changes that might thereafter be made in respect to sueh competency ? We are in dined to the opinion that the former, only, was intended. The language employed does not well admit of any other interpretation. The words, “who are
We are referred by counsel for the appellant, for analogies, to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the acts of Congress adopting the State laws on the subject of process, &c. The most of these cases are examined hr the case of Simpson v. Niles, 1 Ind. 196. Nothing is perceived in these cases that is at variance with the conclusion here arrived at.
Upon the adoption of the code, parties were not competent witnesses for themselves, either in civil or criminal actions, except, perhaps, where examined by the adverse party.
The act of 1861 not changing the law as to competency of parties in criminal actions, it follows that the appellant was not competent, and that the ruling was correct.
Per Guriam. — The judgment is affirmed, with costs.