144 Ga. 408 | Ga. | 1915
Other witnesses were examined both by the plaintiff and defendants; and the testimony delivered by them was substantially to the effect that at the time of the execution of the deed, and prior thereto and afterwards, the grantor attended to business matters in the usual way, and his mind was apparently sound. The testimony of the defendants’ witnesses bore more on the feeble condition of the grantor’s health than upon his mental capacity. It would not be profitable to set out the testimony in greater detail. The foregoing sufficiently states the substance of it. From all of the testimony there is no direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the grantor, at the time he executed the deed, did not have mental capacity to execute a contract. The most that could be said of the evidence, viewed in the most favorable light for the plaintiff, is that it might authorize a finding that the grantor was of weak or feeble mind. Under the authorities hereinabove cited, this alone would not be sufficient to set aside the deed on the ground of mental capacity. It has already been pointed out that it affirmatively appears that the deed was prepared under the immediate direction of the grantor, and that he was not coerced or influenced thereto by either of the defendants.
Judgment reversed.