Hittle v. City of StocktonHittle v. City of Stockton
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
To prevail on a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him because of a protected trait. See
I
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas had worked as a mechanic and laboratory technician for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation before being laid off as part of a general reduction in force. 411 U. S., at 794. After the layoff, the plaintiff participated in civil rights protests against McDonnell Douglas’s employment practices. Id., at 794–795. When McDonnell Douglas posted an opening for a new mechanic position, the plaintiff applied but was not hired. Id., at 796.
The plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging that it had refused to rehire him because of his race. Id., at 797. The employer responded that its refusal was not because of the plaintiff’s race, but because he had engaged in illegal demonstrations. See ibid. The District Court initially dismissed the plaintiff’s suit, but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a bench trial. Id., at 797–798. To guide the District Court on remand, the Eighth Circuit “attempted to set forth standards to govern the consideration” of the claim. Id., at 798. This Court granted certiorari to clarify the controlling standards. Ibid.
The Court explained that “the issue at the trial” would be whether the employer refused to hire the plaintiff because of his race or because of his participation in unlawful conduct. Id., at 801. To help the trial court make that ultimate determination, this Court offered a three-part framework for analyzing the circumstantial evidence to determine the real reason for the employer’s actions. First, the Court explained, the plaintiff “must carry the initial burden” of “establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” Id., at 802. A plaintiff can make this showing with evidence that (1) “he belongs to a racial minority,” (2) “he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants,” (3) “despite his qualifications, he was rejected,” and (4) “after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” Ibid. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Ibid. If the defendant carries that burden, then the plaintiff must have an “opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason for [rejecting him] was in fact pretext.” Id., at 804.
This framework was designed to help the trial court evaluate the circumstantial evidence offered by both sides and make an ultimate finding as to liability. See id., at 807. In other words, the framework was intended to offer “‘a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence’” that “‘bears on the critical question of discrimination.’” Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 715 (1983).
The Court made no attempt to ground its new evidentiary framework in the text of Title VII or any other source of law. The Court appears to have made it out of whole cloth.
II
The application of McDonnell Douglas in the summary-judgment context has caused significant confusion. Some confusion likely arises from the fact that the framework was not designed with summary judgment in mind. It was created as a tool for resolving the “ultimate question” in a Title VII case—that is, whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. But, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the question for the court is not whether the defendant has in fact engaged in unlawful discrimination. Instead, the question is whether the plaintiff has proffered enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to find a Title VII violation. See
Because the McDonnell Douglas framework was designed for use in a bench trial, the language this Court has used to describe the framework does not neatly track the plaintiff’s summary-judgment task.2 For example, the first step requires a plaintiff to “establis[h] a prima facie case.” 411 U. S., at 802. And, the third step requires the plaintiff to show, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253, that the employer’s stated reason “was in fact pretext” for discrimination, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 804. But, a plaintiff need not establish or prove any elements—by a preponderance or otherwise—to survive summary judgment. At that stage, he need only offer enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986). At least a few courts have suggested that this Court’s language “likely bears some responsibility for the continuing confusion” regarding McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 945.
Whatever the origins of the confusion, it is producing troubling outcomes on the ground. Lower court decisions reflect “widespread misunderstandings about the limits of
McDonnell Douglas.” Id., at 946. Our precedent makes clear that the framework is, at most, a “procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production” when evaluating circumstantial evidence. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 521 (1993). Put another way, it is “‘merely’” a “‘way to evaluate the evidence’” that bears on the ultimate finding of liability. Aikens, 460 U. S., at 715. Yet, some courts treat McDonnell Douglas as a substantive
Some courts also fail to appreciate that McDonnell Douglas is necessarily underinclusive. The framework sets forth criteria that, if satisfied, will allow a plaintiff to prove a Title VII violation. But, satisfying McDonnell Douglas is not the only way or even the best way to prove a claim. The McDonnell Douglas Court itself explained that “[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases” and the prima facie proof required in one case “is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” 411 U. S., at 802, n. 13; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 575 (1978) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas “was not intended to be an inflexible rule”). Yet, some courts treat the McDonnell Douglas framework as the exclusive method for evaluating evidence at summary judgment. As Judge Newsom has ably explained, this practice very likely runs afoul of
Adding to the confusion, judges appear to have different views on how best to apply the framework at summary judgment. Some courts require a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case at the
A remarkable number of lower court judges have gone out of their way to describe the chaos sown by McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Walton v. Powell, 821 F. 3d 1204, 1210 (CA10 2016) (majority opinion of Gorsuch, J.) (McDonnell Douglas “has proven of limited value” and invites “confusion and complexities”); Brady, 520 F. 3d, at 494 (majority opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (describing the first step of McDonnell Douglas as “a largely unnecessary sideshow” that has “spawn[ed] enormous confusion and wast[ed] litigant and judicial resources”); Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 945 (explaining that McDonnell Douglas has caused “continuing confusion”); id., at 951 (Newsom, J., concurring) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas is a “judge-concocted doctrine that obfuscates the critical inquiry” at summary judgment); Nall, 917 F. 3d, at 351 (Costa, J., specially concurring) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas is a “judge-created doctrine [that] has been widely criticized for its inefficiency and unfairness”); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F. 3d 835, 863 (CA7 2012) (Wood, J., concurring) (asserting that McDonnell Douglas has “lost [its] utility” and has “inflicted” “snarls and knots” “on courts and litigants alike”); Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F. 3d 806, 813 (CA6 2011) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas “often fails to fulfill its purpose” and that this failure “is particularly pronounced in the
I am not aware of many precedents that have caused more confusion than this one. By my best lights, a Title VII claim should survive summary judgment so long as the plaintiff establishes a genuine dispute of material fact about each element of his claim. See
III
This case squarely presents the question whether McDonnell Douglas should be overruled. Given the widespread confusion caused by McDonnell Douglas, and given the frequency with which courts encounter Title VII cases, it behooves us to revisit McDonnell Douglas and offer clear guidance on how to determine whether a Title VII claim survives summary judgment.
This petition provides an opportunity to do so. Petitioner Ronald Hittle, a devout Christian, served as fire chief for the city of Stockton, California, from 2005 to 2011. While employed by the city, Hittle’s supervisor directed him to attend a leadership training program. After Hittle did so, his supervisor chastised him for selecting a religious program. The city then hired an outside investigator to investigate, among other things, Hittle’s attendance at this religious leadership training. The investigator “interrogated Hittle at length” regarding his Christian faith and ultimately found that Hittle had committed misconduct. 101 F. 4th 1000, 1008–1009 (CA9 2024). According to the investigator, two of the four “most serious acts of misconduct” were: “[i]nappropriate use of City time and a City vehicle to attend a religious event,” and “[f]avoritism . . . regarding certain employees of the department in approving their inappropriate attendance on City time of a religious event.” 2 Excerpts of Record in No. 22–15485 (CA9), ECF Doc.
The District Court analyzed Hittle’s claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework and entered summary judgment for the City on the ground that Hittle had “not shown sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.” 2022 WL 616722, *8 (ED Cal., Mar. 2, 2022). The Ninth Circuit affirmed for the same reason—that Hittle had failed to “demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him were mere pretext for religious discrimination.” 101 F. 4th, at 1017. Both decisions below rested on a purported failure to satisfy a component of McDonnell Douglas. Accordingly, this case presents us with an opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas and decide whether its use at summary judgment comports with
This case highlights how McDonnell Douglas may distort a lower court’s analysis. Hittle presented “ample” evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of those who decided to terminate him. 101 F. 4th, at 1022 (VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). That evidence is more than likely sufficient for Hittle to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as required by
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I would have taken this opportunity to revisit McDonnell Douglas and decide whether its burden-shifting framework remains a workable and useful evidentiary tool. I respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.