[¶ 1] Richard Dick appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Augusta, Perry, J.) holding that Dick’s premarital agreement with Terry L. Hoag (formerly Terry L. Dick) was invalid and unenforceable. Dick contends that the court erred in failing to apply the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 601-611 (1998), and that, in the alternative, the court erred in its interpretation and application of Maine common law regarding premarital agreements. Hoag contends that the UPAA does not apply, that the court did not commit clear error in finding the agreement unenforceable, and that the court’s analysis was consistent with the applicable common law. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The court found the following undisputed facts. Dick and Hoag were married in 1982, and were divorced in 1986. They continued to live together after the divorce. Because Hoag’s church threatened to excommunicate her unless she' ceased cohabiting with Dick or married him, Hoag and Dick discussed getting remarried. They informally discussed the nature of premarital agreements in the company of Dick’s son, an attorney, in the late winter of 1987. When the discussion turned more specifically to drafting a premarital agreement for Dick and Hoag, Dick’s son suggested that each be represented by a separate attorney. Hoag said she did not need separate counsel because she did not want anything. Dick insisted that he would remarry Hoag only if they executed a premarital agreement. In April of 1987, Dick and Hoag agreed to remarry.
[¶ 3] Ultimately, Dick’s son drafted a premarital agreement, which was delivered to the parties on May 23, 1987, the date of the wedding. Dick made one modification at that time and Hoag gave the agreement a cursory reading. There were no further discussions about Hoag obtaining the advice of independent counsel. The parties executed the document in the church parking lot immediately before the wedding ceremony.
[¶ 4] The agreement provides that the estate of each party “shall remain and be his [or her] separate property subject entirely to his [or her] individual control and use the same as if he [or she] were unmarried”; that each party relinquishes all rights to “any property that [the other] may hereafter acquire or become entitled to”; that the party bringing an action for divorce “agrees to pay all expenses incurred in such action, and agrees that the other party shall never be called upon to pay alimony, separate maintenance, cost of suit or any other expense incurred by the party bringing the action except as otherwise provided herein”; and that, regardless of who commences the suit, Hoag “shall accept [$6,000] in full satisfaction of all of -her claims” and Dick “shall make no claim to the separate estate of [Hoag].” An attachment disclosed some, but not all, of Dick’s property. At the time they executed the agreement, Hoag was, nonetheless, aware of all of Dick’s property and that it was valued at approximately one million dollars. Hoag owned some personal property of negligible value, but no real property.-
[¶ 5] Hoag filed a complaint for divorce in 1997. Dick moved for a summary judgment on the validity of the premarital agreement. After a hearing, the court entered an order pending divorce concluding that the premarital agreement was invalid and unenforceable. Dick appealed to the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.), which dismissed his appeal *393 as interlocutory. He appealed to us, but we also dismissed.
[¶ 6] The District Court (Augusta, French, J.) entered a divorce judgment that awarded to Hoag, inter alia, $150,600 representing her share of the marital property; general spousal support of $600 per month until October 31, 2006, with nominal support thereafter; and attorney fees of approximately $17,500. The court awarded to Dick, inter aha, ah the real property and most of the personal property, including a sail boat and home furnishings.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] Because Dick does not contest the court’s factual findings, we review the legal determination of the agreement’s validity and enforceability de novo for errors of law based on the facts found by the court.
See Trask v. Devlin,
A. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
[¶ 8] Dick contends that the court erred in refusing to apply the enforcement provision of the UPAA, 19-A M.R.S.A. § 608, 1 because the statute simply codifies general and long settled contract law. Dick further contends that the Legislature intentionally omitted the uniform act’s provision that the act applies to any premarital agreement executed on or after the effective date. Hoag contends that the statute may only be applied prospectively to agreements executed after the UPAA’s effective date.
[¶ 9] The UPAA became effective on September 29, 1987. P.L.1987, ch. 302. Although the uniform act that provided the basis for the Maine act included a provision that the act “applies to any premarital agreement executed on or after [the effective] date,” UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 12, 9C U.L.A. 58 (2001), the Maine act does not contain that provision.
[¶ 10] The Maine Constitution provides that “[t]he Legislature shall pass no ... law impairing the obligation of contracts,” Me. Const, art. I, § 11, and we construe statutes to preserve their constitutionality,
Town of Baldwin v. Carter,
*394 B. Maine’s Common Law Regarding Premarital Agreements
[¶ 11] Dick contends that the court should have implied a new legal standard from the 1979 amendment to the Probate Code permitting a spouse, after fair disclosure, to waive by agreement rights of election and rights to certain allowances. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-204 (1998). Dick also contends that the court erroneously relied on outdated Maine common law that fails to reflect the status of women in modern society. According to Dick, the court erred in applying a rule requiring that a party enter into a contract intelligently and upon independent legal advice.
[¶ 12] The court relied in part on our holding in
Rolfe v. Rolfe,
that.there shall be no fraud or imposition practiced; that full and complete disclosure shall be made, and that adequacy in provision for the spouse shall result; that gross disproportion of such adequacy may invalidate such agreement; that the natural confidence of the relations of the parties shall not be violated; that, where gross disproportion results, fraud will be presumed; and that the burden is upon him who sets up an antenuptial agreement to prove fairness, notice, understanding, and adequacy.
Id.
at 83,
[¶ 13] Since the
Rolfe
decision, we have stated that, although a defendant in an action to enforce such an agreement bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses of fraud, duress, or intimidation, a presumption of fraud arises when the evidence establishes that the agreement’s provisions for the surviving spouse are “clearly disproportionate to the [deceased spouse’s] wealth.”
Wilson v. Wilson,
[¶ 14] Nearly two decades after our decision in Wilson, the Legislature adopted the following provision of section 2-204 of the Probate Code:
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property and family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement or waiver signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure ....
18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-204. After the enactment of this provision, we reviewed a case in which the husband died while the divorce action was pending, and his estate contended that the husband and wife’s “Agreement Incident to Divorce,” purporting to dispose of all the parties’ marital and non-marital property, constituted a waiver of the wife’s elective share in his estate.
Estate of Galluzzo,
[¶ 15] We have acknowledged, by implication, that people may execute enforceable premarital agreements that apply in the event of a divorce.
See Foster v. Foster,
[¶ 16] Here, the premarital agreement all but eliminates Hoag’s rights to receive a share of the marital property and to recover any amount of spousal support. Pursuant to the agreement, she would only recover $6000 in settlement of all claims, and as the party bringing the action, she would be responsible for all litigation costs. The agreement was presented to Hoag on the day of her wedding, thus depriving her of any opportunity to obtain advice from independent legal counsel regarding the document’s terms.
See Galluzzo,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The UPAA provides a test to determine whether a premarital agreement is enforceable:
A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that:
A. That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
B. The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, that party:
(1) Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
(2) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and
(3) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
19-A M.R.S.A. § 608(1).
. Although Dick contends that the court erred in citing out-of-state cases, citation to analogous cases as persuasive authority is appropriate.