90 Me. 395 | Me. | 1897
Bill in equity praying an injunction against the use by defendant of the words “Poland Springs” and “Poland Springs
This cause was set down for hearing generally, and not specifically on the demurrer, after replication filed, and before the expiration of sixty days after issue joined. In the absence o£ agreement of parties, this could be done by complainant alone. The effect of this proceeding was to waive the replication, and set the cause for hearing on bill, answer and demurrer, the answer to be taken as true. Upon such hearing, the bill, answer and demurrer were all to be passed upon by the court. Dascomb v. Marston, 80 Maine, 230. Hearing was had by a single justice, and by him the demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed. The case conies here upon appeal from that decision and exceptions to the ruling. The appeal vacated the decree below. And the cause would now regularly be heard by this court upon the bill, the answer taken as true, and the demurrer contained in the answer; but as counsel have argued the demurrer alone, we confine our opinion to it.
The complainant owns a tract of land in Poland, upon which are two hotels; one known as the “Mansion House,” and the other as the “Poland Spring House,” with accommodations for over five hundred people in both houses. The bill alleges that upon said tract of land there is “ a spring of water known as the Poland Spring, which water is of great medicinal and commercial value and has been for upwards of thirty years. That it is widely sold throughout the United States and foreign countries.” “That it is of great value, both because of the patronage which it draws to said hotels, and because of its wide sale.” That it has been for many years sold “ under the name of Poland Spring water or Poland water, natural mineral spring water;” and that said name is of great value “as a trade-mark;” and that “by reason of the
The defendant operates a railroad running from Mechanic Falls to a point on the Maine Central railroad about three miles east of Danville Junction, and has upon its line a station at a point nearest to complainant’s property, and about two miles distant therefrom, which is named and called “Poland Springs;” and at its junction with the Maine Central, it has a station called “Poland Springs Junction.” The bill alleges that, at or near said station named “ Poland Springs,” there is no house, shop or settlement requiring the existence of said station.”
Complainants allege that the use of the words, “Poland Springs,” by defendant “to designate its station,” endangers their trade-mark in the name of “Poland Spring water;” and that water shipped from defendant’s station may be marked “Poland Spring water,” or “water from Poland Spring,” and sold in competition with complainants’ water. There is no allegation in the bill that this has been done, or is threatened to be done, by the defendant or any one else.
It may be conceded that the complainants have a trade-mark, as claimed; but it has not been infringed upon, nor threatened to be infringed upon, by the defendant. Defendant is a railroad company, chartered for the transportation of persons and merchandise, as a common carrier, and only for that. It would be ultra vires for it to enter upon the business of bottling, shipping and selling water, or to enter into any commercial birsiness, not necessary and incident to its business of common carrier. Until it does, or threatens to do this, the complainants are not injured, and have no cause for an injunction upon that ground. The cases cited by the learned counsel for complainants in his very able and instructive argument, in relation to trade-marks, have no application to the facts of this case.
Complainants allege that the name “ Poland Springs,” given to defendant’s station nearest complainants’, property, tends to deceive the public, and induce the belief that the station is at the com
The station is called “Poland Springs,” in the plural. The trade-mark claimed by complainants, is “Poland Spring,” indicating one only. The station name indicates the nearest approach by that railway to the mineral springs in Poland, not to any particular one.
The bill alleges that defendant has contracted with the Maine Central and Boston and Maine railroads, to sell tickets with coupons marked “Poland Springs;” and that the holders intending to visit complainants’ “hotel property” are misled thereby to suppose they are to be transported to complainants’ “hotel property;” and the complainant “ is greatly and peculiarly injured in its said' stage line and in its said hotel and spring water properties.” It is not claimed that defendant owns or manages any hotel, or threatens to do so, in competition with complainants’ hotels.
It would seem that a railroad, which carried guests four miles nearer complainants’ hotels than any other railroad, would benefit
But the gravamen of complainants’ bill, is that “ for many years a stage line, now owned by complainants, has been operated throughout the year from its said property to Danville Junction, on the line of the Maine Central and Grand Trunk Railways, receiving from said companies all passengers holding tickets with coupons entitling the holder to be transported by this stage line to plaintiffs’ property.” These tickets, with stage coupons, it is alleged, were issued by various railroads, presumably by arrangement with complainants; and thus the profitable transportation by stage was insured to the complainants. There is no allegation in the bill that the facilities for transportation from defendant’s station, named Poland Springs, to complainants’ hotel, are not ample and convenient. In the absence of such allegation, it is fair to presume that no complaint is made upon that ground by complainants or travelers visiting complainants’ hotels. It is admitted that the distance from defendant’s station to complainants’ hotels, is four miles less than by complainants’ stages from Danville Junction; and travelers can reach complainants’ hotels from defendant’s station, with much less fatigue than by complainants’ stages. Yet the complainants ask this court, sitting in equity, to aid it in deceiving travelers desiring to visit its hotels, into the belief that the only practicable approach thereto is by way of Dan-ville Junction, and thus secure to it the profits on six miles of stage transportation, as a gainful monopoly, although the traveler is thereby subjected to four miles of unnecessary stage ride, which to the aged, infirm or timid, is a serious inconvenience. The widely reputed medicinal quality of its water, naturally attracts to complainants’ hotels a large number of the weak and invalids who hope for benefit from its use. They should be freed, as far as practicable, from unnecessary annoyance'or fatigue on their journey thither.
The principle in Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 322, and kindred cases, does not apply. In that case the defendant was restrained
The fact that complainants for a series of years had run a stage line from Danville Junction to their hotels, affords no legal right to exclude another stage line over the same route; much less from another station upon another railroad to the same destination, so long as the new line is not represented in some way as that of complainants, and by this means a fraud is perpetrated upon the traveler, or the complainants.
The duty of the railway was accomplished when it furnished safe egress to its passengers at their terminal station, in the absence of special contract for farther transportation. If the passenger’s ticket contained a coupon for conveyance from the station to complainants’ hotel, the natural implication would be that the stage connection was controlled by the railway rather than by complainants. It is not charged that any representation, that this stage communication was that of complainants’, was made in fact; and no fraud, to the injury of complainants’ line, is shown to have been practiced.
It is inconceivable that travelers, familiar with the connection of the Maine Central and Grand Trunk railways at Danville Junction with a stage line to Poland Spring hotel, should suppose, when they alight from defendant’s road at its station “ Poland
The case stated by the bill does not entitle the complainants to the relief prayed for. The demurrer was rightly sustained.
Decree affirmed-, demurrer sustained.
Bill dismissed with additional costs.