{¶ 1} Hissong appeals from the judgment of the Miami County Common Pleas Court in favor of Ron and Tina Miller, d.b.a. Z-Coil Pain Relief Footwear. The facts giving rise to the litigation are as follows.
I
{¶ 2} In February 2008, Hissong visited Ron and Tina Miller’s Piqua, Ohio, Z-Coil Pain Relief Footwear store. While there, Hissong asked the sales clerk if she could use the restroom. The clerk replied, “[0]f course,” and directed Hissong “through the curtains to the left of the trellis in the back.”
{¶ 3} In July 2008, Hissong filed a complaint against the Millers for negligence. She asserted that the abrupt and unexpected drop in floor elevation — in other words, the absence of a landing — was a hidden or latent danger that the Millers ought to have warned her about. The Millers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they had no duty to warn Hissong of any damages that lurked in the darkness behind the basement door she entered. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment for the Millers. Hissong has assigned three assignments of error in this appeal.
II
{¶ 4} In each assignment of error, Hissong argues a different reason why the court’s decision was erroneous. First, she argues that the court wrоngly concluded that the stairs in the Millers’ store were open and obvious. Second, Hissong argues in the alternative that even if the trial court were correct that the stairs were open and obvious, the court wrongly concluded that attendant circumstances did not excuse her failure to see them. And third, Hissong argues that the court wrongly concluded that the step-in-the-dark rule barred her claim.
{¶ 5} We will review the trial court’s summary-judgment decision de novo. See Cox v. Kettering Med. Ctr., Montgomery App. No. 20614,
{¶ 6} Broadly speaking, before a plaintiff can recover from a defendant for negligence, she must prove that the defendants owed her a duty of care, that they breached the duty, and that the breach proximately caused her injury. See Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc. (1984),
A shopkeeper owes his customers a duty of ordinary care
{¶ 7} Proving that the Millers had a duty to protect her from the stairs is key to Hissong’s claim because without such a duty, the Millers are not legally liable for her injuries. See Olivier v. Leaf & Vine, Miami App. No. 2004 CA 35,
Dangers that are open and obvious
{¶ 8} The Millers could expect that customers would protect themselves from dangers in their store that were open and obvious. The question of open- and-obvious dangers does not concern an affirmative defense, but rather concerns the threshold issue of whether a duty of care exists. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co.,
{¶ 9} Here, the trial court concluded that the stairway was open and obvious as a matter of law. But Hissong, in her first assignment of error,
{¶ 10} The question of whether a particular danger is open and obvious is answered objectively, without regard to the injured plaintiff. Accordingly, the open-and-obvious test “properly considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as oppоsed to the nature of the plaintiffs conduct in encountering it.” Armstrong,
{¶ 11} What is material to the open-and-obvious test is whether the danger is observable, which means it “is discovеrable or discernible by one who is acting with ordinary care under the circumstances.” (Emphasis omitted.) Earnsberger v. Griffiths Park Swim Club, Summit App. No. 20882, 2002-Ohio-
{¶ 12} Rather, “the crucial inquiry is whether a customer exercising ordinary care under the circumstances would have seen and been able to guard him or herself against the condition.” (Citation omitted.) Olivier at ¶ 31. It follows, then, that a plaintiffs failure to watch where she is walking is not necessarily dispositive of the open-and-obvious question. Frano v. Red Robin Internatl., Inc.,
{¶ 13} Not surprisingly, whether a particular danger is open and obvious depends heavily on the particular facts of the case. While it is true that the question of whether a duty to warn exists is one of law for courts to answer, it is no less true that “[w]hether a given hazard is open-and-obvious * * * may involve a genuine issue of material fact, which a trier of fact must resolve.” Henry v. Dollar Gen. Store, Green App. No. 2002-CA-47,
{¶ 14} When Hissong reached the door to what she believed was the restroom, she opened it inward only about a foot and a half. She saw a light switch inside, and as she reached for the switch, she stepped through the doorway. Hissong admitted that she did not look down before stepping through the doorway. In her deposition, she explained why:
{¶ 15} “Q. Okay. And did you turn on the light switch before you took a step in?
{¶ 16} “A. No, I was walking in as I reached for it.
{¶ 17} “Q. And did you look down to see where you were walking?
{¶ 18} “A. No. I was going into the bathroom.
{¶ 19} “Q. So you didn’t look down to see what you could see when you put your foot down?
{¶ 20} “A. Absolutely not. I never do when I go to the bаthroom.”
{¶ 21} The deposing attorney could not get Hissong to admit that if she had looked down, she would have seen the stairs:
{¶ 22} “Q. * * * Was the room lighted in any way when you opened the door?
{¶ 23} “A. Just from the light that was coming from the room I was walking from.
{¶ 24} “Q. Was that sufficient light to show you where the stairs were?
{¶ 25} “A. If I had seen the stairs?
{¶ 26} “Q. Yes.
{¶ 27} “A. Because I didn’t see the stairs.
{¶ 28} “Q. Because you never looked down?
{¶ 29} “A. I never looked down.
{¶ 30} “ * * *
{¶ 31} “A. I didn’t see anything but the light switch.
{¶ 32} “Q. So no matter what I ask you you only saw the light switch?
{¶ 33} “A. That’s what I was aiming for.”
{¶ 34} Do most people look down before stepping inside a restroom? This question, we think, cannot be answered as a matter of law. On the one hand, one can reasonably think that people should always watch where they step, so one could conclude that by not looking down Hissong failed to exercise ordinary care to protect herself from a visible danger.
{¶ 35} On the other hand, one could also reasonably think that most people, like Hissong, simply do not look down when stepping into a restroom. One could think that a door, particularly one that opens inward like the door here, hides the danger. See Allgauer v. Le Bastille, Inc. (1981),
{¶ 36} The first assignment of error is sustained.
The step-in-the-dark rule
{¶ 37} Unlike the open-and-obvious doctrine, the step-in-the-dark rule is an affirmative defense. Also unlike that doctrine, the rule does not relate to the duty element of a negligence claim, but instead relates to the cause of the plaintiffs injury. Here, the trial court concluded that the rule vitiated any liability that the Millers might have to Hissong because she was contributorily negligent in stepping into the darkness behind the door. But Hissong, in her third assignment of error,
{¶ 38} “The step-in-the-dark rule * * * holds generally that one who, from a lighted area, intentionally steps into total darkness, without knowledge, information, or investigation as to what the darkness might conceal, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.” (Citations omitted.) Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel, Inc. (1976),
{¶ 39} But as the rule recognizes, in some situations, a person’s step into the darkness is perfectly reasonable. As one court has explained, “[i]t cannot be said that a person is guilty of negligence as a matter of law under all circumstances when such person enters a dark place where his sense of sight alone does not enable him to see what is before him.” Chardon Lakes Inn Co. v. MacBride (1937)
{¶ 41} Conversely, the plaintiff in MacBride did exercise ordinary care by asking and then following directions. The plaintiff had asked the hоstess at the defendant’s inn for a ladies’ restroom. The hostess’s directions led the plaintiff to the rear of a hallway where there was the door to the ladies’ restroom and, immediately to the right of that door, another door, behind which, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, were stairs that descended to the cellar. The plaintiff apparently (the court’s recitation of the facts is somewhat unclear) tried to open the restroom door and found it locked. Thinking she had made a mistake, she turned to the door on the right and opened it. After the plaintiff stepped inside and onto an unseen landing, because the light at the end of the hall was quite dim, she began searching for a light switch. She eventually stepped off the landing, lost her balance, and bounced down the unseen stairs. Reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the court distinguished Flury based on that plaintiffs failure to make any investigation. In contrast, said the court, the plaintiff here acted in aсcordance with the directions of one in charge of the premises. The plaintiff, said the court, “might reasonably rely upon the belief that she would not be directed into a place of danger by the person in charge of the inn.” MacBride,
{¶ 42} Here, the analytical question is whether Hissong unreasonably stepped into the darkness behind the door. The analysis subjectively asks whether Hissong acted negligently in her encounter with the darkness. The question for summary-judgment purposes, then, is whether reаsonable minds can answer this question differently.
{¶ 43} The facts show that a sales clerk allowed Hissong to use a restroom in the back room of the Millers’ store, an area where customers are generally not permitted and where Hissong had never been. Directing her to the restroom, “[the clerk] told [Hissong] to turn left at the trellis and the door was right there.” Photographs in the record suggest what went wrong. A color photograph of the back room, which is what we assume Hissong saw when she walked through the
{¶ 44} In support of its decision to grant summary judgment, the trial court cited Leonard v. Modene & Assoc., Inc., Wood App. No. WD-05-085,
{¶ 45} Whether Hissong was negligent is also a question that cannot be answered as a matter of law. On the one hand, after Hissong opened the door and saw the darkness of the other side, one can reasonably think that Hissong should have been wary and looked down bеfore she stepped inside. But on the other hand, one can also reasonably think that despite the notice on the door, in light of the directions given by the sales clerk, and considering the back room’s configuration, Hissong did exercise ordinary care, even though she did not look down, because she was following directions. See Tetrault v. Ghibellini (1944),
{¶ 46} The third assignment of error is sustained.
No attendant circumstances were present
{¶ 47} “As a corollary to the open-and-obvious doctrine, we have recognized that there may be attendant circumstances [that] divert the individual’s attention from [a] hazard and excuse her failure to observe it.” (Citation omitted.) Olivier,
{¶ 48} Circumstances that are attendant “would come to the attention of the reasonable [person] * * * and reducе the degree of care that an ordinary person would exercise.” Huey v. Neal,
{¶ 49} The second assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶ 50} Overruling the second assignment of error but sustaining the first and third assignments of error, the trial court’s order granting the Millers’ summary judgment is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. The Millers have filed a motion to strike Hissong's references to deposition testimony other than her own. Because our decision does not rely on testimony other than Hissong’s, the issue raised in the motion need not be decided. The motion to strike will be overruled.
. The attorney taking Hissong's deposition described the distance as "about from your fingertips to your elbow.”
. “The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of Ohio's open and obvious rule where multiple issues of fact existed and where reasonable minds could conclude that the hazard was not open and obvious.”
. "The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of Ohio's step-in-the-dark rule, where multiple issues of fact existed and reasonable minds could conclude that plaintiff had not stepped into the dark within the meaning of that rule.”
. “The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the basis of Ohio’s open and obvious rule where attendant circumstances were present, thus obviating the rule.’’