Tаylor Ann Hinton was charged by accusation with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive (“DUI — less safe”). Following a bench trial, the trial court found her guilty of the charged offense. Hinton now appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction.
“On appeal from a criminal conviction that follows a bench trial, the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence, and we view the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s finding of guilt[.]” (Citation omitted.) Hickman v. State,
Around 11:50 p.m., the sergeant observed an orange BMW traveling toward him that appeared to be speeding. Based on his visual observation and laser speed detection device, the sergeant determined that the vehicle was traveling at 51 miles per hour in a posted 35 mile-per-hour zone.
The sergeant initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle pulled over but, in the process, drove onto the sidewalk. Once the vehicle stopped, the sergeant approached the driver, later identified as Hinton, who was 17 years old. During their initial encounter at the car window, the sergeant noticed an odor of alcohol coming from Hinton and asked her аbout it. Hinton denied having consumed any alcoholic beverages that night.
The sergeant had Hinton exit her vehicle so that he could perform a series of field sobriety tests. As he spoke with Hinton, the sergeant noticed that her speech was slurred. Hintоn claimed that she smelled of alcohol because someone had spilled a drink on her clothing, but the sergeant determined that the odor of alcohol was coming from her breath. The sergeant further noted that Hinton’s eyes were glassy and her pupils were dilated. When asked about her dilated pupils, Hinton claimed to be on medication but did not elaborate. Hinton also stated that she was nervous and felt like she was going to vomit.
At that point, the sergeant concluded, based on his training and years of experience, that Hinton was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that she was a less safe driver and placed her under arrest. After placing Hinton under arrest, the sergeant read her the Georgia implied consent warning for drivers under the age of 21. He requested that Hinton take a State-administered breath test, but she refused.
During a subsequent inventory search of the interior of Hinton’s vehicle, the sergeant discovered several unopened cans of beer in the car and one open can behind the passenger seat. There was spilled beer in the front cup holder, as well as spilled beer underneath the рassenger seat, consistent with Hinton having moved the open beer can from the cup holder to behind the passenger seat in an effort at concealment. No medications were found in the vehicle during the inventory search.
Hinton was chаrged by accusation with DUI — less safe, and she agreed to a bench trial. The sergeant who stopped Hinton and arrested her testified to his observations as set out above, and he also gave his opinion, based on his “experience and trаining and over 600 DUI arrests,” that she had been under the influence of alcohol that night. Hinton chose not to testify and did not present any evidence on her own behalf. After hearing from the sergeant, the trial court found Hinton guilty, leading to this appeal.
In her sоle enumeration of error, Hinton contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction for DUI — less safe. In reviewing a conviction for evidence sufficiency, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but instead construe the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict. Sheehan v. State,
OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) provides that “[a] person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while... [u]nder the influence of alcohol to the extent that it is less safe fоr the person to drive.” To sustain a conviction under this statutory provision, the State must prove that the defendant was “(1) driving, (2) under the influence of alcohol, (3) to the extent that it was less safe for the person to drive.” (Footnote omitted.) Jaffray v. State,
Hinton does nоt dispute that she was driving or that she was doing so in a manner less safe. Rather, her sole contention on appeal is that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was under the influence of alcohol. We are unpersuaded and instead conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found Hinton guilty of DUI — less safe beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia,
“The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.” OCGA § 24-4-8. Here, the sergeant testified regarding Hinton’s speeding and driving onto the sidewalk, the smell of alcohol on her breath, her argumentative and belligerent behavior toward him, her slurred speech, her watery eyes with dilated pupils, hеr failure of the HGN test, her refusal to submit to the alco-sensor breath test or to the State-administered
The sergeant’s testimony was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinton was under the influence of alcohol. See Corbin v. State,
Hinton, however, argues that her conviction must be reversed because the evidence presented by the State allegedly failed to exclude every alternative, reasonable hypothesis of her innocence. See OCGA § 24-4-6.
First, the reasonable hypothesis rulе applies only when all of the evidence against the defendant was circumstantial. See Meeks v. State,
Second, even if the evidence against Hinton had been entirely circumstantial, “it is well settled that DUI may be proved solely by circumstantial evidence.” (Punctuаtion and footnote omitted.) Jaffray,
Furthermore, where the defendant offers an explanation of circumstantial facts or an alternative hypothesis of events, the reasonableness of that explanation is for the factfinder. Becausе the factfinder has heard the witnesses and observed them testify, it is considered more capable of determining the reasonableness of the hypothesis produced by the evidence or lack thereof than is an appellate cоurt.
(Footnote omitted.) Wells v. State,
Nevertheless, Hinton emphasizes that during cross-examination, the sergeant conceded that dilated pupils can indicate that someone is under the influence of some type of drug, and he also conceded that there was a “50/50” chаnce, based on Hinton’s manifestations
For these reasons, contrary to Hinton’s argument, the limited concessions made by the sergeant on cross-examination did not render the verdiсt of guilty unsupportable as a matter of law. See O’Connell v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Hinton also was charged with and convicted of possession of an alcoholic beverage by an underage person, failure to obtain a Georgia driver’s license, speeding, and possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage. She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding these convictions. Additionally, Hinton was charged with but acquitted of reckless driving.
OCGA § 24-4-6 provides: “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”