48 F. 312 | D. Ky. | 1891
This is a libel in rem for the wages claimed by the libel-ant, and the questions raised by the claimant, the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, are: (1) Has a court of admiralty jurisdiction of the subject? (2) If it has jurisdiction, is not the payment of the wages due libelant by the claimant defendant, by and under an order of a state court under a proceeding of garnishment, a bar to a recovery in this court ?
The steamer St. Louis is owned and used by the claimant defendant for the purpose of transporting its trains across the Mississippi river. It is really a steam ferry-boat, with iron rails so adjusted as to permit the trains of the defendant to be run over and upon it, and thus be transported across the Mississippi river by the steamer. This boat is registered, has a large tonnage, and has the capacity of transporting
“But later eases seem to extend the scope of admiralty jurisdiction to all classes of vessels used in commerce or navigation, without regard to the necessity for such liens arising in order to enable them to conduct the voyage. ” Henry, Adm. p. 91.
it has been decided that the crew of an ordinary ferry-boat running across a river, and within the same state, have a maritime lien. Murray v. Ferry-Boat, 2 Fed. Rep. 86. See, also, The Cheeseman v. Two Ferry-Boats, 2 Bond, 868; The Gate City, 5 Biss. 200. In the case of The Volunteer, 1 Brown, Adm. 159, it was held that an admiralty court had jurisdiction in a collision between two tug-boats which were employed in harbor service in the same harbor, and within the body of the same county, lout ns links of transportation in interstate commerce.
’¡'he answer of the defendant sets out the attachment of the wages claimed by the libelant by process of garnishment, and a'judgment thereon by J. P. Pollock, a justice of the peace in and for the state of Kentucky, and a subsequent payment thereof by the defendant. The sums thus paid are pleaded by defendant as a bar to any recovery by libelant in this suit, as they cover the whole amount of bis wages. It appears from the record of the proceedings in the justice’s court the libel-ant was before the court by actual service of the summons, but that neither he nor the defendant set up the character of libelant’s claim, and
The court in Ross v. Bourne, 14 Fed. Rep. 859, in considering .section 61 of the act of 1872, says: “This provision is general in its terms, and is applicable to all wages earned by seamen, 'whatever the nature of the voyage.” I conclude the present case is within its provisions, and that libelant’s wages could not be attached by the process of garnishment issued from a common-law court. Whether these wages could have been thus subjected, in the absence of a prohibitory statute, is a most interesting question, which has been most ably and learnedly discussed by Justice Gray, then chief justice of Massachusetts supreme court, on the one side, and by Judge Benedict on the other. See Eddy v. O'Hara, 132 Mass. 56, and McCarty v. The City of New Bedford, 4 Fed. Rep. 818. But this court need not express an opinion on this mooted question, as we think the statute covers the cace.
It seems from the record filed of the proceedings before the justice*of the peace that libelant was before him by actual service of the summons, and these wages have been in fact'paid by the defendant, and applied to the payment of libelant’s debts. These debts of his are presumably
It appears from the record that proceedings wore commenced before the commissioner of this court on the 30th of January, 1891, and that the defendant had actual notice of this proceeding before the judgment was rendered by tho justice of tho peace on the 5th of February, it was the duty of tho defendant, under the circumstances, as well as the libel-ant, to bring to the attention of the state court — -justice of the peace — the fact of the proceeding in admiralty. I shall not, therefore, give libel-ant judgment for tho wages which have .already been paid by defendant, and applied to libelant’s just debts, but will give libelant a judgment for the costs of the admiralty proceedings; and it is so ordered.